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INTRODUCTION

Recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court have once again
sparked debate about the contours of the proper role for courts in the
American constitutional order. Indeed, some observers have been
willing to characterize the Supreme Court of the last decade as a 'judicial minimalist" one, in the sense that it decides "one case at a time"
and "leaves things undecided" in order to keep open more "breathing" space for democracy.' Others have remained profoundly skepti-

1
COURT

R. SUNSTEIN,
3-23 (1998).

CAss

ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
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Cal of that characterization, viewing many putatively "minimalist" cases
rather as obvious "wedge" decisions laying the groundwork for future
waves of "maximalist" activism. 2 In fact, several decisions in recent

years suggest that the skeptical view is a considerably more accurate
assessment of the current trend in decisionmaking on the Court.3 It is

certainly clear, at the very least, that the Court's last few terms have
been a disappointment to the reform proponents ofjudicial nonpartisanship and restraint.
Indeed, a large number of decisions in the last few terms on issues such as federalism, 4 congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment, 5 abortion, 6 religion, 7 free expression, 8 capital
punishment,9 and affirmative action 10 should be at least troubling to
any proponent of principled judicial restraint. Of course, the Court's
recent and highly controversial decision in Bush v. Gore, ruling five to
four in favor of ending recounts in the disputed 2000 presidential
election, has also been widely criticized as an extravagant, unprinci2

See, e.g.,

RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY

154 (1999). Among these "wedge" decisions, Posner includes Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620 (1996), and United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). Id.
3 For discussions of the 1999-2000 term, a notable low-point on the Court in
recent years, see Jeremy Rabkin, A Supreme Mess at the Supreme Court, THE WKLV. STANDARD, July 17, 2000, at 24; and Jeffrey Rosen, Pride and Prejudice,THE NEW REPUBLIC,
July 10 & 17, 2000, at 16, 16.
4 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free
School Zones Act as exceeding the scope of the Commerce Clause power of
Congress).
5 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as exceeding the scope of the Section Five, Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement power of Congress).
6 See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (invalidating a state restriction on partial-birth/dilation and extraction abortions).
7 See, e.g., Sante Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (invalidating
local school district's policy of allowing students to vote on whether to have an "invocation" at a high school football game and to vote on the person to deliver that
invocation).
8 See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (invalidating on freedom of expressive association grounds the application of a state anti-discrimination
statute forbidding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to the Boy Scouts
of America).
9 See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (2002) (holding that executions of
the mentally retarded are cruel and unusual punishments prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment).
10 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (subjecting a
federal affirmative action program using race-based presumptions to strict scrutiny
under the equal protection clause).

NOTRE

DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 78:1

pled, and partisan decision. 1 Notably, commentators across the political spectrum have criticized the Court in recent years for its general
"arrogance," "hubris," "contempt for the competing views of the political branches," and "strategic concern for [the Court's] own institutional prerogatives,"' 12 as well as for its displays of political "feuding,"
constituency-serving, results-oriented judging, excessive "partisan [ship]," and lack of "respect for the dignity and authority of the
law." 13
In light of the Court's tendency to engage in dubious exercises of
judicial power, scholarly concern about expansive judicial policymaking has also continued across the political spectrum. For instance, in
recent years Cass Sunstein has endorsed a mild form of judicial restraint, which he calls 'judicial minimalism";1 4 Judge Richard Posner
has advocated a moderate form ofjudicial restraint grounded in legal
pragmatism; 15 Jeffrey Rosen has also defended the virtues of a traditional form of judicial restraint; 16 and Mary Ann Glendon has advocated what she calls the "classical" model ofjudging, also a traditional
form ofjudicial restraint. 7 Additionally, other scholars have objected
to an expansive judicial role along other dimensions or aspects of the
judicial power. For instance, Hadley Arkes has opposed judicial
supremacy, endorsing instead a Lincolnian form of departmentalism;18 Robert P. George has rejected a conception of judicial
supremacy that requires the President and Congress to submit to "unconstitutional exercises of judicial power" by the Supreme Court that
11 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (invalidating judicially mandated recounts as
violation of Equal Protection Clause); seeJeffrey Rosen, Disgrace, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
Dec. 25, 2000, at 18; see also BUSH v. GORE: THE COURT CASES AND THE COMMENTARY
(E.J. Dionne Jr. & William Kristol eds., 2001) [hereinafter BUSH v. GORE]. Notably, a
number of "conservative" legal theorists and Bush supporters have been less than enthusiastic about the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore. See, e.g., Michael M. McConnell,
A Muddled Ruling, in BUSH v. GORE, supra, 289-92; Gary Rosen, Reconsidering"Bush v.
Gore", COMMENT., Nov. 2001, at 35. For an argument that prominent legal academics
responded to Bush v. Gore in a highly partisan and ideologically charged manner, see
Peter Berkowitz & Benjamin Wittes, The Professors and Bush v. Gore, WILSON Q., Autumn 2001, at 76.
12 See Rosen, supra note 3, at 12-13.
13 See Rabkin, supra note 3, at 24.
14 SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 3-14.
15 POSNER, supra note 2, at 154-55, 249-52.
16 Rosen, supra note 3; Rosen, supra note 11.
17 MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 111-73 (1994).
18 See, e.g., Hadley Arkes, Lincoln, Nietzsche, and the Constitution, FIRST THINGS, Apr.
1996, at 16 (criticizing judicial imperialism).
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are destructive of the "constitutional order";19 Jeremy Waldron has
voiced his opposition to judicial review as a practice inimical to individual participatory rights; 20 Mark Tushnet has advocated an amend2
ment to the Constitution to abolish the practice of judicial review; '
and Robert Bork has (at least briefly) supported an amendment granting Congress the power to override the Supreme Court's exercise of
judicial review. 22 It is evident, then, that both the question of the
proper judicial role in American government and the closely linked
constitutional imperative of robust representative democracy continue to be debated across the political spectrum and that various
forms of judicial restraint continue to engage the imagination of reform-minded scholars of both the political left and right. A reexamination of reform proposals designed to restrain judicial power is
therefore a very timely subject of inquiry.
Of course, the question of judicial overreach is scarcely a new
issue in American politics. Indeed, the question of the properjudicial
role dates back to the founding, as well as to the early Republic and
the clashes between Federalists and Anti-Federalists, 23 Hamiltonians
and Jeffersonians. 24 The role of the Supreme Court was also controversial during the Jacksonian era, 25 the years leading up to the Civil
War, 26 and during Reconstruction. 27 Moreover, democratic reform
19
20

Robert P. George, The Supreme Court 2000, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 2000, at 34.
SeeJeremy Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of ConstitutionalRights, 13 OXFORD J.

18 (1993) (discussing the conflict between a liberal conception of the
person that involves a commitment to participatory rights and judicial enforcement of
a bill of rights trumping participatory rights).
LEGAL STUD.

21

See MARK

TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS

174-76

(1999).
22

ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING ToWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND

AMERICAN DECLINE 117

(1996). Bork has since retracted this position on the grounds

that it would not work effectively in actual practice. See Robert H. Bork, Foreword to
MAX BOOT, OUT OF ORDER: ARROGANCE, CORRUPTION, AND INCOMPETENCE ON THE

(1998).
See, e.g., BERNARD ScHwARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 3-14 (1993);
THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); Brutus, Essays of Brutus, in THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: WRITINGS BY THE OPPONENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION 103, 164-65 (Herbert
J. Storing ed., 1985).
24 See, e.g., ROBERT G. MCCLOsKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 16-34 (2d ed.
BENCH v-xiv

23

1994); SCHWARTZ, supra note 23, at 15-68; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAw

122-23 (1973).

25 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 23, at 70-72; AndrewJackson, Bank Veto Message, in 1
GREAT ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1765-1865, at 291-96 (Richard Hofstadter ed.,
1958) [hereinafter GREAT ISSUES].

26 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); Abraham Lincoln,
First InauguralAddress, in GREAT ISSUES, supra note 25, at 389-97; see also MCCLOSKEY,
supra note 24, at 70-74; SCHWARTZ, supra note 23, at 109-24.
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movements championing the participatory rights of ordinary Americans have made the elite judicial "usurpation" of democratic authority
a regular part of our political discourse since the turn of the last century, when the state and federal courts first began to exercise the
power of judicial review routinely and aggressively. 28 For instance,
both the populist and progressive reform movements, faced with the
reactionary and imperialist judiciary of the Lochner era, advocated a
number of reform proposals-including a number of constitutional
amendment proposals-to limit the Court's capacity to exceed its authority in violation of the political rights of American citizens. 29 In
the post-World War II era, the Court's use of highly expansive judicial
power in the area of civil liberties has also been seriously questioned
by scholars from both the left and right. 30 Additionally, the Supreme
Court's very active federalism jurisprudence in the last decade has
come under fire from many scholars.3 1 It should be clear, then, that a
constitutional question such as the proper scope of judicial power,
which has been such a perennial subject of debate for a century or
more, is likely to remain one of continuing interest indefinitely. A
reexamination of reform proposals designed to restrain judicial power
is thus not only of current interest but is also certain to continue to
remain of interest to scholars and jurists for the foreseeable future.
While this Article is chiefly concerned with the question of restraining judicial power through the use of constitutional amendment, its foundations require a discussion of such overlapping
constitutional questions as judicial interpretive theory, the proper
scope of judicial power, and the best structural interpretation of the
role of the Supreme Court in the republican governmental framework
of the American constitutional design.3 2 This Article approaches
27 See MCCLOSKEY, supra note 24, at 70-74; SCHWARTZ, supra note 23, at 138-44,
154-55.
28 See MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 336-37 (1986). See generally WILLIAM G. Ross, A MUTED
FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURT, 1890-1937
(1994) (discussing movements attacking the courts).

29 See infra Part II.C.
30 See supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text; see also infra Part II.
31 See, e.g.,
Peter M. Shane, Federalism's "Old Deal": What's Right and Wrong with
ConservativeJudicialActivism, 45 VILL. L. REV. 201 (2000); Louise Weinberg, Fear and
Federalism, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 1295 (1997); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 707
(1999) (Souter, J., dissenting).
32 For discussion of this cluster of questions, see, for example, Jack Wade Nowlin,
The ConstitutionalIllegitimacy of ExpansiveJudicialPower: A Populist StructuralInterpretive
Analysis, 89 Ky. LJ. 387 (2001) [hereinafter Nowlin, Constitutional Illegitimacy]; Jack
Wade Nowlin, The Constitutional Limits ofJudicial Review: A Structural Interpretive Ap-
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these questions from a moderate judicial restraint standpoint, 33 and
from an innovative theoretical perspective that views the question of
the proper judicial role as essentially a question of structural constitutional interpretation.3 4 Thus, this Article is concerned with the perennial problem ofjudicial overreach as a "structural" problem in light of
the logic of judicial review and the fundamental structural principles
of the American constitutional design that expansive judicial power
erodes. 35 Indeed, the problem posed by expansive judicial power is
fundamentally one of constitutional structure, and therefore also one
of structural constitutional interpretation, given the implications of
expansive judicial power on popular sovereignty, representative de36
mocracy, the separation of powers, and federalism.
Responding to these concerns, reform movements over the years
have sought to shape and limit judicial power in several ways. Judicial
"mistakes" about the meaning of the Constitution have typically provoked a number of remedial responses, involving a general "debate,
litigate, legislate" strategy intended to bring the issue before the Court
a second time in the hope of correction. 3 7 More far-reaching concerns about judicial (mis)conduct have usually involved a concentration on a broader long-term "nominate" strategy, involving support
for the appointment of "restraint" reform judges to the federal
bench.3 8 There is, however, good reason to question whether even a
quite diverse strategy-involving debate, litigation, legislation, and
nomination of judges committed to judicial restraint-will ultimately
be successful in keeping the judicial power within constitutional limproach, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 521 (1999) [hereinafter Nowlin, Constitutional Limits]; and
Jack Wade Nowlin, NaturalLaw, the Constitution, andJudicialMoralExpertise-An Epistemic Analysis, VERA LEX: J. INT'L NAT. L. Soc'v, Winter 2001, at 71 [hereinafter Nowlin,
Natural Law].
33 See infra Part II.B.
34 See Nowlin, ConstitutionalIllegitimacy, supra note 32.
35 For a comprehensive examination of these constitutional questions from ajudicial restraint perspective, see GEORGE W. CAREY, IN DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTION
122-38 (rev. ed. 1995) [hereinafter CAREY, IN DEFENSE]; GEORGE W. CAREY, THE FEDERALIST: DESIGN FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC 128-53 (1989) [hereinafter CAREY,
FEDERALIST]; Nowlin, ConstitutionalIllegitimacy, supra note 32, at 396-99; and Nowlin,
ConstitutionalLimits, supra note 32, at 529-40, 546-53.
36 Nowlin, ConstitutionalLimits, supra note 32, at 396-97.
37 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, What Do You Do When the Supreme Court Is Wrong?,
PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1979, at 3, 8.
38 See, e.g., 2000 Republican Party Platform, infra note 393 (noting that "the most
important factor" in restraining judicial power to "restore the separation of powers

and reestablish a government of law" is "the appointing power of the presidency").
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Indeed, something very like the problem of contemporary expansive judicial power has been a perennial cause for concern among
reformers for over a century, at least since the 1880s and the rise of
the Lochner era. 40 There is some reason, then, to consider whether
advocating a more directly structural and systemic response-such as
a structural amendment to the Constitution, as a more fundamental
and far-reaching remedy for such a serious, intractable, and likely systemic structural problem-would be a beneficial course of action.
Moreover, it is quite possible that even a mere amendment proposal
itself could have a significant political and educative effect that would
complement and enhance existing reform efforts, substantially in41
creasing their overall effectiveness.
This Article, then, will address the historically progressive reform
project of using constitutional amendment to minimize the scope of
the judicial power. The purpose of this reform project is to restore
the traditional republican design of the Constitution and also better
fulfill the populist aspirations of the evolving American political and
constitutional tradition. 4 2 This latter goal involves not only re39 See TuSHNET, supra note 21, at 174-76 (noting that amending the Constitution
is the only effective strategy in addressing the problem ofjudicial power); BORK, supra
note 22, at 117.
40 KAMMEN, supra note 28, at 185-216.
41 See UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (David E.
Kyvig ed., 2000) [hereinafter UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES].
42 The term "populist" in this Article is used to refer both to the principle of
popular sovereignty as the proper foundation of government, and a very robust "populist" or majoritarian form of representative democracy as the proper form of government. The term "populist constitutional law" is used here largely to refer to a
structural-proceduralunderstanding of constitutional law where courts play a very limited role in substantive policymaking on basic questions ofjustice and a highly significant but not exclusive role in more restrained and "legalistic" forms of constitutional
interpretation. Thus, populist constitutional law as defined here also envisions a
much greater role for the American people and their elected representatives in the
resolution of basic questions of justice and the common good, and it also contemplates a somewhat more significant role for political actors in constitutional interpretation, such as the popular/political/extra-judicial resolution of the constitutional
limits of the judicial power and Congressional interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment via its section five enforcement power. This view of populist constitutional law is similar to, but less extreme than, that of Mark Tushnet. See TUSHNET,
supra note 21, at 177-94 (advocating a structural-procedural version of the of the kind
of populist constitutional law advocated here, one entirely rejecting judicial review of
constitutional questions). For a discussion of "thin" populism of the kind endorsed
by Tushnet and by this Article and its relation to a "thick(er)" conception of populism
identified with actual populist movements in American history, see Mark A. Graber,
Thick and Thin: InterdisciplinayConversations on Populism, Law, PoliticalScience, and Constitutional Change, 90 GEO. LJ. 233 (2001). For a comparison of constitutional popu-
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straining judicial power but also revitalizing the traditional and once
robust practice of populist/extra-judicial forms of debate about constitutional meaning. 43 In light of these reform goals, this Article engages the following principal issues. First, what kind of structural
amendment would most effectively restrain judicial power and promote forms of constitutional populism? Second, what kind would
have the greatest likelihood of ratification? And third, what kind
would maximize its political and educative impact, furthering diverse
reform efforts, even as a simple proposal? 44 The last of these three
considerations is at least as important as the first two considerations,
given the small probability that any amendment will actually be formally proposed by Congress or ratified by the states.
lism and progressivism, see J. M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional
Categories, 104 YALE L.J. 1935 (1995) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND
THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993)). One can compare this structural-procedural
form of constitutional populism as it relates to the judicial role, with closely related
"populist" representation reinforcement approaches to constitutional interpretation.
See, e.g.,
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

(1980) (advocating ajudicial interpretive theory entailing reinforcement of the representative democratic process); RICHARD D. PARKER, HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE: A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST MANIFESTO (1994) (promoting a vision of populist constitutional
law to be enforced by courts to promote rather than impede majority rule). For the
impact of the evolving populist ethos on the structure of the Constitution, as originally written, and through the amendment process, see ELY, supra, at 88-101. One
can also compare these "populist/representation reinforcement" interpretive approaches with a populist "pedigree" interpretive methodology, and emphasize a requirement of a tight "fit" with legal materials evincing strong populist pedigrees such
as constitutional text, original understanding, and longstanding constitutional traditions. See Nowlin, Constitutional Illegitimacy, supra note 32, at 404-11. The robust
democratic imperative of "thin" constitutional populism also has important points of
commonality with civic republican communitarian approaches to constitutional law,
which also emphasize the centrality of self-government to a proper understanding of
freedom of the individual. This Article also endorses the civic republican project of
promoting popular civic virtue and suggests that the project be done in the area of
judicial power in part through the use of political and educative constitutional
amendment. See infra Parts II-1V. For a general discussion of civic republicanism in
the area of constitutional law, see Richard H. Fallon Jr., What Is Republicanism and Is It
Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1695 (1989). For an analysis of American constitutional and political thought emphasizing the civic republican traditions of the founding and the early Republic, see MICHAELJ. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT (1996).
For a discussion of the relationship of (thicker) contemporary conceptions of populism to communitarianism, see CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES AND
THE BETRAYAL OF DEMOCRACY 92-114 (1995).
43

On the history and methodology of extra-judicial constitutional interpretation,
E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND

see KEITH

CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING

44

See infra Part IV.C.3.

(1999).
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Three of the more common reform amendment proposals-each
with an extensive historical pedigree dating back to earlier reform
movements-involve establishing (1) a congressional override or
"veto" of the Supreme Court; (2) electoral controls, such as a recall
election, on the Justices; and (3) a requirement of a supermajority
vote (of perhaps six or seven) of the Justices to strike down a law as a
constitutional violation. 45 A fourth, more recent proposal by Mark
Tushnet, is an amendment which abolishes judicial review by declaring the Constitution non-justiciable. 46 Each of these proposals has
something to be said for it, but this Article will ultimately advocate
another very different approach-an amendment that uses the original structural understanding of the Bill of Rights as a model for constitutional reform.
In brief, the Founders' original understanding of the Bill of
Rights is that of a document (1) heavily structural in substance, echoing the great design themes of the Philadelphia Constitution-popular sovereignty, representative democracy, federalism, and the
separation of powers; (2) largely declaratory in its structural effect,
clarifying and reinforcing those existing design themes rather than
involving a substantive alteration in the constitutional architecture;
(3) primarily political in its immediate effect, empowering in the political arena constitutional objections to governmental acts in violation
of the Bill of Rights; and (4) principally educative in its long-term
effects, fostering a national political culture which would cherish and
guard the rights and rights-driven structural principles articulated in
the Bill of Rights. 47 As shall be shown, the founding generation

placed a very high value on constitutional structure as a prirhary
means of preserving rights, and it also strongly supported the solemn
and formal expression of principles of free government in constitutive
documents as a means of shaping political debate and culture, providing rights whose ultimate security lay in a representative form of government and longstanding and deeply rooted popular support.
Thus, while reform movements as various as the Reconstruction
Republicans, the populists, the progressives, New Dealers, and the
contemporary judicial-restraint left and right have suggested several
possible amendment proposals to limit judicial power, this Article advocates a fundamentally new approach-one that finds its inspiration
in the constitutional theory and practice of the founding generation,
45
46

See infra Part I.C.
See TUSHNET, supra note 21, at 174-76 (discussing these constitutional amend-

ment proposals).
47

See infra Part III.
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as evinced by the Virginia Declaration of Rights, the Declaration of
Independence, the Philadelphia Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and
the Eleventh Amendment. This new approach-from a traditional
perspective-involves the use of a judicial restraint amendment with
distinctive characteristics and effects. First, the amendment would be
structural in its focus, emphasizing that structural constitutional
norms such as popular sovereignty, representative democracy, the separation of powers, and federalism mandate judicial restraint as a matter of constitutional limits on the judicial power. Second, the
amendment would be declaratory of the implicit pre-existing constitutional design, properly interpreted, rather than a structurally innovative proposal for altering the constitutional design. Third, the
amendment would be political in its immediate and day-to-day effect,
shaping American political discourse and sharpening political objections to highly expansive judicial power as a violation of constitutional
structure. And finally, the amendment would be educative in its longterm effects, ultimately shaping American political culture on the
question of the judicial power and promoting a civic culture that recognizes the constitutional imperative of judicial restraint and places a
high value on robust understandings of structural norms such as representative democracy. This proposal is both more moderate in its
effect on the judicial power and better grounded in the architectonic
design of the Constitution and the evolving American constitutional
tradition than are other contemporary reform proposals. It also will
effectively promote judicial restraint because it is directed, as a political and educative matter, precisely at fostering a proper popular understanding of the root of the controversy over judicial power-the
existence and the enforcement of the constitutional limits on the Supreme Court.
This Article, then, advocates a judicial restraint amendment as a
fundamental and far-reaching structural response to what is in fact a
serious, intractable, and troubling problem of constitutional structure, as well as a complement to diverse reform efforts involving a
"debate, litigate, legislate" and a judicial restraint appointment or
"nominate" strategy. 4 8 This new approach is fundamental and farreaching because it functions in a crucial populist educative and political manner, by promoting politically structural constitutional
objections to expansive judicial power and ultimately by instilling a
better understanding of the structure of the American constitutional
design in the national sentiment. These important political and edu48 For an example of how such an amendment might be drafted, see infra Part
IV.B.
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cative effects in turn will strongly encourage both judicial self-restraint
and the moderate use of checks on the judiciary, as well as other various reform efforts by the political branches and through the political
process. The amendment will therefore greatly facilitate a diverse
range of reform efforts in the area of the judicial power while still
preserving the legitimate and important functions of the judiciary. Indeed, in light of the clear elite dominance of the judicial process, use
of a broader political and educative measure to promote constitutional objections to expansive judicial power and to foster a political
climate that strongly empowers diverse judicial restraint reform efforts
may be the most practical way to enforce limits on the Supreme Court
without seriously altering the constitutional design or impeding the
legitimate exercise of judicial power.
Part II of this Article will discuss the concerns of reformers in the
area of judicial power and the question of the constitutional limits of
judicial review, which an amendment proposal could clarify. Part III
will discuss the necessity and value of an amendment proposal as a
general reform strategy and examine several prominent proposals and
their historical pedigrees. Part IV will examine the original populist
reform "spirit" of the Bill of Rights-the Founders' constitutional theory and practice-as a model for constitutional reform, examining
the Bill of Rights and a series of related founding-era constitutional
measures. Part V will examine and evaluate the concept of a judicial
restraint amendment and will put forth and evaluate a specific amendment proposal: the Constitutional Rights Restoration Amendment.
I.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

A. Judicial Review in the American ConstitutionalDesign
The fundamental assumption underlying this Article, but one
which will not be defended here in any detail, is that there is what one
may call a structural constitutional objection to the sort of highly expansive judicial power often asserted by Justices such as William Brennan, 49 defended by theorists such as Ronald Dworkin, 50 and used to
49

See, e.g., WilliamJ. Brennan,Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary

Ratification, in

INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT

23 passim (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990).
50

See RONALD

DWORKIN,

A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE

(1985);

RONALD DWORKIN, FREE-

DOM'S LAw: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996) [hereinafter
DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW]; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE

(1986);

RONALD DWOR-

KIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA AND INDIVIDUAL
FREEDOM

(1993);

RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

(1977).
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support constitutional decisions such as Roe v. Wade,5' Lochner v. New
York, 52 and Dred Scott v. Sandford,53 among others. 54 This expansive or
51
52
53

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).

54 Notably, Brown v. Board of Education, 437 U.S. 483 (1954), attacked by segregationists at the time as insufficiently supported by legal materials and a usurpation of
state legislative authority, is in fact not an exercise of highly expansive judicial power
and has a much better grounding in traditional legal materials than is often recognized. While space constraints preclude a full discussion, a few points are worth making here. First, the specific purpose of the Reconstruction Amendments was to
protect African-Americans from hostile state legislation, and the Court's holding in
Brown falls squarely within that purpose defined at a fairly specific level of generality.
See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 303 (1880) (observing that the Fourteenth Amendment is "one of a series of constitutional provisions have a common
purpose; namely, to secure to a recently emancipated race, which had been held in
slavery through many generations, all the civil rights that the superior race enjoys").
Even the Plessy Court acknowledged that "[t]he object of the [Fourteenth]
[A]mendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races
before the law . . . ." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896). Second, as also
noted by the Brown Court at the time and by scholars today, the view that public
school and other forms of "social" segregation are unconstitutional was within the
range of original understandings of the Equal Protection Clause, though that may not
have been the predominant understanding. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 489 ("The most
avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove
all legal distinctions among 'all persons born or naturalized in the United States."');
Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947
(1995) (contending that the prohibition of school segregation under the Equal Protection Clause is consistent with the original understanding of the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment). Thus, the Court's decision in Brown has significant support in the range of original understandings of the Amendment. Third, even if one
were to accept the Plessy Court's apparent distinction between protected civil (presumably civil-economic) and political rights and unprotected "social" rights, the rise
of modern public education and its importance to economic success and political
participation, as the Court's analysis in Brown demonstrates, warrants treating school
attendance as a protected civil and political right rather than an unprotected "social"
right. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. In fact, more broadly the "social" forms of segregation imposed by state governments prior to Brown and its progeny had the clear purpose and effect of limiting the exercise of civil-economic and political rights by
African-Americans, rights which even the Plessy Court recognized as protected by the
Reconstruction Amendments. Thus, even if one were to accept the Plessy Court's view
that "social" segregation is not in itself prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment
directly, "social" segregation's purpose with respect to and impact on uncontestedly
protected constitutional rights warrants its invalidation as a form of indirect prohibited civil/political discrimination. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242
(1976) (holding that discriminatory purpose in combination with discriminatory effects establish sufficient discrimination to trigger heightened scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause). Further, even if the "separate but equal" standard under
the Equal Protection Clause, solidified in Plessy's progeny, is thought to have signifi-
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"activist" conception of the judicial role is one that is non-deferential,
does not require that decisions be strongly grounded in traditional
legal materials, allows judges to exercise a substantial amount of political discretion in determining the meaning of the Constitution, and
accepts, even celebrates, judicial policymaking in areas of political importance and controversy. 55 The structural problem with this view of
the judicial function, most simply put, is its incompatibility both with
(1) the essential structural logic of judicial review as expressed in
traditional and authoritative sources as FederalistNo. 7856 and Marbury
v. Madison57 and (2) the best understandings of fundamental structural constitutional principles such as popular sovereignty, representative democracy, civic republicanism, federalism, and the separation of
powers. 58 Thus, expansive judicial power is inimical to both the structural logic of judicial review and the basic structural features of the
constitutional design.
While space constraints prevent a careful elaboration of these
points in this Article, a few observations will be helpful in clarifying
them. First, the basic logic of judicial review is widely understood as
being linked to the judiciary's function as interpreter of law and the
nature of the Constitution as law-not the putative higher quality of
the judiciary's moral-political judgments and/or the nature of the
Constitution as a set of evolving moral-political aspirations. 59 There is
simply no obvious reason to endorse final judicial resolution of constitutional questions if those questions largely pivot on moral-political
cant support in traditional legal materials, the Court in Brown was still plainly right in
holding that such "separation" in practice is inherently unequal as a simple empirical
matter. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95; see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 82-83 (1990). In short, then, the
Court's conclusion in Brown that public school segregation is unconstitutional, while
not a highly restrained legal judgment, is also not highly activist, but rather it is a
conclusion that has substantial support in traditional legal materials. Thus, it should
not be viewed as suspect on judicial power grounds.
55 Nowlin, ConstitutionalIllegitimacy, supra note 32, at 435.
56 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 432 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1999) ("The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the
courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by judges as, a fundamental
law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning .....
57 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
58 See CAREY, IN DEFENSE, supra note 35, at 123-36; CAREY, FEDERALIST, supra note
35, at 138-53; GLENDON, supra note 17, at 117, 122-23, 159; Nowlin, Constitutional
Illegitimacy, supra note 32, at 394, 474-75; Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil,
57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989).
59 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177; see THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander
Hamilton).
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rather than legal-historical judgments. 60 This fact is strongly suggestive of a more narrow, apolitical, and legalistic understanding ofjudicial review. 61 Therefore an exercise of the judicial power which pivots
primarily on the Justices' broad moral-political views rather than their
narrower legal-historical judgment is not an exercise consistent with
the logic of the structural choice of judicial review.
Second, a sweeping lawmaking role for the unelected federal judiciary is ultimately incompatible with robust conceptions of other
constitutional principles of fundamental importance, including popular sovereignty, representative democracy, separation of powers, and
federalism, suggesting, again, the constitutional necessity of a more
restrained, and much less aggressively political, judicial role. 62 Indeed, a court engaging in (quasi-)legislative activity-rather than an
elected bicameral legislature subject to executive veto-plainly erodes
the constitutional principles of representative democracy, the separation of powers, bicameralism, and presentment. 63 In short, expansive
judicial power defeats the obvious purposes of the constitutional design, including that of making political power generally accountable
to the people and broadly diffusing it across a range of institutions.
Indeed, there is little purpose in setting up elaborate constitutional
architecture featuring strict constitutional requirements for formal
60 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 58, at 854 ("Central to [the analysis in Marbury]
is the perception that the Constitution, though it has an effect superior to other laws,
is in its nature the sort of 'law' that is the business of the courts-an enactment that
has a fixed meaning ascertainable through the usual devices familiar to those learned
in law.")
61 A legalistic role for the Court is compatible with a broad range of interpretative approaches to constitutional meaning, as long as judicial political discretion is
limited, a "tight" fit with legal materials is maintained, judicial discretion is minimized, and judicial review is exercised with due deference to authority of legislative
bodies as policymaking institutions. On the "modalities" of legal interpretation, see
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 11-22 (1990).
62 See, e.g., CAREY, IN DEFENSE, supra note 35, at 123-33; ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITIcs 65-79, 186-92 (1989) (criticizing anti-democratic judicial "quasiguardianship" as a governmental structure); ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF FEDERALISM (2001) (contending that the Court has been a vehicle of radical centralization undermining the fundamental constitutional principle of federalism); SANDEL,
supra note 42, at 3-119 (discussing the displacement of the civic republican/communitarian understanding of the American Constitution by the "procedural republic/
liberal individual conception" in the mid-twentieth century). See generally Waldron,
supra note 20 (discussing the tension between representative democracy and judicial
review); Michael Walzer, Philosophy andDemocracy, 9 POL. THEORY 379 (1981) (discussing the tension between judicial review and democracy and endorsing a form ofjudicial restraint, as opposed to the rule of "philosopher judges").
63 Nowlin, ConstitutionalIllegitimacy, supra note 32, at 398.
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constitutional amendment and the exercise of legislative authority, if
the judicial arm of the government may simply circumvent both these
sets of strictures at will, making social policy by engaging in highly
creative and politically driven "interpretations" of abstract constitu64
tional provisions.
For instance, if the meaning of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel or unusual punishments" 65 was thought to pivot on a
66
broad inquiry into the moral philosophy of crime and punishment
rather than on a narrow inquiry into traditional legal materials such as
text, original understanding, legal traditions, and predominant state
practice, there would be no obvious structural reason to assign final
interpretive authority to the Supreme Court rather than to Congress. 67 On this understanding of constitutional interpretation, judicial constitutional review of the provision simply has no special logical
68
force as a deduction from the structure of the constitutional design.
This is a very telling point, given that the text of the Constitution does
not expressly grant the power of judicial review to the Supreme
Court 69 and that power rests precisely upon such a structure-based

deduction. 70 Moreover, as noted, such an assignment of political
power to the courts also undermines the basic populist-federal-republican design of the Constitution, allowing for what are in effect judicial constitutional amendments and/or politically discretionary (i.e.,
legislative) control by the judiciary of the punishment aspect of the
substantive criminal law. 71 Notably, then, this expansive judicial
power would be exercised by simple majority vote of as few as five
Justices who are unelected and electorally unaccountable. Clearly
64 Notably, scholars who both support and oppose expansive judicial power recognize that the Founders had no intent or expectation that the Supreme Court would
engage in global policymaking. See, e.g.,
RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 322-36 (2d ed. 1997) (opposing expansive judicial power and noting that "the judiciary was excluded from policymaking" by the Founders); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 243
(1999) (defending expansive judicial power while acknowledging the "historical
truth" of the proposition that "the Framers did not intend the Court to act as a constitutional convention or to shape public policies by interpreting the Constitution").
65 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
66 Cf DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 50, at 149 (advocating "a
fusion of constitutional law and moral theory").
67 See, e.g.,
Scalia, supra note 58, at 854.
68

Id.

69 See U.S. CONST. art. III.
70 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803);
78 (Alexander Hamilton).
71 Nowlin, ConstitutionalIllegitimacy, supra note 32, at 398.
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both the amending power and general legislative power, in accordance with the constitutional design, must be exercised by the governments of the states and by the Congress.
Therefore, as has been argued elsewhere, support for expansive
judicial power is rooted in a basic misreading or misinterpretation of
the structural nature of the American constitutional design. 7 2 Indeed,
highly authoritative basic sources of law, such as constitutional text,
original understanding, early constitutional practice, and evolving
consensus-based practice confirm this judgment as to the meaning of
the Constitution. 73 Even a broader, "moral" reading of the Constitution's design for government, one drawing openly on more controversial moral-political arguments, is unlikely to support convincingly a
sweeping, quasi-legislative role for unelected federal judges, given, at
the very least, the great moral-political value of representative
74
democracy.
In particular, there is no good reason to suppose either that
judges' moral judgments are generally more trustworthy than those of
legislators and voters or that the Court, the decisions of which are
often marked by partisanship, power politics, and pragmatism, is some
special "forum of principle" with special insight into difficult moral
questions. 75 Furthermore, shifting political authority from represen72

Id. at 472-74; see also Robert P. George, Natural Law, the Constitution, and the

Theory and Practice ofJudicialReview, 69 FoRDlAM L. REv. 2269, 2280 (2001) (rejecting
the view that the structure of the Constitution, properly interpreted, "confer[s] upon
judges the power to enforce their views of natural law and natural rights, even in the
absence of textual or historical warrant for their views").
73 See Nowlin, ConstitutionalIllegitimacy, supra note 32 (arguing that an interpretation of the structure of the Constitution to determine the proper constitutional limits
of the judicial power should be rooted firmly in sources of law with strong popular
sovereignty pedigrees and that such a "populist" structural interpretation of the constitutional design establishes the constitutional illegitimacy of expansive judicial
power).
74 Nowlin, Constitutional Limits, supra note 32, at 561-62; Nowlin, Natural Law,
supra note 32, at 171.
75 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson observe, "Without much more empirical analysis than anyone has yet undertaken, no one can say, even if the contrast exists
in some form, whether either the motives or the decisions of legislators are more or
less principled than the motives or decisions of judges." Amy GUTMANN & DENNIS
THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND

DISAGREEMENT:

WHY MORAL

CONFLICTS CANNOT

BE

46 (1996). Even Ronald
Dworkin has admitted that the moral insights of judges often do not seem "spectactularly special." DwoRKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 50, at 74; see also Nowlin, Natural
Law, supra note 32, 111-13 (concluding that there is no firm or clear connection
between the putative institutional advantages of courts in moral reasoning and the
generation of superior moral conclusions because of the extent to which largely "unreasoned" moral intuitions shape our moral reasoning and determine our general
AVOIDED IN POLITICS, AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT
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tative institutions to the judiciary over the long run simply dilutes the
political influence of ordinary Americans, including working families,
the poor, racial minorities, and religious minorities while increasing
the political power of elite, upper-middle class professionals who dominate the legal profession as judges, lawyers, and legal scholars. 76
Moreover, there is good reason to believe that differences in social
class are strongly correlated to differences in political views on a range
of important issues, suggesting that the political consequences of expansive judicial power are significant and to the detriment of ordinary
Americans. 77 Finally, there is little enough reason to hope for a consistent policy of noblesse oblige in this area from political elites, even
if such a position were not repugnant to the participatory rights of
American citizens in all walks of life, and even if it were not premised
upon their putative comparative incapacity for self-government. 78
Therefore an interpretation of the structure of the Constitution granting highly expansive power to the Supreme Court is neither properly
moral conclusions on the issues which actually divide contemporary America); cf
Michael S. Moore, Justifying the Natural Law Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation, 69
FoRDHAM L. REV. 2087 (2001) (discussing the institutional advantages of judicial
moral reasoning in comparison to legislative moral reasoning). For a comprehensive
discussion of the institutional capacity question as it relates to legislatures, see
TUSHNET, supra note 21, at 54-71.
76 As John Hart Ely has observed,
[T]here [is] a systematic bias in judicial choice of fundamental values, unsurprisingly in favor of the values of upper-middle, professional class from
which most lawyers and judges, and for that matter most moral philosophers, are
drawn. People understandably think that what is most important to them is
what is important, and people like us are no exception. Thus the list of
values the Court and commentators have tended to enshrine as fundamental
is a list with which readers of this book will have little trouble identifying:
expression, association, education, academic freedom, the privacy of the
home, personal autonomy, even the right not to be locked in a stereotypically female sex role and supported by one's husband. But watch most fundamental-rights theorists start edging toward the door when someone
mentions jobs, food, or housing: those are important, sure, but they aren't
fundamental.
ELY, supra note 42, at 59 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).

77 See id.; see also STEVEN BRINT, IN AN AGE OF EXPERTS: THE CHANGING ROLE OF
PROFESSIONS IN POLITICS AND PUBLIC LIFE 81-103 (1994); CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE
TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN: PROGRESS AND ITS CRITICS 487-532 (1991).
78

Mary Ann Glendon maintains that the "[c]ommon [elite] attitude that the ed-

ucated are better equipped to govern the masses finds its institutional expression in a

disdain for ordinary politics and the legislative process, and a preference for extending the authority of courts, the branch of government to which [elites] have the
easiest access." MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCLOSURE 178 (1991); PARKER, supra note 42, at 54-60.
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grounded in traditional legal materials nor a morally attractive reading of the constitutional design.
The Constitutional Requirement ofJudicial Restraint

B.

This Article, then, assumes that the architecture of the republican Constitution, properly interpreted, protects individual liberties
primarily through the establishment of democratic institutions, the
diffusion and balancing of political power, and the cultivation of civic
virtue among the voters. 79 In this framework of government, the
unelected judges of the federal judiciary should play an importantbut by contemporary standards fairly minimal, modest, or restrained-supplementary role in the protection of individual rights.
This restrained role for judges complements rather than erodes the
fundamental republican structures of the Constitution. Thus, what
one may call the judicial restraint or republican understanding of the
American constitutional design envisages the proper exercise ofjudicial review as one that is firmly grounded in traditional legal materials,
that minimizes the political discretion of judges, that strives to be
apolitical, that shows considerable deference to the judgment of democratic political actors, and that results in a set of fairly "thin" and
consensus-based, judicially enforceable constitutional norms. 80 A
broad definition of restraint would also include those originalist
judges who justify judicial originalism primarily as a means of limiting
judicial discretion, adhering to the structural logic of judicial review,
and preserving the contours of the constitutional design.8 1 Under
CAREY, IN DEFENSE, supra note 35, at 3-17 passim; SANDEL, supra note
79 See, e.g.,
42, at 24-39.
80 See Nowlin, Constitutional Illegitimacy, supra note 32, at 394-96 passim.

81

See, e.g.,

ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND

37-47 (1998). There is also a real question whether "originalists" in the
fashion of Robert Bork or Antonin Scalia are truly proponents of a form of judicial
THE LAw

restraint. See

CHARLEs FRIED, ORDER AND LAW. ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION

56-70 (1991); SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 209-43 (1999); see also BORK,supra note 54,
at 153-55. Bork maintains that the originalist judicial role "corresponds to the original understanding of the place of courts in our republican form of government." Id.
at 153. In fact, Bork further contends,
No other method of constitutional adjudication can confine courts to a defined sphere of authority and thus prevent them from assuming powers
whose exercise alters, perhaps radically, the design of the American Republic. The philosophy of original understanding is thus a necessary inference
from the structure of government apparent on the face of the Constitution.

Id. at 155. Notably, originalist judges and Justices such as Antonin Scalia have often
been more activist in recent years than their rhetoric in the abstract would seem to
suggest. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Bush
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this structural understanding of the judicial power, greater discretionary political authority is exercised by voters and their elected representatives in accordance with constitutional norms of representation,
separation of powers, bicameralism, presentment to the executive,
and federalism. Less discretionary power, comparatively speaking, is
exercised by unelected federal judges given the strict limits placed
here on more aggressive forms of judicial review. This conception of
the constitutional design might then also be fairly called a populist,
republican, democratic, or federalist understanding. 8 2
Further, as noted, this is scarcely a new conception of the structure of the Constitution or of the proper judicial role therein. On the
contrary, it is rather a traditional model possessing a very distinguished and venerable judicial pedigree. Indeed, Mary Ann Glendon
has described this broad conception of the proper judicial role as the
"classical" conception of judging.8 3 It is a conception of the judicial
role that recognizes (at least implicitly) the important structural constitutional constraints on the judicial power and that therefore emphasizes the necessity of rendering deferential, non-ideological, and
non-partisan judicial decisions firmly grounded in traditional legal
materials.8 4 Some of the most obvious exemplars of this view of the
judicial role among American judges would include Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Learned Hand, Benjamin Cardozo, Felix Frankfurter, John
Marshall Harlan 111,85 and Byron White. 8 6 Admittedly, this is a very
broad prescription and one that is also ultimately aspirational in character, closely tied to the Constitution's republican past and its evolving
populist future. A number of more particular conceptions of the
proper judicial role fit within these broad 'judicial restraint" requirements. Even so, the central thrust of judicial restraint remains clear
and unambiguous: it is the effort to minimize aggressive, discretionary, judicial lawmaking in areas of political importance and
controversy.
v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Of particular concern here would be questions of the (in)consistent application of originalism,
the historical clarity of the "understanding" asserted as the "original" one, and the
question of changed underlying circumstances to the application of the original
understanding.
82 See Nowlin, ConstitutionalLimits, supra note 32, at 550-51.
83 GLENDON, supra note 17, at 117-29.

84
85

Id. at 391.
See id. at 111-29;

EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES

OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES

86 See DENNISJ.
(1998).

345 (expanded ed. 1988).

HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE

441-43
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Thus, it is an understanding of the proper judicial role well
within this broad conception of judicial restraint-the conception of
Holmes, Cardozo, Frankfurter, and Harlan-that this Article terms
'judicial restraint." This Article also maintains that this broad form of
judicial restraint is not only "good policy" or essential to the Court's
"legitimacy" in some political sense of the term but is actually required
by the structure of the Constitution.8 7 This constitutional requirement of judicial restraint is rooted in the structural imperative that
the Court adhere to the structural logic of judicial review and respect
the contours of fundamental constitutional values such as popular sovereignty, representative democracy, separation of powers, and federalism. In short, then, this Article maintains that highly expansive or
"activist" judicial power (far) exceeds the scope of the Supreme
Court's authority under Article III of the Constitution. Such expansive judicial power is incompatible with the logic ofjudicial review and
conflicts with core constitutional norms of the most fundamental importance. In sum, expansive judicial power may, itself, be fairly
deemed not only morally or politically objectionable, but constitution88
ally illegitimate or, stated more bluntly, unconstitutional.
C.

The Judicial Power and ConstitutionalIllegitimacy

Nor should the use of terms such as "constitutionally illegitimate"
or "unconstitutional" in this context be thought at all quixotic or inappropriate. While it is true that the discourse of "unconstitutionality" has generally not been favored in the context of debates about the
legitimate use of judicial interpretive methodologies and the proper
degree of judicial deference to elected officials,8 9 it is also true that
87 Nowlin, ConstitutionalIllegitimacy, supra note 32, at 472-74.
88 Id.
89 But see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 446 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that "[t]he Court therefore acts in plain violation of the Constitution when it denies effect" to an act of Congress without an assertion that the act
violates a constitutional provision rather than a judge-made prophylactic rule); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 521 (1965) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (contending that
"[t]he adoption of such a loose, flexible, uncontrolled standard for holding laws unconstitutional, if ever it is finally achieved, will amount to a great unconstitutionalshift
of power to the courts" (emphasis added)); CAREY, IN DEFENSE, supra note 35, at 136
(noting that by exercising expansive judicial power "the Court has itself violated the
manifest tenor of the Constitution"); Robert P. George, Natural Law and the Constitution Revisited, 70 FORDHAM L. Rav. 273, 274 (2001) (contending that the Supreme
Court "acted unconstitutionally in the 1856 decision of Dred Scott v. Sandford [and] in
the 1905 decision of Lochner v. New York" (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted));
George, supra note 19, at 34 (contending that a proper conception of judicial
supremacy does not require the executive and legislative branches to defer to "uncon-
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the use of the language of "(un)constitutionality" is analytically justified in discussions of the judicial power 9° and is expressly recognized
as such in a closely related area of debate over the proper scope of the
federal judicial power: the constitutional limits Article III places on

the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 91 Indeed, then, this recognition of constitutional limits on the federal judicial power is warranted
in the area of judicial interpretation and judicial deference as well as
in the area ofjurisdiction for a number of reasons. First, the Supreme
Court is a branch of the constitutionally limited national government,
stitutional exercises of the judicial power" which are "blatant and destructive of the
constitutional order"); see also Nowlin, ConstitutionalLimits, supra note 32, at 563 (asserting a tentative conclusion that "structural interpretive analysis of the role of courts
in the American constitutional design is suggestive of decided [implicit] constitutional limits on the exercise of judicial review" in favor of a more "traditional, lawyerly, and limited role for courts"); Nowlin, ConstitutionalIllegitimacy, supra note 32, at
394 (concluding that "expansive judicial power is ... constitutionallyillegitimate, that
such a conception of the judicial function exceeds the scope of power allocated to the
Supreme Court by the Constitution");Jack Wade Nowlin, A Dangerous Branch: Interpretation, Illegitimacy, andJudicial Constitutional Violations (article in progress; preliminary draft presented before the Annual Conference of the Southern Political
Science Association (Nov. 8, 2001)) (contending that "[t]he Supreme Court can violate the Constitution by exceeding the scope of its power under Article III") [hereinafter Nowlin, A Dangerous Branch]. Nowlin further contends that
sound and substantial structural objections to decisions of the Supreme
Court-those objections grounded in the concern that a particular exercise
of the judicial power undermines other important structural constitutional
norms such as representative democracy, the separation of powers, or federalism-are often better articulated in the language ofjudicial constitutional
violations [rather] than as mere interpretive criticism of the Court's
decisions.
Nowlin, A Dangerous Branch, supra, at 1-2.
90 See generally Nowlin, A Dangerous Branch (discussing judicial interpretive
methods, deference, and other aspects of the debate over judicial restraint and judicial activism).
91 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Article III lists the subject-matter jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court in terms of the nature or content of the litigation and the status of
the parties; it also mandates the "case" or "controversy" requirement; and it defines
the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Court. For a general discussion of these
constitutional limits on the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, see, for example, ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 49-178 (2d ed.
2002). Notably, the Eleventh Amendment also places a constitutional limit on the
federal jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. See CHEMERNSKY, supra, at 178-228; see
also infra Part III.D. More controversially, the Supreme Court in recent years has recognized additional constitutional limits on the federal judicial power arising from the
federal structure of the Constitution and the federalist retention of sovereign immunity by the state governments in the absence of a congressional abrogation of that
immunity under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Seminole Tribe of
Fl. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 46 (1996).
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and there is no reason to suppose that the Court's power is unlimited
by the Constitution or that the Court is somehow institutionally incapable of exceeding the constitutional limits on its power. In fact, even
a moment's reflection demonstrates that the Supreme Court is a creature of the Constitution, that its only source of authority is the Constitution, and that the scope of its power is clearly limited by the
Constitution-just as are the powers of the President and the Congress. 9 2 Certainly if the legislative or executive branches may act unconstitutionally by exceeding the scope of their constitutional
authority and/or by violating constitutional norms related to, say, representative democracy, federalism, or the separation of powers, surely
the judicial branch may contravene the national charter in a similar
manner. 93 Notably, Article III, the text of which expressly grants the
Supreme Court the 'judicial power," also contains express textual constitutional limits on the judicial branch, 9 4 which are expressly recognized as such by the Supreme Court and by scholars. 95 The power of
judicial review is itself a textually implicit power derived principally
from arguments related to the supremacy and structure of the Constitution. 96 Thus there is also every reason to suppose that the proper
92 See U.S. CONST. art. III.
93 One can certainly see the structural concerns implicitly or explicitly at play in
any number of cases, including United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (federalism); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (political speech and democracy); INS. v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (separation of powers, presentment to the president,
and bicameralism); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheaton) 316 (1819) (federalism, representation).
94 See supra note 91.
95 For instance, on the question of original and appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court in Marbury recognized that its original jurisdiction was established by
Article III and that Congress could not authorize-nor the Court itself exerciseadditional original jurisdiction without violating the Constitution. Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). The Court has also recognized that the outer
limits of its subject-matter jurisdiction are determined by the Constitution. On the
question of the "case" or "controversy" requirement, the Supreme Court has, for example, held that "standing" is the "irreducible constitutional minimum" necessary to
meet the justiciability standard to be considered a "case" or "controversy" under Article III, Section 2. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Thus
an assertion of jurisdiction without standing would violate Article III.
96 As Erwin Chemerinsky notes, "Article III never expressly grants the federal
courts the power to review the constitutionality of federal or state laws or executive
actions." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 91, at 37. The Supreme Court established the
power of judicial review in Marbury, where the Court's decision relied heavily on the
argument that the judiciary has a special duty to interpret laws and resolve legal disputes, an argument ultimately based in the separation of powers. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) at 167. The assertion that the Court should be the ultimate arbiter of the
meaning of the Constitution or otherwise play a preeminent role in constitutional
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scope of judicial review is determined by implicit constitutional limits
on the power of judicial review, also derived from the supremacy and
structure of the Constitution. 9 7 In short, then, a structurally based
implicit constitutional grant of authority is likely to have structurally
based implicit constitutional limits defining the contours of the grant.
Indeed, the very logic ofjudicial review itself as well as the necessity of making its exercise cohere with other fundamental constitutional values such as democracy, separation of powers, and federalism
suggests strongly that implicit constitutional limits constrain the exercise of the implicit power of judicial review.9 8 It is by no means selfevident, then, that the Supreme Court may constitutionally exercise
the power ofjudicial review in any fashion it happens to choose. 99 For
instance, Alexander Hamilton, one of the earliest proponents and
great defenders of judicial review, implicitly recognized that the Supreme Court could indeed violate the Constitution's separation of
powers by "usurpations" and "encroachments" on the legislative authority. 10 0 In fact, Hamilton made a sharp distinction between judicial 'Judgment" and legislative "will," as an expression of the
separation of powers, and recognized that a judicial exercise of the
latter in the guise of the former was a "usurpation" of the authority of
Congress that potentially warranted removal from the federal
interpretation over and against the federal executive and legislature are routinely derived from similar structural arguments about the Court's special institutional role as
a court in resolving legal disputes.
97 Cf Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting). Justice
Rehnquist observed that
[w]hile overreaching by the Legislative and Executive Branches may result
in the sacrifice of individual protections that the Constitution was designed
to secure against action of the State,judicial overreaching may result in sacrifice of the equally important right of the people to govern themselves....
The very nature of judicial review, as pointed out by Justice Stone in his
dissent in the Butler case, makes the courts the least subject to Madisonian
check in the event that they shall, for the best of motives, expand judicial
authority beyond the limits contemplated by the Framers. It is for this reason that judicial self-restraint is surely an implied, if not an expressed, condition
of the grant of authority ofjudicial review.
Id. at 470 (emphasis added).
98 See Nowlin, ConstitutionalIllegitimacy, supra note 32, at 399-401.
99 Id.
100 THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 451-52 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1999). As Hamilton writes, "There can never be a danger that the judges, by a
series of deliberate usurpations on the authority of legislature, would hazard the
united resentment of the body intrusted with it, while this body was possessed of the
means of punishing their presumption by degrading them from their stations"
through the impeachment power. Id. at 485.
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bench. 10 1 Such a "usurpation" of congressional authority would undermine the Constitution's requirement of separation of powers and
thus may be easily characterized as a constitutional violation.
Second, the Supreme Court itself has never claimed to be above
the constitutional limitations of the Basic Lawa 02 -and has, quite the
contrary, recognized at least some important constitutional limits on
its own authority in the area of jurisdiction. Notably, Marbury v.
Madison, the case first establishing the doctrine of judicial review, was
itself premised on the constitutional limits that Article III places on
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 10 3 The Supreme Court's holding that its original jurisdiction is established by Article III of the Constitution and cannot be altered by Congress should also make it plain
that the Court's original jurisdiction cannot be altered by the Supreme Court itself.10 4 The Court has further recognized the requirement that it resolve only "cases" or "controversies," and thus, for
instance, that it is forbidden to issue advisory opinions. 10 5 Further,
Supreme Court Justices and other judges often use language at the
very least suggestive of the unconstitutionality of particular Supreme
Court decisions in their opinions, despite the obvious institutional
self-interest in avoiding such language. 10 6 Notably, Justice Scalia recently asserted that a Supreme Court decision striking down a law of
Congress without a good faith belief in the law's unconstitutionality is
10 7
itself a "plain violation" of the Constitution by the Supreme Court.
101 Id. at 470.
102 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-79 (1803) (noting that Article
III limits the Court's jurisdiction).

103 Id.
104 Id. at 173-74.
105 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. During the Washington administration, in response to
a request for an advisory opinion by Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, "the Supreme Court said that it was constitutionallyforbidden to issue 'advisory opinions'-

opinions on the constitutionality of legislative or executive actions that did not grow
out of a case or controversy." GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSITUTIONAL LAw 86 (4th
ed. 2001) (emphasis added).

106 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959 (1973) (White, J.,
dissenting); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
107 See United States v. Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428, 446 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
It takes only a small step to bring today's opinion out of the realm of powerjudging and into the mainstream of legal reasoning: The Court need only go
beyond its carefully couched iterations that "Mirandais a constitutional decision," that "Miranda is constitutionally based," that Miranda has "constitu-

tional underpinnings," and come out and say quite clearly: "We reaffirm
today that custodial interrogation that is not preceded by Mirandawarnings
or their equivalent violates the Constitution of the United States." It cannot
say that, because a majority of the Court does not believe it. The Court there-
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Third the question of judicial constitutional violations is clearly
not resolved by the Supreme Court's own implicit "supreme" affirmation of the constitutionality of its use of judicial power, though it is
doubtless true that the lack of an official binding remedy in the form
of an "official" declaration of unconstitutionality by a legally superior
institution has obscured the very concept ofjudicial constitutional violations. As Justice Robert Jackson observed,
Whenever decisions of one court are reviewed by another, a percentage of them are reversed. That reflects a difference in outlook
normally found between personnel comprising different courts.
However, reversal by a higher court is not proof that justice is
thereby better done. There is no doubt that if there were a superSupreme Court, a substantial proportion of our reversals of state
courts would also be reversed. We are not final because we are in10 8
fallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.
As Justice Jackson's remarks suggest, judicial "finality" with respect to justiciable constitutional questions renders the Supreme
Court "infallible" only in the narrow formal or procedural sense that
its decisions are not subject to further binding "official" review within
the system by a higher "super-Supreme Court." 10 9 Judicial finality is
not grounded in any notion of factual or substantive infallibility, that
the Court is necessarily always right about the meaning of the Constitution, including, of course, the question of the constitutional limits
on its own power.
Indeed, it is hard to imagine a basis for the view that the Court is
substantively infallible, that it cannot get the meaning of the Constitution "wrong," other than the simple "legal skeptic's" position that law
itself is best defined as the decisions of the courts and therefore that
the Constitution itself simply is whatever a majority of the Justices of
the Supreme Court say it is at any given time.I1 0 Both simple logic
and our longstanding legal practices reject the skeptic's position and
maintain a clear and important distinction between the actual meanfore acts in plain violation of the Constitution when it denies effect to this Act of
Congress.

Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 521 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) ("The adoption of such a loose, flexible, uncontrolled standard for holding laws unconstitutional, if ever it is finally achieved, will
amount to a great unconstitutional shift of power to the courts.
(emphasis
added)).

108
109
110

Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id.
On the analytic distinction between finality and infallibility in judicial decision,
see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 141-47 (1961).
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ing of the Constitution and the opinions of Supreme Court majorities
about the meaning of the Constitution. Indeed, the Constitution cannot simply be whatever the Supreme Court "says it is" because the
Constitution predates the Supreme Court and established it as an institution of the federal government.1 1 ' Moreover, the very logic of the
traditional practice of Supreme Court dissents rests upon this important distinction, that a Supreme Court majority can be mistaken about
the meaning of the Constitution, not, of course, on the non-sensical
proposition that the majority is mistaken about its own opinion about
constitutional meaning. The Supreme Court, of course, has also overruled its own decisions countless times-despite the weight of the
principle of stare decisis-typically expressly holding that its earlier
decision was wrong about constitutional meaning.
Further, the venerable tradition of scholarly commentary criticizing Supreme Court decisions as "mistaken" also exemplifies a rejection of this "legal realist" position. As Justice Jackson's point suggests,
a "higher" court, including the metaphorical court of scholarly opinion and constitutional history, will often vote to "reverse" the Supreme
Court. In sum, the internal logic of our constitutional practices,
therefore, reaffirms the crucial distinction between procedural finality
and substantive infallibility: the majority of the Supreme Court can
indeed misinterpret the Constitution and issue decisions that are
wrong about the meaning of the Constitution.
What follows from these three points: the existence of constitutional limits on the Court, the Court's recognition of such limits, and
the fallibility of the Court in resolving questions of constitutional
meaning? The implications of this analysis for the question ofjudicial
constitutional violations should be clear: if the authority of the Supreme Court is limited by the Constitution and if the Court can misinterpret the Constitution, then it can misinterpret the constitutional
limits on its own authority, exceed those limits even in good faith, and
thereby violate the Constitution. Thus as a simple analytic matter, it is

111 See id. One important aspect of Hart's essential position is that the "legal realist" assertion that "law is what the courts say it is" or "a prophecy of what courts will
rule" inevitably founders analytically on the necessity of a form of law prior to any court
to create the courts which legal realists of this type view as the creators of law. Id. at
136-37. An infinite regression of law-creating courts is obviously not a satisfactory
answer. Notably, even the creation of the Supreme Court itself required further legal
action in addition to the ratification of the Constitution: the passage of enabling legislation by the U.S. Congress, the Judiciary Act of 1789, determining the details of the
Court and its operation. SeeJudiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73; see also SCHWARTZ,
supra note 23, at 16.
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clear that the Court is not only a "guardian" of the Constitution but
also a potential threat to the Constitution.
Why is this point important? Because while there is obviously no
appeal from the Supreme Court and no "higher" institution to issue a
formal ruling of unconstitutionality overturning a Supreme Court decision, there are a range of appropriate remedial responses to improper judicial decisions, including debating, litigating, legislating, 112
nominating justices, 11 3 and seeking constitutional amendment. The
use of these remedial responses are affected by our understanding of
the judicial power.' 14 Notably, then, it is crucial to the effective use of
these political checks on the judiciary that objections to highly expansive judicial power be properly articulated and understood politically
as constitutional objections to judicial constitutional violations because of the effect that a proper understanding of the constitutional
limits ofjudicial review may have on the reactions of political actors to
judicial misconduct. The active and effective use of these various
methods of checking the Supreme Court may very well depend on
precisely how political actors understand what the Court has done. Is
the judicial decision in question viewed as (1) a "mere" mistake about
constitutional meaning, (2) a decision that is "illegitimate" in some illdefined political or prudential sense of the term, or (3) a judicial violation of the structure of the Constitution that citizens and elected
officials have a civic duty and a constitutional obligation to attempt to
correct? Certainly the dangers inherent in the limited nature of the
widely agreed upon methods for checking the Supreme Court are further aggravated substantially by the failure to recognize that the Court
itself sometimes poses a threat to the Constitution. Fostering a proper
understanding of the Supreme Court's potential role as a violator of
the Constitution-in additional to its important role as vindicator-is
therefore of supreme importance to the project of keeping the federal
judiciary within the constitutional limits on its powers.
In sum, then, this Article maintains that the Supreme Court's authority is limited by the Constitution, that some moderate form of judicial restraint is mandated by the structure of the Constitution, that
expansive judicial power is fairly viewed as violative of the ConstituSee Moynihan, supra note 37, at 8.
See, e.g., DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 65-125 (3d ed. 1993).
114 Other methods for checking the Court exist as well, though the propriety and
constitutionality of their use may be in question. These would include alteration of
the Court's appellate jurisdiction, (partial) de-funding of the Court through the appropriations power by Congress, and simple refusal to enforce decisions by the executive branch.
112
113
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tion's republican design for government, and, therefore, that citizens
and elected officials have an obvious civic obligation to uphold and
defend the integrity of the American constitutional order through the
prudent and constitutionally sound use of the various methods of
checking the judiciary. Those readers who disagree with these basic
assumptions will also likely dispute the need for the kind of constitutional reform in the area of judicial power advocated here, but it is
also clear that strong objections to more expansive conceptions of judicial power are held by a large number of reform-minded jurists,
scholars, theorists, elected officials, and others more broadly across
the political spectrum. Therefore, this Article's discussion of reform
proposals will be of interest to a large number of readers.
II.

STRUCTURAL RESPONSES TO A STRUCTURAL PROBLEM

A.

Is an Amendment Necessary?

From a judicial restraint reform perspective, the federal courts in
the last several decades have often exceeded their authority under the
Constitution, and, given the seriousness of this inconsistency with basic constitutional structures and rights, it is imperative that a more
effective set of remedies be found to limit the Court's ability to contravene the basic law. 1 5 There are, in fact, a number of mutually reinforcing avenues of political reform that could be-and often have
been-pursued in this context. Through the years, the various reform defenders of the republican Constitution's traditional design for
government and core populist aspirations have sought the appointment of what we may broadly call "restraint" judges to the federal
bench and have exhorted those already on the bench to respect the
Constitution's judicial restraint structural requirements.'16 Reformers
have also encouraged the President and Congress to take more seriously their responsibility to uphold and defend the constitutional design against Supreme Court overreach by qualifying executive
enforcement of "expansive" decisions or by limiting judicial power
through regulation of its appellate jurisdiction or funding.1 17 Additionally, reformers have worked to better acquaint the American people with the best (republican) interpretation of the American
constitutional design.' 18 Finally, they have also promoted greater
115

See Nowlin, ConstitutionalIllegitimacy, supra note 32, at 456-61; see also MAX

BooT, OUT OF ORDER: ARROGANCE, CORRUPTION AND INCOMPETENCE

116
117
118

198-208 (1998).

See BOOT, supra note 115, at 210-18.
See HADLEY AR.Es, FIRST THINGS (1986); BoRK, supra note 22, at 115-17.
See CAREY, IN DEFENSE, supra note 35; see also TUSHNET, supra note 21, at 51-53.
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public awareness of the judicial process by working to publicize the
Justices' views, judicial philosophies, political perspectives, and particular decisions.' 19
Even so, it might well be thought that such a judicial restraint
reform project cannot be achieved simply by attempting to appoint
judges with a better understanding of the limits the Constitution
places on their power, by keeping these judges "honest" through a
more vigorous application of the Constitution's scheme of checks and
balances, and by promoting a better public understanding of the issues surrounding the Supreme Court. 120 It may well be thought that
the first strategy has simply failed, that the inevitable political temptations to legislate from the bench are enormous, that politico-cultural
elites will generally support such efforts in light of the greater sensitivity of the courts to their views, and thus that a significant number of
judges will succumb to more aggressive, politically driven, and "maximalist" conceptions of constitutional interpretation. 121 It may be
thought as well that the second strategy of relying on political checks
has and will continue to fail, especially given the hardening of constitutional practice in the twentieth century around "absolutist" versions
of judicial supremacy and independence' 22-excluding the sort of
checking function by the President and Congress that Hamilton envisaged.' 23 Finally, it may well be thought that the third strategy of educating the people with respect to constitutional limits on judicial
power will fail given the complexity of the issues, the public's general
lack of awareness of the problem, and the general opacity and mystique surrounding the judiciary in American political culture. For instance, both Mark Tushnet on the political left and Robert Bork on
the political right seem to agree that ordinary political measures will
not be successful in properly limiting the judicial power. 124 One may
very well conclude, then, that the extraordinary measure of a constitutional amendment limiting judicial power in some fashion is the only
likely means of bringing the Supreme Court back to constitutional
legitimacy. 125

119

See BooT, supra note 115, at 210-18.
See BORK, supra note 22, at 116-18; see also TusHNET, supra note 21, 174-76.

120
121

BORK,

122

Id.

123
124

BORK, supra note

125

See

supra note 22, at 116-18.

See THE FEDERAUST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton).
BORK,

22, at 116-18;

TutSHNET,

supra note 21 at 174-76.

supra note 22, at 117 (advocating a constitutional amendment to

override Supreme Court decisions).
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B.

The Value of an Amendment Proposal

Even if one thinks this view is too pessimistic, one should still
seriously consider the question of whether formally to amend the
Constitution, I 26 as a fundamentally "structural response" to the now
deeply rooted structural problem of expansive judicial power.
Amending the Constitution can also serve as a means of both restoring a semblance of the earlier and sounder judicial restraint vision of
the American constitutional design in light of our evolving democratic
traditions and promoting the fulfillment of the populist aspirations at
the heart of the American ethos. It is in fact quite possible that the
enterprise of keeping the Court within constitutional limits over the
long term might require-or at least might be substantially furthered
by-an effort to pass a structural amendment to the Constitution, an
amendment whose purpose would be to achieve some approximation
of the restraint reform goal with, of course, the minimum of impairment to the Court's ability to engage in its important legitimate judicial functions. Such a reform effort would seek to restore the more
abstract or overarching structure of the original American constitutional design with its emphasis on protecting rights through establishing democratic institutions, diffusing political power, and promoting
civic virtue among the voting public, even if such127reform might require a more particularized structural innovation.
Of course, the disadvantages of such a constitutional reform effort are familiar. An initial objection to the amendment process is the
danger of "tinkering" with the Constitution, "cluttering" the document with trivial amendments, potentially producing internal incoherence within the Constitution itself, and often simply creating new and
difficult questions to be resolved by courts rather than finally "setfling" difficult constitutional or political issues.1 28 While these concerns should be taken seriously, they are clearly not a basis for
rejecting all efforts at amendment.1 29 As the discussion above indicates, an amendment to limit the Supreme Court's power to violate
126 For discussions of a broad range of questions of constitutional theory surrounding the amendment process, see RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
127

As we shall see, the judicial restraint amendment advocated in this Article does

not require a structural innovation. See infra Part IV.B.
128 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, ConstitutionalAmendmentitis, THE Am. PROSPET, Fall
1995, at 20. See generally UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES, supra note 41.
129 See TUSHNET, supra note 21, at 177-81; Sullivan, supra note 128, at 20 ("The
Constitution surely should be amended on occasion-for example, when changes
consistent with its broad purposes are unlikely to be implemented by ordinary legislative means.").
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the Constitution is very likely warranted by the deep gravity of the
problem, its obviously intractable response to ordinary political remedies, and its present status as a fundamental constitutional question.
Indeed, the proper scope of the judicial power is a constitutional
question because it implicates both the integrity of the design of the
Constitution and the constitutional rights of the American people,
even in the absence of a constitutional amendment proposal.
A more generalized objection to the amendment process is
rooted in veneration of the constitutional text, and is thus an objection to altering what might be thought of as the "sacred scripture" of
the Constitution.1 30 While veneration of the Constitution is an important aspect of the American civil religion, rightly understood it provides no basis for objections to the amendment process. First, a
proper veneration for the Constitution, even understood narrowly as
the text alone, necessarily includes veneration for the text of Article V,
outlining the amendment process. A proper respect for this important textual provision surely would include a willingness to use the
process it establishes should a problem arise that is thought to warrant
it.131 Second, there is no reason to limit one's veneration of the Constitution to the text alone, rather than to extend it as well to the other
constituent parts of the operational Constitution: its foundational
principles, history, structure, and organic development. Thus, it is unclear why one would suppose that constitutional change through the
amendment process-even though it alters the text of the Constitution-necessitates any more (implied) criticism of the "pre-change"
Constitution than any other form of constitutional change, such as
novel judicial interpretations. Such interpretations could conceivably
alter the meaning of the Constitution much more dramatically than
would many amendments. Third, proper veneration of the Constitution, however one defines it should involve critical reflection on its
merits, rather than mere unthinking allegiance, to remain more faithful to the Enlightenment spirit of the founding and thus to the philosophical foundations and origin of the Constitution. 13 2 In short,
profound reverence for the Constitution-an important and salutary
130

See SANFORD

LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH

29 (1988) (discussing "What is

the Constitution?" and describing a "protestant" approach that views the Constitution
as the "text alone").
131 U.S. CONST. art. V.

132

See,

e.g.,JACK

N. RAKOVE,

ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAK-

(1996). Notably, the founding generation, broadly understood, critically appraised constitutional matters, as evidenced by its support for the
American revolution, its ultimate rejection of the Articles of Confederation, its debates over the adoption of the Philadelphia Constitution, and its adoption of the Bill
ING OF THE CONSTITUTION
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part of American civil religion-is in no way inconsistent with recourse to the amendment process, when circumstances warrant.
Further, there is reason to suppose that veneration arguments
may in fact mask dubious forms of anti-populism. Notably, generalized opposition to the constitutional amendment process is often asserted by persons who also support routine judicial alterations of the
Constitution through the expansive use ofjudicial review. 138 As noted
above, it is unclear why an alteration of the constitutional text via the
super-majoritarian amendment process of Article V should be thought
intrinsically more objectionable than alterations of the meaning or
substance of the Constitution by a vote of the Justices of the Supreme
Court, particularly if the judicial decision is poorly grounded in legal
materials. In fact, one suspects that much of the actual root of such
objections to amendment is a reaction against its assertion of popular
control of constitutional meaning in the face of elite judicial con35
trol.134 In such cases, the objection is "explicitly anti-populist,"'
driven by a "deep-rooted fear of [the] voting" power of ordinary
Americans, 136 rather than by any actual objection to constitutional
change per se. Thus, this view is in tension with the best understanding of the American constitutional order as grounded in the moral
and political imperative of popular sovereignty.1 37 In sum, general
objections to the use of the Article V amendment process are highly
unpersuasive when those concerns are rooted in a narrow, selective,
of Rights (1792), the Eleventh Amendment (1798), and the Twelfth Amendment
(1804).
133 See LEVINSON, supra note 130, at 149-51 (discussing judicial review and the
amendment process).
134 It would involve an aspect of what Sanford Levison calls a "catholic" approach
to the question of who has authority to engage in constitutional interpretation. A
"catholic" approach is centered around the Court as sole or primary interpreter and
would be hostile to attempts to override the Court's authority via constitutional
amendment. In contrast, the "protestant" approach involves recognition of broader
interpretive authority and would not object to an assertion of popular constitutional
lawmaking. (Though as noted above, those who also take a "protestant" position of
the question, "What is the Constitution?", might object to an alteration of the constitutional text.) For a discussion of these approaches to constitutional interpretation,
see LEVINSON, supra note 130, at 29.

135 TUSHNET, supra note 21, at 180; Richard D. Parker, Old Glories in Tandem: Flag
and Constitution, THE WKLv. STANDARD, Nov. 13, 1995, at 34 (noting that "the very
process of amending the Constitution stirs [the establishment's] ultimate nightmare,

of ordinary people-rude blue-collar types, in the words of one of my colleaguesremaking basic law").
136

137

supra note 21, at 177; cf GLENDON, supra note 78, at 178.
See U.S. CONST.pmbl., arts. V,VII; Nowlin, ConstitutionalIllegitimacy, supra note

TUSHNET,

32, at 401-04.
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and visceral veneration of constitutional text (rather than a broad,
comprehensive, and reflective veneration of the operational Constitution) or based on discomfort with the popular sovereignty basis of the
Constitution (rather than enthusiastic acceptance of our basic law's
populist moral-political foundations). 138
Even so, the practical disadvantages of reform through the
amendment process are worth considering. First, the amendment
process is cumbersome, requiring "supermajority" support, 139 something that would be almost impossible to achieve for any major substantive alteration in the constitutional design. Second, partisan
proponents of expansive judicial power will likely have some success
in their predictable efforts to portray constitutional reformers who
support structural innovations as "radicals" who want to "subvert" our
historic Constitution rather than as proponents of judicial restraint
and constitutional populism, which they actually are. Third, the practical effects of reforms that advocate serious structural innovations in
the constitutional design are generally very difficult to predict, leading
to serious concerns about unintended and perhaps ultimately self-defeating consequences.
Still, the great advantages of such an approach are undeniable as
well. Indeed, simply proposing an amendment in a serious fashion
has great potential to generate important educative, political, and
symbolic effects. As David Kyvig writes, "An amendment ma[kes] a
terse statement of principle as to how the government should operate.
Advancing one c [an] provoke intense discussion and ignite passionate
enthusiasm. Suggesting an addition to the nation's basic charter of140
fer[s] a vivid symbol of a precept its proponents consider[ ] vital."

Indeed then, even if an amendment was almost certain to fail it could,
potentially, have a number of important and related reform benefits.
First, such a proposal could, as a "terse statement of principle," reflect
a broader understanding of the American constitutional design in
capsule form, making it easier to communicate to the general public
and thus potentially increasing the view's visibility and popular support. Second, it could help to spark a healthy public debate on the
structural issues surrounding judicial power and help to raise public
awareness and understanding of the problems surrounding the more
extravagant uses of judicial review. It could provide a "vivid symbol"
138 Additionally, as shall be shown, the amendment proposal endorsed in this Article involves no substantive alteration of the best structural interpretation of the Constitution or the limits of the judicial power.

139 U.S. CONsT. art. V.
140
TION,

DAVID

E. Kyvic.,

EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITU-

1777-1995, at 427 (1996).
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of the constitutional requirement of judicial restraint. In this way, it
might provide a political rallying point or cynosure of debate, one
which could then help highlight and dramatize the constitutional importance of the issue, build support for various reform efforts, and
perhaps promote and further legitimate judicial restraint in broader
circles by demonstrating greater popular political support. Finally, it
could send a definite message to highly activist judges: that there are
serious constitutional limits to judicial power and that many Americans believe judges have overstepped these limits and violated the
Constitution's allocation of power in the American constitutional
framework.
C.

Some Leading Amendment Proposals

A general reform approach involving amendment proposals to
discourage expansive judicial power is not a radical political innovation. In particular, advocating structural constitutional amendments
specifically designed to weaken a "usurping" Court-and to communicate disapproval of its misconduct-is as old as the judicial penchant
for expanding its power at the expense of other fundamental constitutional values. 141 For instance, in both the Reconstruction and Populist-Progressive eras, there was significant support among leading
reformers for placing more effective limits on the judicial power, ei142
ther by amendment or (perhaps more dubiously) by simple statute.
Leading "restorative" and structural reform proposals with solid
historical pedigrees include variations of the following: (1) establishing a congressional override of the Supreme Court, (2) placing direct
electoral controls on the Court, and (3) requiring a supermajority of
the Supreme Court to strike down legislation. 1 43 Many of these proposals have had support from both the political "left" and "right" at
various times throughout American history. Notably, opposition to
See, e.g., KAMMEN, supra note 28, at 262-63.
142 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 96 (1998); Ross,
supra note 28, at 130-32; Michael McConnell, Comment, Institutionsand Interpretation:
A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111IHARv. L. REV. 153, 174-81 (1997). For
instanceJohn Bingham, principal author of the Fourteenth Amendment, threatened
in 1867 to introduce a constitutional amendment to abolish the Supreme Court. See 2
CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 448-49 (1928). As
141

William Ross writes, a progressive Republican such as Theodore Roosevelt was, by
1912, "beginning to fear that American democracy could not survive the continuation
of arrogant judicial assaults on popularly enacted social legislation" and thus advocated a controversial "recall" measure for overturning state judicial decisions. Ross,

supra note 28, at 139.
143 See, e.g., BOOT, supra note 115, at 206-08.
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more expansive judicial power is clearly a predominantly left-wing position in American political history, associated with Jeffersonians, Jacksonians, Lincolnian and "Radical" Republicans, populists, farmer and
labor movements, progressives, and New Dealers.1 44 Only more recently have political conservatives also emerged as opponents of judicial activism. This is so in part for the obvious reason that opposition
to expansive judicial power tends to be populist in nature and also
that populism in its various forms is historically a left-wing value in the
145
United States.

The congressional override option has been advanced by such
differing individuals as progressive Republican Senator Robert La Follette in the 1920s and conservative Republican Judge Robert Bork in
the 1990s. 1 46 The electoral control option is used in almost forty

states with respect to their state supreme courts, whose justices are
subject to partisan, non-partisan, or recall elections, often for six-,
eight-, or ten-year terms. 14 7 The electoral option is also strongly associated historically with the American "left," including Jacksonians,
populists, labor unionists, and progressives.1 48 The supermajority option also has a long history, and its proponents often claim that it can
be established by a simple congressional statute. 149 In 1867, for instance, Reconstruction Republican Thomas William of Pennsylvania
"urged a bill for the concurrence of all the Judges in any opinion of a
constitutional question."'150 In the 1920s, leading progressive Republican Senator William Borah revived the proposal, advocating legislation that would "require the concurrence of at least seven members of
the Court in any decision that invalidated an act of Congress."'15 1 In
the 1990s, conservative journalist Max Boot endorsed a similar "two-

144 Some of the more prominent contemporary left-leaning or progressive opponents of highly expansive conceptions of judicial power include Cass Sunstein, Mark
Tushnet, Jeffrey Rosen, and Jeremy Waldron. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 1; TUSHNET,
supra llote 21; Rosen, supra note 11; Waldron, supra note 20.
145 See, e.g.,
MICHAEL KAZIN, THE POPULIST PERSUASION: AN AMERICAN HISTORY

(1995).
146 See, e.g.,
BORK, supra note 22, at 117-18; Ross, supra note 28, at 193-217.
147 See, e.g.,
LAURENCE BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS: PROCESS AND POLICY 100-03
(1990).
148 See, e.g.,
id. at 97-99.
149 See BOOT, supra note 115, at 206-08.
150 2 WARREN, supra note 142, at 449, A statutory requirement of eight judges was
also proposed at this time by the Chicago Tribune, the leading Republican newspaper

in the West. Id.
151

Ross, supra note 28, at 218.
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thirds plan," requiring a concurrence of six Justices to strike down
152
legislation as a constitutional violation.
As noted, Mark Tushnet advocates a fourth option-what we
might call an "anti-judicial review" constitutional amendment, which
would declare the entire Constitution non-justiciable. Tushnet's
amendment reads simply, "The provisions of this Constitution shall
not be cognisable by any Court." 153 Tushnet draws on the model of
the Irish Constitution, the social welfare provisions of which are denominated "directive principles of social policy" which "shall be the
care of the [parliament] exclusively, and shall not be cognisable by
any Court."1 54 Tushnet's proposal also has some historical antecedents in the opposition of some in the founding generation to any
power ofjudicial review,1 55 in the focus on popular/political enforcement of bills of rights in the prejudicial review era, 156 and in some of
the strongest anti-judicial power statements of Reconstruction Republicans.1 57 Indeed, in early 1867, Representative John Bingham, the
principal author of the Fourteenth Amendment, which had issued
from Congress only six months earlier, proposed "sweeping away at
once the Court's appellate jurisdiction in all cases" if the Court were
to threaten important Reconstruction measures. 158 Therefore, even a
drastic measure such as Tushnet's has significant historical precursors.
What can be said of these four proposals by way of evaluation?
Each has its obvious strengths and weaknesses, and a lengthy examination of them will not be attempted here. 59 What is worth noting here
is that the first two options examined, the congressional override and
electoral options, would represent quite drastic, though arguably restorative, alterations in the American constitutional design. These
proposals would certainly require a constitutional amendment, would
be unlikely to achieve any significant degree of support given the procedural conservatism of the American people with respect to constitu152 BOOT, supra note 115, at 206-08.
153 See TUSHNET, supra note 21, at 175.
154 Id.
155 For instance, in the debates over the judiciary Act of 1802, Senator John Breckenridge, a Jeffersonian, asserted that "the Legislature [Congress] have the exclusive
right to interpret the Constitution, in what regards the law-making power, and the
judges are bound to execute the laws they make." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 178-80 (Joseph Gales ed., 1802).
156 See infra Part III.
157 KAMMEN, supra note 28, at 117-20.
158 2 WARREN, supra note 142, at 448-49.
159 For a comparative examination of structural approaches, including the congressional override, judicial tertn limits, and two-thirds plan, see BooT, supra note
115, at 201-08. Boot endorses the two-thirds plan. Id. at 206-08.
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tional reform, and thus, given these proposals' limited visibility and
support, would have quite limited political and educative value even as
simple proposals such as these. Further, serious concerns about unintended consequences also inevitably arise with proposals such as these
involving major structural innovations in the constitutional design.
All these objections apply as well to the fourth option, Tushnet's proposal, which is also questionable for its quite radical "root and
branch" rejection of the practice of judicial review in all its forms.
Therefore, the third measure, the supermajority option, appears
to be by far the best proposal of the four, given both its quite modest
structural alteration of the status quo and the fact that it is arguably
achievable by a simple statute. 160 It has two concomitant drawbacks.
First, its results would be modest, eliminating only 5-4 decisions that
strike down laws, and eliminating them whether they were beyond the
proper scope of the judicial authority or not. 16 1 Second, if passed as a
statutory measure, it would be subject to a simple congressional repeal, as well as to a serious challenge to its constitutionality as an unprecedented congressional regulation of judicial voting procedures.
In any event, there should be no doubt that a serious public debate on
the pros and cons of these measures would very beneficial to the constitutional order.
D. A New Amendment Proposalfrom an "Older" Perspective

Even so, this Article advocates a very different kind of structural
measure, a fifth option, an amendment that lacks the impressive historical pedigrees of the congressional override, electoral control, and
supermajority proposals, but one that is also much more directly in
line with the founding generation's understanding of the spirit of reform reflected in the Bill of Rights and the American constitutional
tradition more broadly. It is a measure more moderate in nature and
yet at the same time ultimately much more far-reaching in its implications for American constitutional development and one that would
preserve the practice of judicial review properly understood while diminishing the instances of its improper use. Finally, it is a measure
160 See id. at 207-08.
161 Still, although such a provision might have altered the outcomes in Lochner
and Casey, see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a New York
state law regulating baker's hours as a violation of due process); Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming the right to abortion), it would not have
altered the outcome in Dred Scott. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1856) (holding that African-Americans, slave or free, could not be citizens of the
United States and that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause contains a substan-

tive right to own slaves as "property").
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that would maximize its political and educative value even as an
amendment proposal unlikely ever to be formally proposed by Congress or ratified by the states. As will be demonstrated, there is in fact
every reason to suppose that our contemporary reform efforts can
benefit from a careful analysis of the political thought of the first generation of American "reformers"-the men who wrote the Virginia
Declaration of Rights, the Declaration of Independence, the Philadelphia Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Eleventh Amendment.
One may turn, then, to the original "spirit" of the Bill of Rights and to
the broader origins of the American constitutional tradition, as a possible model for constitutional reform.
III.

THE BILL OF RIGHTS AS A MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

A.

The Bill of Rights in Structural Perspective

As one considers the question of how to amend the Constitution
in order to restore it to a more robustly republican form, it is worthwhile to turn from the Jacksonians, Reconstruction Republicans,
populists, progressives, and New Dealers to the Founders who originally wrote and ratified our national charter and to ask this question:
what would the founding generation have done if faced with the struc162
tural problem of expansive judicial power?
One might begin to answer this question by examining the structural original understanding of the first set of "reform" amendments
to the Constitution, our celebrated Bill of Rights. How, then, was the
Bill of Rights originally understood by the Founders? There are various reasons for examining original understanding in this context.
One reason, of course, is because one may believe that constitutional
1 63
meaning is ultimately dependent upon original understanding.
Another reason, as historian Jack Rakove has observed, is because one
may believe that the political "meditations about popular government
that we encounter there remain more profound than those that the
ordinary politics of our endless democratic present usually sustain[ ],"164 While this Article is not unconcerned with the first rea162 As noted, constitutional historians across the political spectrum recognize that
the Founders had no desire or expectation that the Supreme Court would engage in
expansive judicial policymaking. See sources cited supra note 64.

163 For an analysis of some of the interpretive questions surrounding the theory of
originalism, see INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION (Jack Rakove ed., 1990). For defenses of originalism, see BORK, supra note 54; and CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF
MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW (1994).

164

RAKovE, supra note 132, at 368 (emphasis added).
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son, 1 6 5 it is the second reason that is the primary purpose of the
inquiry here: to seek inspiration for future constitutional reform in
the "profound meditations" of the Founders on constitutional government rather than to advocate a full restoration of the original understanding of our constitutional past. One is thus interested in the
"original understandings" of the Bill of Rights in this context not because there is any hope or desire to restore the original understanding after more than two centuries of constitutional development, but
rather because it may well serve as an inspiration-or even a quite
practical model-for future constitutional reform in the area ofjudicial power.
One may note here as well that the range of original understandings sought here is not the specific substantive meaning of provisions-whether, say, the prohibition on "cruel and unusual
punishment" was understood to preclude flogging in general or the
death penalty for minor offenses-but rather the broader structural,
functional, or operational meaning of the Bill of Rights as a whole and
as an addition to (and an elaboration of) the Philadelphia Constitution. What was the purpose of the Bill of Rights? What was it meant
to do? Who was to interpret and enforce it? How was it to protect
rights and from whom? How did it fit with, complement, reinforce, or
alter the original Constitution?
In examining this question, one must get beyond the common,
contemporary, and clearly anachronistic misunderstanding of the
original meaning of the Bill of Rights. This misunderstanding assumes that the Bill of Rights is an anti-majoritarian document meant
to protect a broad range of individual rights through judicial review in
combination with a powerful, politically insulated, and creative judici165 For instance, the lack of support expansive judicial power has in such basic
legal materials as the constitutional text, original understanding, and "original" (i.e.,
early) constitutional practices provides the primary legal foundation for the contention that such judicial action exceeds the scope of the Court's authority under Article
III and violates the constitutional design. See Nowlin, ConstitutionalIllegitimacy, supra
note 32, at 421 passim. As Robert George has observed,
Any argument seeking to establish the authority of courts to invalidate legislation by appeal to natural law and natural rights ungrounded in the constitutional text or history, therefore, will itself have to appeal to the constitutional
text and history. This is by no means to suggest that there is anything selfcontradictory or necessarily illicit about such arguments. There is no reason
in principle why a Constitution cannot, expressly or by more or less clear
implication, confer such authority on Courts. It is merely to indicate that
the question whether a particular constitution in fact confers it is, as I have
said, one of positive, not natural, law.
George, supra note 72, at 2280-81 (2001) (emphasis added).
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ary that routinely vetoes the moral, political, and constitutional judgments of the people's elected representatives in Congress and the
states.166 As will be discussed, that is largely a modern, post-1920s development, which has only very limited antecedents before the
1890s 167 and which is much more dependent upon the Fourteenth
Amendment and the precedents of the Warren Court than upon the
168
original Bill of Rights.
166 Justice Robert H.Jackson, in his opinion in West Virginia State Board ofEducation
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), a case striking down compulsory flag salutes, provides
one of the clearest and earliest statements of the neiw understanding of the Bill of
Rights that had gradually developed in post-Civil War America, one anachronistically
projected back by Jackson to the founding as the "original understanding." Jackson
writes, "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by courts." Id. at 638.
This view of the Bill of Rights is quite wrong as a matter of history. See infra Part III.C.
For a discussion of the development of this view and its major reinterpretation of
American constitutional theory and structure, see SANDEL, supra note 42, at 26-54.
See also Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 245, 256 (1991) (noting that the constitutional theory of
Jackson in Barnette and of scholars such as Ronald Dworkin is "fundamentally at odds
with the restricted nature of judicial review in antebellum America and the constitutional tradition up to around World War II").
167 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998) (observing that the Bill of Rights as originally understood was primarily
structural in nature and majoritarian in emphasis rather than rights-oriented in nature and counter-majoritarian); KAMMEN, supra note 28, at 31, 336-37 (observing that
the judiciary did not enforce the Bill of Rights for more than a century after its ratification and that the Bill of Rights thus remained in an important sense undiscovered
in American jurisprudence until the mid-twentieth century); SANDEL,supra note 42, at
38 (noting that "the Bill of Rights [did not] play an important role in protecting
individual liberties against federal infringement" for "the first century of its existence"). For a brief discussion of these points, see Nowlin, ConstitutionalIllegitimacy,
supra note 32, at 433-39.
168 See, e.g., AmAR, supra note 167, at xiii, 284-94; SANDEL, supra note 42, at 39-42.
Notably, Amar traces the modern understanding of the Bill of Rights as "countermajoritarian" to incorporation and to the countermajoritarianism of the Fourteenth
Amendment. AmAR, supra note 167, at xiii, 284-94. Amar, however, likely over-estimates the "counter-majoritarian" nature of the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, given the substantial evidence of the Reconstruction Congress's
emphasis on the primacy of congressionalenforcement of the Amendment's provisions
through civil rights legislation rather than judicial "enforcement" through creative
forms of constitutional interpretation. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE

122 (1988) (noting

that "the framing generation anticipated that Congress rather than the courts would
be the principal enforcer of section one"); CAss R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 152 (1993) (observing that "[t] he framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were
entirely correct in thinking that Congress, rather than the courts, should be the prin-
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Indeed, if one seeks to discover the Founders' true "original understandings" of the Bill of Rights, one will find that it was primarily
(1) structural in substance, echoing the basic "design" themes of the
Philadelphia Constitution; (2) declaratory and complementary in its
effect on constitutional structure, clarifying, emphasizing, and reinforcing those "design" themes rather than substantively altering them
in any way; (3) political in function, empowering the people's constitutional objections to tyrannical acts by their government; and (4) educative in its long-term effects, helping to instill basic respect in
America's evolving political culture for foundational constitutional
principles, structures, and values. These claims warrant examination
in more detail.
B.
1.

The Structural Roots of the Bill of Rights

Structure and Rights at the Founding

One may shed some light on the question of the original structural understanding of the Bill of Rights through an examination of
related founding-era statements of political principle that both demonstrates the theory and practice of the Founders on these issues and
also that directly influenced the writing of the Bill of Rights. These
would include the Virginia Declaration of Rights, the Declaration of
Independence, and the Philadelphia Constitution. It is in these foundational documents that we shall find the crucial historical context for
our determination of the original structural understanding of the Bill
of Rights and the broad constitutional theory of the founding generation as it relates to natural rights, republican government, constitutional structure, and bills of rights.
cipal vehicle for enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment"); McConnell, supra
note 142, at 194 (noting that "[t]he historical record shows that the framers of the
Amendment expected Congress, not the Court, to be the primary agent of its enforcement"). For a discussion of the structural/enforcement dimension of the Fourteenth
Amendment, see Nowlin, ConstitutionalIllegitimacy, supra note 32, at 440-51. Notably,
the Supreme Court has rejected congressional preeminence in this context in recent
years, opting for a restrictive reading of congressional power under Section Five. See
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Perhaps surprisingly, those Justices
most sympathetic to historical approaches to determining constitutional meaning

have adopted the most-rather than the least-restrictive interpretation of congressional power under Section Five, apparently driven by the desire to promote basic

structural principles of federalism and judicial supremacy that the Fourteenth
Amendment was in fact originally intended to limit or qualify. For the current division on the Court, see Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356 (2001).
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The Virginia Declaration of Rights

The State of Virginia's decision in 1776 to break with the British
Empire necessitated the writing of a new state constitution to reflect
its assertion of political independence and replace its colonial charter. 169 Within a month of setting its "irreconcilable grievances" before
the British Crown and instructing Richard Henry Lee to propose a
motion for independence to the Continental Congress in Philadelphia, the Virginia Convention for Independence promulgated a formal "Declaration of Rights" for the State of Virginia. 170 This was done
in June of 1776, a few weeks before the writing of a formal state constitution establishing the institutions of its post-commonwealth government, for which this initial Declaration would serve, in effect, as both
a Preamble and a Bill of Rights. 17' The Virginia Declaration was written principally by George Mason, 172 and its language provided an important source of inspiration for a number of American constitutional
documents, including the Preamble to the Declaration of Independence, 73 the bills of rights of several other states, 174 and the federal
Bill of Rights.' 75 It is well worth examining some of its salient features
in detail to illuminate our inquiry into the original structural understanding of the Bill of Rights.
The Virginia Declaration begins by characterizing itself as "[a]
Declaration of Rights made by the representatives of the good people
of Virginia, assembled in full and free Convention; which rights do
pertain to them, and their posterity, as the basis and foundation of
government." 76 Its penultimate provision states in part "that no free
government, or the blessing of liberty, can be preserved to any people
but by ...frequent recurrence to fundamental principles."'177 As shall
be shown, the Virginia Declaration is itself best understood as a broad
statement of "fundamental [political] principles" concerning the "basis and foundation of government" as it relates to republican constitutional structures and rights. These fundamental principles of rights
169

See ROBERT

ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS:

31-40 (1991).
170 Id.; see NEIL H.

COGAN, CONTEXTS OF THE CONSTITUTION

1776-1791, at

30-32 (1999).

supra note 169, at 35-39.

171

RUTLAND,

172
173

Id. at 36-39.
PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPEN-

104, 192-93 (1997); RUTLAND, supra note 169, at 36.
174 MAIER, supra note 173, at 192-93; RUTLAND, supra note 169, at 41-77.
175 RUTLAND, supra note 169, at 202 (noting that Madison's original draft of the
Bill of Rights "leaned heavily on the Virginia Declaration of Rights").
176 VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS pmbl. (1776).
177 Id. art. 15.
DENCE
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and structures range from the very abstract and foundational1 78 to the
179
much more particular and derivative in nature.
What is most important in this context is the decided emphasis
on the fundamental structural principles one finds in the Declaration
of Rights. Indeed, structural and foundational issues, rather than direct statements of individual rights, concern the clear majority of the
Declaration's provisions, despite what one might conclude from its title alone and our modern usage of the term "rights." The Virginia
Declaration in fact includes a broad statement of popular sovereignty
and a number of overtly structural provisions concerning issues such
as separation of powers, representation, and jury trial, in addition to
several specific articulations of individual rights. In fact, of its sixteen
articles enumerating "rights," nine relate to the fundamental principles of republican government, such as popular sovereignty, separation of powers, rotation in office, and representation, and only seven
relate to the specific rights of individuals. 8 0
For instance, in addition to its support for popular sovereignty,'8 ' the Virginia Declaration endorses republicanism,1 8 2 a form
of legislative supremacy, 8 3 representation, 8 4 separation of powers, 18 5 and rotation in office.' 8 6
178 E.g., id. art. I ("That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and
have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they
cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of
life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing
and obtaining happiness and safety.").
179 E.g., id. art. XI ("That in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the ancient trial by Jury is preferable to any other and ought to
be held sacred.").
180 RUTLAND, supra note 169, at 38-39.
181 VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. II (1776) ("All power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people.").
182 Id. art. IV ("[N]either ought the Offices of Magistrate, Legislator, orJudge, to
be hereditary.").
183 Id. art. VII ("That all Power of suspending Laws, or the Execution of Laws, by
any Authority without Consent of the Representatives of the People, is injurious to
their Rights, and ought not to be exercised.").
184 Id. art. VI ("That Elections of Members to serve as Representatives of the People, in Assembly, ought to be free; and that all Men, having sufficient Evidence of
permanent common Interest with, and Attachment to, the Community, have the
Right of Suffrage .... ).
185 Id. art. V ("That the legislative, and executive Powers of the State should be
separate and distinct from the Judicative .... ).
186 Id. (declaring that "[t]he Members of the [executive and legislative branches]
may be restrained from Oppression, by feeling and participating the Burthens of the
People, they should, at fixed Periods, be reduced to a private Station, return into that
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Other less overtly structural provisions still have an important
structural basis, such as the representative democratic and civic republican emphasis on the importance ofjury participation in trials. 187 Indeed, the founding generation valued jury trials precisely for directly
structural reasons relating to the overlapping value of what one could
call judicial bicameralism (judge and jury), intra-judicial checks and
balances (the jury's check on the judge), and judicial representation
(people of the community on the jury).1 88 In sum, then, one of the
chief values of a right to a jury trial was the benefit to the criminal
defendant that a popular check such as a jury could provide on the
unjust administration of justice by biased, dishonest, or tyrannical
judges. Jury participation was also highly valued for its civic educative
effect on the individuals serving as jurors. 8 9
That the Virginia Declaration of Rights is so strongly structural in
its emphasis is indicative of the founding generation's view of the
close connection between republican constitutional structures and individual rights. What was this connection more precisely? In the view
of the founding generation, republican constitutional structures
could directly instantiate participatory rights (such as voting, officeholding, and jury participation) and could also indirectly protect nonparticipatory rights (such as broader natural rights to life, liberty, and
property) both by making government accountable to the people and
by balancing and diffusing political power across the institutions of
government. 190 In fact, as shown, even some principles articulated as
specific individual rights were actually rights to certain governmental
structural procedures (such as jury trial) designed chiefly to protect
one from other injustices (such as judicial misconduct) and to encourage responsible, habitual, and enlightened political participation
by the populace generally, which would also result in greater societal
protection of rights. Therefore, on this view, governmental structures
designed to balance and diffuse political power, while making it generally accountable to the people, are essential to the preservation of
individual rights.
body from which they were originally taken, and the vacancies be supplied by frequent, certain, and regular Elections").
187 Id. art. XI ("That in Controversies respecting Property, and in Suits between
Man and Man, the ancient Trial by Jury is preferable to any other, and ought to be
held sacred.").

188 AMAR, supra note 167, at 81-104;

RAKOVE,

supra note 132, at 293-302.

189 AMAR, supra note 167, at 93-96.
190 See CAV.Eh, IN DEFENSE, supra note 35, at 3-17;
288-338; SANDEL, supra note 42, at 27.

RAKOVE,

supra note 132, at
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Another highly important but somewhat different question of
constitutional structure arises here as well: how was the Virginia Declaration itself meant to function structurally? How was it meant to protect the rights and rights-driven structural principles that it declared?
Who in fact was meant to interpret and enforce it? And against
whom? In answering these questions, three things should be noted.
First, the Virginia Declaration used the permissive language of
"ought" rather than the mandatory language of "shall" in its articles
and was thus plainly hortatory in nature rather than legally binding on
the legislature. 191 Therefore, the provisions of the Virginia Declaration did not amount to a legal command charging some institution or
set of political actors (such as judges) to actually enforce it on the
Virginia Legislature. 192 Second, it is also worth noting that judicial
review was in its infancy in Virginia, if it even can be said to have existed at all at this time, and therefore judicial enforcement of a bill of
rights was not a reasonable structural option, even if the Virginia Declaration had been phrased in legally binding language.1 93 Third, the
Declaration was written and promulgated by what was essentially the
state legislature of Virginia and thus was quite arguably subject to a
simple legislative repeal. 194 As Rakove concludes, concerning the
function of the state bills of rights of this era, such as Virginia Declaration, "Insofar as these articles did address the legislature, they were
meant to guide it in exercising its discretionary authority rather than
to restrainlegislative power by creating an armory ofjudicially enforce95
able rights."1
One may conclude, then, that the provisions of the Virginia Declaration were not subject to judicial enforcement of any kind against
191

See VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (1776).
192 See RAKOVE, supra note 132, at 307.
193 The first commonly identified direct assertion of the 'judicial power to rule on
constitutionality" by state courts did not occur until 1780. SCHWARTZ, supra note 23,
at 7. Moreover whether these early (pre-] 787) cases actually involved assertions of the
power of judicial review is often contested. ROBERT LoWRY CLINTON, MARUtRY v.
MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 48-55 (1989). The earliest arguable assertion of judicial review in Virginia, Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. 5 (1782), was not decided until

1782. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 23, at 8. It has also been contested whether this case
actually involves an assertion of the power of judicial review. CLINTON, supra, at 49.
In any event, the actual invalidation of a governmental act was extremely rare in Virginia, as in other states, until the time of the Civil War. As Friedman notes, up until
the year 1860, only four laws or governmental practices were invalidated as unconstitutional in the State of Virginia. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HIsTORY OF AMERICAN
LAW 355 (1985).
194 RAKoVE, supra note 132, at 307-08.
195 Id. at 307.
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the legislators or the voters who put the former into office. Indeed, it
is likely that the colonists at this time would have been particularly
unimpressed by a proposal to protect rights through the power of judicial review because judges were then seen as subordinate to the
royal governors who had engaged in oppression-and as parties to
that oppression-and were thus deliberately made subject to an array
of checks and procedural limitations. 196
What, then, one may ask, was the purpose of the Virginia Declaration? What was its strategy for protecting the rights and structural
principles it declared? In fact, Virginia's formal, legislative Declaration of Rights was meant to function in a primarily political and educative manner-a point strongly reinforced by its penultimate
provision emphasizing the importance of frequent recurrence to fundamental principles-such as the Declaration of Rights itself articulates in solemn fashion.' 9 7 Indeed, as a formal statement of guiding
political principles, the Virginia Declaration would both (1) canalize
political debate about the related questions of constitutional structure
and rights, and (2) shape the civic education of the citizens of Virginia, including future generations ("their posterity") as they related
to these issues.' 98 Thus, the Virginia Declaration would function to
protect rights by empowering politically constitutional objections to
acts of government and by shaping the broader political culture of
Virginia to cherish certain rights and structures.
As Amar notes, this emphasis on the primacy of the civic republican political and educative value of such declarations or bills of rights
was very widely held at the founding.1 99 For instance, Edmund Randolph, Virginia statesman and one of the framers of the Philadelphia
Constitution, observed,
In the formation of the [Virginia Declaration of Rights] two objects
were contemplated: one, that the legislature should not in their acts
violate any of those cannons [sic]; the other, that in all the revolutions of time, of human opinion, and of government, a perpetual
standard should be erected, around which the people might rally,

and by a notorious record be forever admonished to be watchful,
2 °°
firm and virtuous.
196
197

VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XV

Id. at 289-90.

198

See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 132, at 336 (discussing these functions in the con-

(1776);

AMAR, supra note 167, at 131-33.

text of the Bill of Rights).
199 AMAR, supra note 167, at 131-33.
200

Edmund Randolph, Essay on the Revolutionary History of Virginia, in 44 VA. MAG.
BIOGRAPI-Iy 47 (1936), quoted in RUTLAND, supra note 169, at 39.
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Indeed, Virginians as radically different in political outlook as
Patrick Henry and John Marshall both agreed on the importance of
formal declarations of the "maxims of free Government" in bills or
declarations of rights for purposes of legislative self-enforcement and
for the shaping of political discourse, public opinion, and civic culture-and thus also for protecting rights through the ordinary political process.2 11' In fact, as we have seen, the Virginia Declaration's
penultimate provision reads in part "[t]hat no free government, or
the blessing of liberty, can be preserved to any people but ...

by fre-

quent recurrence to fundamental principles," the same fundamental
principles (or "maxims") that the Virginia Declaration itself articulates in solemn form. 2°2 As Amar has observed, the Virginia Declaration "feature [s] a maxim about the need for maxims," an expression,
as a fundamental principle, of the importance of regular recourse to
fundamental principles.2z13 Of course, this was done to further emphasize the importance of such a recourse both to guide political debate and to shape civic education.2 1 4 It should be clear, then, that the
structural operation of the Virginia Declaration was linked closely to
popular and legislative interpretation and to (self-) enforcement politically by the state legislature and people of Virginia. One may conclude that the Virginia Declaration of Rights, a major source of
inspiration for many state bills of rights and the federal Bill of Rights,
was primarily structural in its emphasis, protecting rights indirectly via
constitutional structures. One may also conclude that the Virginia
Declaration was understood to function structurally, in an essentially
populist, republican, political, and educative manner, depending on
popular and legislative self-enforcement for its efficacy in protecting
rights.
What value, then, does the Virginia Declaration's profound meditations on government have for our present reform project? First, one
may note that the Virginia Declaration demonstrates a firm commitment to basic principles of republican government, including popular
sovereignty, representation, and the separation of powers. 2115 If one
shares these fundamental commitments of the American constitutional tradition and wishes to honor them, the need for reform in the
area of judicial power should be readily apparent. Second, the Virginia Declaration reflects the founding generation's sophisticated
note 167, at 131-32.

201

AMAR, supra

202
203
204
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VA. DEcLARArION OF RicGTs art. XV (1776).
AMAR, snpra note 167, at 131.

Id.
See supra text accompanying note 180.
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understanding of the close connection between republican governmental structures and the rights of individuals. In fact, the basic security of our liberties depends precisely upon the preservation of
these important governmental structures. This understanding of the
importance of constitutional structure suggests that expansive judicial
power, as a threat to republican governmental structures, is ultimately
a threat to individual and collective rights. This insight is also suggestive of the need for judicial power reform. Third, the Virginia Declaration itself involves the deployment of a particular strategy for
discouraging potential constitutional violations of rights and structures: a populist, republican "declaration" (or "bill") of rights that solemnizes basic republican principles of free government and that
functions to protect rights in a political and educative manner
through governmental self-enforcement and the promotion of civic
virtue among voters. This strategy therefore operates through popular political "enforcement" rather than through the exercise of judicial review and is suggestive of a particularly relevant approach to
constitutional reform: advocacy of a constitutional amendment to protect the structural integrity of the constitutional design through its
potential political and educative influence in shaping political debate
and civic culture. Indeed, had anything like the contemporary structural problem of expansive judicial power actually existed in Virginia
in 1776, it is likely the framers of the Virginia Declaration would have

included a hortatory article in favor of the structural principle of judicial restraint, emphasizing its connection to other structural principles of free government. In short, then, the Virginia Declaration of
Rights is a rich source of inspiration-and even a quite practical
20 6
model-for contemporary constitutional reform.
3.

The Declaration of Independence

In this context, it is also well worth examining the Declaration of
Independence, the great constitutive founding statement of American
political principles-principles that inspired the first generation of reformers to seek political independence from the British Empire. In
fact, particularly relevant in the judicial reform context is the sometimes neglected connection between the Declaration's opening
paragraphs (its "preamble") and its specific list of grievances against
206 Moreover, as we shall see, what the Virginia Declaration reveals about the
founding generation's understanding of the relationship of rights and stncture will
strongly reinforce our later conclusions about the structural, declaratory, political,
and educative aspects of the federal Bill of Rights, even given the important differences between the two documents. See infra Part III.C.
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George III and the English Parliament.211 7 What is the nature of this
connection? The "philosophical" preamble to the Declaration explains the colonists' views of the foundation of government, natural
rights, and the closely related basis of the right of revolution. It reads,
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of
Happiness-That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of
the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to
abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation
on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to
them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. 2 18
One can see at the outset the importance of the constitutional
structural issue of the basis of government in the consent of the people and the concomitant right of revolution (linked also to a popular
amendment power) when government becomes tyrannical. The parallels here to the Virginia Declaration are obvious, and there is good
reason to suppose that the language of the Virginia Declaration
2119
shaped that of the Declaration of Independence in some respects.
Moreover, both documents are reflections of the "common sense" of
2 1
the matter as it struck the "American mind" of the era.
The authors of the Declaration of Independence then declare
that the American colonists have suffered a "long Train of Abuses and
Usurpations" and that "[s]uch has been the patient Sufferance of
these Colonies; and such is now the Necessity which constrains them
to alter their former Systems of Government. The History of the present King of Great-Britain is a History of Repeated Injuries and Usurpations." 2 11 What follows, then, in the text of the Declaration is a
litany of evils committed by the British Crown, illustrating in concrete
detail what actions the colonists thought so "destructive to the[ ]
Ends" of securing natural rights of "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of
Happiness" that they would warrant an inference of despotic intent
2 12
justifying revolution.
207

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

208

Id. para. 2.

pmbl. (U.S. 1776).

209

See, e.g.,

210

Remarks of Thomas Jefferson, former President of the United States, to Henry

MAIER,

supra note 173, at 123-26.

Lee, future Vice Presidential candidate, May 8, 1825, in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
,JEFFERSON 343 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899), quoted in MAIER, supra note 173, at xvii.
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As Donald Lutz has noted, the list of grievances "[v]iewed one
way" expresses "reasons for breaking with Britain," but, viewed another way, it is a list of "American political commitments" that provide "what amounts to a bill of rights." 213 In short, the Declaration
contains the functional equivalent of a bill of rights, a list of concrete
examples of what the American colonists viewed as "rights" or rightsdriven structures essential to the preservation of natural rights of
"Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness." 21 4 The Declaration of
Independence is itself, then, a bill or declaration of rights.
Moreover, what one finds here-not surprisingly in light of the
emphases of the Virginia Declaration of Rights-is a crucial structural
emphasis on fundamental principles of republican government and
governmental design. As Willmoore Kendall and George Carey have
noted, of the list of grievances attributed to George III "[a]t least
eleven involve violations (seven of which are the first mentioned)" of

the American constitutional principle of "self-government through deliberativeprocesses."2 15 Indeed the following numbered provisions are the
first thirteen grievances-charging abuses, usurpations, and injustices
that justify revolution-against the British Crown:
[1] [George III] has refused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public Good.
[2] He has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of immediate and
pressing Importance, unless suspended in their Operation till his
Assent should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly
neglected to attend to them.
[3] He has refused to pass other Laws for the Accommodation of
large Districts of People, unless those People would relinquish the
Right of Representation in the Legislature, a Right inestimable to
them and formidable to Tyrants only.
[4] He has called together Legislative Bodies at Places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the Depository of their public
Records, for the sole Purpose of fatiguing them into Compliance
with his Measures.
[5] He has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly Firmness his Invasions on the Rights of the People.
[6] He has refused for a long Time, after such Dissolutions, to cause
others to be elected; whereby the Legislative Powers, incapable of
213 DONALD S. LUTZ,
(1988).
214 TIHE DECLARATION
215
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Annihilation, have returned to the People at large for their exercise; the State remaining in the mean time exposed to all the Dangers of invasion from without, and Convulsions within.
[7] He has endeavoured to prevent the Population of these States;
for that Purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their Migrations hither,
and raising the Conditions of new Appropriations of Lands.
[8] He has obstructed the Administration ofJustice, by refusing his
Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary Powers.
[9] He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the Tentire of their Offices, and the Amount and Payment of their Salaries.
[10] He has erected a Multitude of new Offices, and sent hither
Swarms of Officers to harass our People, and eat out their
Substance.
[11] He has kept among tis, in Times of Peace Standing Armies,
without the consent of our Legislatures.
[12] He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power.
[13] He has combined with others [i.e., the British Parliament] to
subject us to a Jurisdiction foreign to our Constitution, and unacknowledged by our Laws; giving his Assent to their Acts of pretended Legislation .... 216

Of the Declaration's fifteen or so remaining complaints, the
American colonists include "imposing Taxes on us without our Consent," "depriving us in many Cases, of the Benefits of Trial by Jury,"
"transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended Offences,"
"taking away our Charters, abolishing our most valuable Laws, and altering fundamentally the Forms of our Governments," and "suspending our own Legislatures, and declaring themselves invested with
Power to legislate for us in all Cases whatsoever.12 1 7 The few remaining non-structural complaints deal largely with the military actions of
the British crown against the colonists.

21

1

One can see that the American colonists' complaints in the Declaration of Independence, alleging serious (indirect) threats to natural rights of "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness" sufficient to
warrant revolution, were overwhelmingly concerned with the structural-procedural issues surrounding one large cluster of issues: individual or "federal" colonial self-government through a representative
216
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process supplemented by independent judges,jury trials as a check on
judges, and a subordinate (and citizen-volunteer rather than professional-standing) military establishment. 219 In the minds of the founding generation, then, natural rights of "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit
of Happiness" were in fact intimately connected to structural governmental norms such as representation in the legislature, jury trial, and
"federal" colonial self-government. A sufficient number of violations
of these structural norms, therefore, would necessarily evidence a tyrannical design to violate natural rights and would justify recourse to
220
the right of revolution.
One might also turn to what could be called the "functional" aspect of the Declaration of Independence-what it was meant to do.
The specific legal status of the Declaration is a subject of some controversy, but it has appeared in the U.S. Code,2 2 1 is clearly a "constitutional" document in the broadest sense, 222 and is one constitutive of
the United States as a political entity. 223 Thus, the Declaration's status

and importance as a foundational and constitutional document
should be uncontested. In fact, Mark Tushnet maintains that the Declaration provides the principles of a "thin" Constitution that ordinary
Americans should interpret and enforce through the political process,
as a form of populist constitutional law. 224 Further, the Declaration,
219 Of course, it is also worth remembering in this context that one of the great
cries of the American Revolution was "[n]o taxation without representation," a position derived from a more fundamental principle of "[n]o [domestic] legislation without representation." See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION,

162, 201-21 (1967); see also

RAKOVE,

supra note 132, at

293-97.

220
221

See THE

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para.

2 (U.S. 1776).
22-23 (1987).

WALTER BERNS, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY

Berns

notes that in the 1970 edition of the U.S. Code, "the Declaration is classified as one of
the 'Organic Laws of the United States.'" Id. at 23.
222 MAIER, supra note 173, at 129 (noting that the Declaration is a "constitutional
document" in the sense that it "concerned the fundamental authority of
government").
223 BERNS, supranote 221, at 22-23 (noting that an "organic law" is an "organizing
or constituting law" and that "[l]ike the Northwest Ordinance and the Constitution,
the Declaration is understood to be a law of the United States and, more precisely, an
organic law"); see also J. M. Balkin, The Declarationand the Promise of a Democratic Culture, 4 WIDENER L. SvMt.J. 167 (1999) (observing that "[t] he Declaration is our Constitution. It is our constitution because it constitutes us, constitutes us as a people
'conceived in liberty, and dedicated to a proposition"').
224 Mark Tushnet sees the Declaration as defining the "thin Constitution" enforced in the political arena and essential to a populist conception of constitutional
law, and he maintains that "[t]he Declaration's principles define our fundamental
law." TUSHNET, supra note 21, at 14. Notably, to the extent one sees a conflict be-

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 78:1

as a founding statement of principles, has also been widely regarded
as providing great insight into the basic purpose of the later Philadelphia Constitution, and thus serves as a guide to constitutional interpretation. 2 25 Even so, it is clear that the Declaration, in and of itself, is
not legally "binding" in the ordinary sense of the term and is thus
226 It
obviously not subject to any sort of (direct) judicial enforcement.
is also worth noting that the doctrine of judicial review was in its infancy in 1776 and could thus scarcely have provided a structural context of enforcement for the document even if it were thought legally
227
binding in some sense.
Additionally, the purpose for which the Declaration was written,
in its own words, concerned "a decent Respect to the Opinions of
Mankind" which required the Colonists to "declare the causes which
impel them to the Separation."' 228 While the Declaration was likely
meant to influence foreign opinion, it obviously was also meant to
influence domestic opinion within the colonies themselves. 229 It is
often forgotten that only about one-half of the politically active individuals of the founding generation supported the American revolutween the Declaration's commitment to robust federal-republican self-government
and expansive judicial power, such power is violative of the "thin" Constitution.
225 Abraham Lincoln, for instance, saw the principles of the Declaration as the
core of the Constitution, stating in essence that the Constitution was written to further the principles of the Declaration. See BERNS, supra note 221, at 15-20; GARY
JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, APPLE OF GOLD: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED
STATES 3-4 (1993); HARRY V. JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED: AN INTERPRETATION
OF THE ISSUES IN THE LINCOLN-DouGLAS DEBATES 374-75 (1959); TUSHNET, supra

21,

at

11; see also ScoTr

note

DoUCLAs GERBER, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARA-

(1995).
226 See, e.g.,
Balkin, supra note 223, at 168 (observing that "[c]ourts today do not
hold the Declaration to be part of the Constitution; they do not read the text of the
Declaration as if its clauses had the force of law, in the way they read the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause"). For a discussion of the Declaration and con-
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stitutional interpretation, see Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the
PrivilegesorImmunities Clause of theFourteenthAmendment, 12 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 63,
67 (1989) (contending that the Civil War Amendments are properly interpreted as
extensions of the promise of the original Constitution, which in turn was intended to
fulfill the promise of the Declaration of Independence).
227 See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
228 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. I (U.S. 1776); see also CARL L.
BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL

4-7 (1922).
229 Pauline Maier writes that the distribution of the Declaration by the Continental Congress as well as the geo-political context of 1776 give "strong reason [s] to think
that the Declaration of Independence was designed first and foremost for domestic
consumption." MAIER, supra note 173, at 130-31; see also PAULJOHNSON, A HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 154 (1997).
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225

2 30
tion and that about as many actually opposed independence.
Therefore, a powerful, solemn, public statement of the chief reasons
for independence was of paramount importance to the crucial political and military project of maintaining and building support for the
Revolution. 23 1 In particular, it is worth recalling that the signing of
the Declaration was an act of treason against the British Crown and
thus was fraught with danger, indeed, the risk of imprisonment and
execution. 23 2 This recognition suggests that the primary value of the
Declaration was political: its value lay in the way it would shape political debate, educate the public, and thus build support for
independence.
Further, as Abraham Lincoln and others believed, a major purpose of the Declaration was precisely an attempt to influence the political views of later generations. 233 Of course, for later generations,
the Declaration's value has been both political and educative. Certainly, the words, ideas, and sentiments of the Declaration of Independence have had that effect, shaping American political thought and
discourse for over two centuries. The ideals of the Declaration have
often been heard on the lips of reformers, including abolitionists, pro-

ponents of civil rights, and feminists. 23- 4 As Pauline Maier observes,

"[T]he sacralization of the Declaration of Independence after 1815
made it a powerful text to enlist on behalf of any cause that might
conceivably claim its authority" in order to "seize the moral high
ground in public debate.

'23 5

These causes included those of "work-

ers, farmers, women's rights advocates," as well as opponents of slavery. 236 For instance, the feminist movement of the mid-nineteenth

century invoked the language of the Declaration of Independence in
the celebrated Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions.2 37 Opponents of slavery often used the language of the Declarasupra note 229, at 171.
supra note 173, at 130-31.
232 See MAIER, supra note 173, at 152-53.
233 See BERNS, supra note 221, at 16-17;JOHNSON, supra note 229, at 154 (maintaining that the Continental Congress "also wanted to give the future citizens of America
a classic statement of what their country was about, so that their children and children's children could study it and learn it by heart"); GARY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYS230
231

JOHNSON,

See id.;

MAIER,

BURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA

234

102 (1992).

See MAIER, supra note 173, at 189-208.
235 Id. at 154, 197 (noting that the Declaration ultimately became "a moral standard by which the day-to-day policies and practices of the nation could be judged").
236 Id. at 197.
237 See Seneca Falls Declaration of 1848, reprinted in AN AMERICAN PRIMER 360
(Daniel J. Boorstin ed., 1966) ("We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men
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tion to articulate their moral objections to slavery.2 38 Notably, William
Lloyd Garrison invoked "the principles of the Declaration of Independence, whose promises made [America] the admiration of the world,"
to justify revolution and "the destruction of the Union and the Constitution," which he felt had betrayed the Declaration's principles. 239
Abraham Lincoln also invoked the Declaration to oppose slavery2 40
and famously held that the Declaration of Independence was a statement of the basic principles at the heart of the Constitution and thus
that the Constitution could be properly understood only in terms of
its purpose to fulfill the principles of the Declaration.2 4' One hundred years after Lincoln's EmancipationProclamationand Gettysburg Ad-

dress, Martin Luther King, Jr. stood beside the Lincoln Memorial and
delivered his landmark "I Have a Dream" speech, invoking the principles of the Declaration in opposition to racism and segregation.2 42
More recently the pro-life movement has invoked the Declaration's
principles in articulating moral-political objections to abortion and
and women are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.").
238 See MAIER, supra note 173, at 199.
239

240

See id.
See, e.g.,

JAFFA, supra note 225, at 375; THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DoucAS DE40-42 (Paul M. Angle ed., 1958); WILLS, supra note 233, at 99-100. Of course,
secessionists also invoked the Declaration of Independence to defend their own putative "declaration of independence" from the United States. See, e.g., DECLARATION OF

BXrES

THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES WHICH INDUCE ANDJUSTIFY THE SECESSION OF SOUTH CAROLINA
FROM THE FEDERAL UNION
HIS-TORY OF

1I-1

(1861), reprinted in

EDWARD MCPHERSON, THE POLITICAL

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA- DURING

THE GREAT REBELLION

15-16

(1864) (asserting that the government of the United States is subject to "the two great
principles" asserted in the Declaration of Independence: "the right of a State to gov-

ern itself; and the right of a people to abolish a Government when it becomes destructive of the ends for which it was instituted"). Unionists similarly invoked the
Declaration and other founding-era documents, such as the ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION
(1774), for the position that the Union pre-dated the Philadelphia Constitution and
thus that no state could unilaterally exit the Union by citing a constitutional violation
as a putative "breach" of the Constitution's compact among the states. See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln, irst InauguralAddress (1861), reprinted in DON E. FEIIRENBACHER, ABRAIHAM LINCOLN'S SPEECHES AND LEFrERS 1832-1865, at 154-62 (Paul M. Angle ed., 2d
ed. 1957).
241 Using a metaphor drawn from Proverbs 25:11, "A word fitly spoken is like apples of gold in a setting of silver," Lincoln maintained that the principles of the Declaration were the "fitly spoken word" that has proved an "apple of gold" and that the
Union and the Constitution "are the picture of silver, subsequently framed around it"
in order to "adorn" and "preserve it." BERNS, supra note 221, at 18-19. Lincoln thus
argued that the purpose of the Constitution was to further the principles of the
Declaration.
242 See MAIER, supra note 173, at 214-15.
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has also drawn on the Lincolnian understanding of the Declaration's
relation to the Constitution in articulating the importance of the right
to life to the very moral and political foundations of the American
2 43
constitutional order.
In the context of judicial power, what inspiration for reform can
contemporary reformers find in the Declaration of Independence?
First, the Declaration of Independence, like the Virginia Declaration
of Rights, displays an obvious commitment to political principles that
concern the foundation and structure of government and that are in
deep tension with expansive judicial power-namely, popular sover2 44
eignty, democratic representation, federalism, and human equality.
Thus, the Declaration's substantive commitments to the core values of
the American political tradition are suggestive of the need for reform
in the area ofjudicial power. Second, the Declaration is indicative of
the founding generation's profound understanding of the crucial relationship of republican constitutional structures to basic natural
rights. The Declaration in fact justifies the American Revolution almost wholly in terms of this relationship. Americans who were denied
their traditional rights to federal-republican self-government in the
Colonies inevitably found their natural rights of "Life, Liberty, and the
Pursuit of Happiness" in danger so grave as to warrant revocation of
their consent to be governed and recourse to military revolution to
establish a new government. This fact also suggests that an institution
that threatens or undermines those same structures today, as the Supreme Court may do when it exercises expansive judicial power, poses
a threat both directly and indirectly to the civil, political, and natural
rights of citizens. Third, the historical record surrounding the Declaration also bears witness to the great moral-political value of solemn
statements of principle in constitutive or organic political documents.
This value lies in the power of formalized and solemnized statements
to shape political debate and the broader evolution of American political culture and thus to spark political reform in later generations.
One may conclude, then, that the Declaration of Independence also
serves as a source of inspiration for a reform project in our own time:
a judicial power amendment that would highlight, emphasize, and
clarify the close connection between individual rights and republican
structures in the Constitution and that would also function in a politiSee, e.g., Hadley Arkes, Prudent Warnings and Imprudent Reactions, in TIHE END OF
II: A CRISIS OF LEGIrIMACY 44-85 (Mitchell S. Muncy ed., 1999) [hereinafter THE END OF DEMOCRAc'?]; Robert P. George, Justice, Legitimacy, and Allegiance, in
THE END OF DEMOCRACY?, supra, at 86-104; Ronald Reagan, Abortion and the Conscience
of the Nation, HUM. LIFE REX'., Spring 1983, at 7.
244 See supra note 224.
243
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cal and educative manner, shaping present and future political discourse and civic education and outlining the proper constitutional
scope of judicial power.
4.

The Philadelphia Constitution

It is also worth examining the Philadelphia Constitution in this
context. At the outset it is important to recognize that the Philadelphia Constitution is primarily a structural and procedural document, 245 and its design reflects the basic structural principles of the

American constitutional tradition evinced in the Virginia Declaration
of Rights and the Declaration of Independence: popular sovereignty, 246 representation, 247 separation of powers, 248 federalism,2 49 as

well as bicameralism and checks and balances. 25" Not surprisingly,
then, the debates in Philadelphia concerning the framing of the Constitution dealt almost entirely with structural-procedural questions of
governmental architecture involving these and related principles.
What was the purpose of these structural principles? In essence, the
Philadelphia Constitution was designed to protect "natural rights to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" through a strategy of establishing democratic institutions, broadly diffusing political power, and
promoting civic virtue among the people.2 5 1 As Michael Sandel has
observed, political liberty at the founding and in the early American
Republic was "understood as a function of democratic institutions and
dispersed power." 252 Further, political liberty was also understood as
253
depending ultimately upon the civic virtue of the sovereign people.
In this broad context, it is worth examining Hamilton's assertion
in The Federalist Papers that the Constitution itself "in every rational
sense, and to every useful purpose," is "A BILL OF RIGHTS."2 54 Hamilton opposed the addition of a bill of rights as simply unnecessary,
maintaining that the preamble's basic statement of popular soverSee ELN', supra note 42, at 88-101.
See U.S. CONST. pmbl., arts. V, VII.
See id. art. I.
248 See id. arts. 1, 11, 111.
249 See id. art. I (the "delegated and enumerated powers" and the composition of
the U.S. Senate); id. art. II (the composition of the electoral college); id. art. V (the
245
246
247

amendment procedures); id. art VII (the adoption procedures).
250 See, e.g., Tun; FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
251 See CAREY, IN DEFENSE, supra note 35, at 122-38.
252
253

SANDEi.,

254

TIHE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 483 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,

1999).

supra note 42, at 27.

See id.
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eignty-"We, the people of the United States, to secure the blessings
of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America" 2 5 5-was "a better recognition of popular rights than volumes of those aphorisms which
make the principal figure in several of our State bills of rights and
which would sound better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution
of government."' 25 6 Hamilton, more broadly, argued that the Philadelphia Constitution was the functional equivalent of a bill of rights
through its formal recognition and structural incorporation of basic
principles of free government recognized "aphoristically" in documents such as the Virginia Declaration of Rights. 25 7 Hamilton is
clearly right on this point. The architecture of the Philadelphia Constitution was indeed designed to protect individual rights and was constructed upon political premises recognizing those rights. Therefore,
the essential functions of the Constitution are precisely those of a bill
of rights, as the function of bills of rights was understood at the founding. Indeed, as Hadley Arkes has observed in this context, "the most
fundamental human rights, the most critical premises of personal
freedom [are] already reflected in the very structure of constitutional
government," the "rights of human beings to be ruled only by their
consent, in a government of free elections, a government restrained
by law." 258 In short, the very structure of the unamended Philadel-

phia Constitution, in fact formally recognized, endorsed, and operated to protect basic individual liberties. The Philadelphia
Constitution, then, as Hamilton asserts, is a "bill of rights" in a basic,
functional sense of the term.
Notably, Hamilton further observes that the security of important
freedoms, such as the liberty of the press, do not depend upon the
presence or absence of a bill of rights, but rather "must altogether
depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people
and the government."' 2 5 9 What protects individual rights, in Hamilton's view, is ultimately: (1) the spirit or foundation and structure of
the government, including its popular basis, democratic institutions,
and general diffusion and balancing of political power to express, mediate, educate, and refine the popular will; and (2) the spirit of the
people, including their civic virtue and their general respect for individual rights and the structure of the government, which will ulti255

256
257

U.S. CONST. pmbl.
THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 254, at 481.
See, e.g., HADLEY ARKES, BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION 78 (1990).

258
259
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mately prevail in any popular form of government. This is consistent
with the mainstream of political thought at the founding: political liberty was a function of representative institutions, diffused and balanced political power, and the civic virtue of the people.
Hamilton thus famously opposed the addition of a bill of rights to
the Constitution, dismissing the idea as one both unnecessary 91°' and
potentially dangerously misleading with respect to the question of federal limits on the powers of Congress. 2"' In Hamilton's view, not only
did the Constitution, as a kind of "bill of rights," render a formal bill
of rights superfluous, but a poorly drafted bill might in fact undermine by implication important constitutional principles, such as federalism. Still, what Hamilton did not explain (and really could not
explain satisfactorily) is why a populist, republican bill of rights that
attempted to reiterate, emphasize, clarify, and deploy "aphoristically"
the key structural themes of the Philadelphia Constitution (the
"spirit" of the government) and to privilege them politically and reinforce them in the "national sentiment" (the "spirit" of the people)
would not have substantial political and educative benefits that would
2 2
outweigh any potential costs. "
In fact, as discussed, this was precisely the view of many members
of the founding generation, such as James Madison, who came to view
a formal solemn statement of ethical "aphorisms" of free government
as providing an additional form of popular political check on the government through its political and educative effects on the political
process and civic culture.2"63 If the Constitution itself serves as a "bill
of rights," as Hamilton suggested, it is quite evident that a bill of rights
could serve as a "supplement" to or elaboration upon the foundational principles of the Constitution. Indeed, as Amar argues, our Bill
of Rights is itself a sort of Constitution, 26 4 a basic corollary of Hamilton's assertion that the Constitution is itself a bill of rights. Certainly,
a carefully drafted bill of rights with no "misleading" implications
could substantially promote constitutional values through its educative and political effect, reinforcing in the "spirit" of the people the
proper respect for the "spirit" of the government. Still, even if Hamil260 See id. at 478-81.
261
See id. at 481-85.
262 See id. at 478-88. Hamilton also did not explain why any potentially misleading
implications of a bill of rights could not be cleared tip through careful drafting. In
fact, the Ninth Amendment was written precisely to address Hamilton's concerns. See
i,fra notes 297-98 and accompanying text; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
263 See infa note 340 and accompanying text.
264 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill (f Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1131-33 (1991).
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ton was wrong to deride the Bill of Rights, he was right to consider the
Philadelphia Constitution as a kind of bill of rights and also to identify
a bill of rights as formal statements or "aphorisms," stating principles
of free government.
What inspiration for constitutional reform may one derive from
the Philadelphia Constitution? One may conclude, first, that the Philadelphia Constitution involves a strong substantive commitment to
fundamental principles of free government that conflict with expansive judicial power. 26 5 This fact should strongly reinforce modern
commitment to reform of judicial power to the extent that one takes
the structural integrity of the Constitution seriously and desires to promote it. Second, the analysis here also reinforces earlier conclusions
about the Founders' view of the close relationship between republican
constitutional structures and constitutional rights in a republican
form of government. This fact also suggests, again, that to the extent
that the Supreme Court erodes basic republican structural principles,
it is a direct and indirect threat to individual rights. In short, to the
extent that the Supreme Court renders political authority less democratic and less diffused and tends to enervate the civic virtue of the
people, it undermines political liberty. This suggests the need for substantive structural reform to preserve, restore, or fulfill the basic rights
and structures of the Constitution. Third, precisely because of the
close relationship mentioned previously, the Philadelphia Constitution is itself a kind of "bill of rights," given its direct recognition of
popular political rights and its provisions for indirectly protecting
non-participatory rights through diffusion and balance of political
power, making it accountable to the people, and promoting civic virtue. Therefore, a reform amendment designed to preserve or restore
the constitutional structures associated with such rights would itself be
a supplement to (and reform in the spirit of) the Philadelphia Constitution as a "bill of rights."
C.
1.

The Original Structural Understandingof the Bill of Rights

The Bill of Rights as a Structural Measure

Is it possible, then, that the Bill of Rights itself, as a complement
to the Philadelphia Constitution, was originally understood as having
a strong structural emphasis? It is worth noting at the outset that the
ratification of the proposed Constitution was ultimately made conditional on the promise of amendments to form a bill of rights and also
that many of the structural objections to the new Constitution were at
265

See, e.g.,

CAREY, FEDERALIST,

supra note 35, at 138-45.
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least partially allayed by the potential to "improve" the document
through an amendment process. 266 In fact, the primary proponents
of a Bill of Rights were Anti-Federalists whose chief objections to the
267
Philadelphia Constitution were fundamentally structural in nature.
Among the amendments they hoped a federal bill of rights would include were limits on the power of the national government, such as
restrictions on the power of Congress to lay direct taxes. 268
In fact, structural amendments that would have radically altered
the governmental framework of the Philadelphia Constitution were
defeated in the Federalist-controlled Congress, which proposed a very
different kind of bill. The Federalists' bill, written principally by
James Madison, was still structural in its orientation and focus, but
declaratory of and complementary to the original constitutional de2 69
sign, rather than designed to alter it and weaken federal power.
Anti-Federalists, therefore, voted almost unanimously against
Madison's bill, and Federalists, who had tended to deprecate the need
for a bill, voted almost unanimously for it.270
Thus, as Akhil Reed Amar and others have observed, the Bill of
Rights, as originally understood by the founding generation, was heavily structural in nature and reflected key "design" themes of the Philadelphia Constitution-such as deliberative democracy, civic
republicanism, federalism, bicameralism, and the separation of powers. 2 7 1 As Amar argues,

A close look at the Bill reveals structural ideas tightly interconnected with the language of rights; states' rights and majority rights
alongside individual and minority rights; and protection of various
intermediate associations-church, militia, and jury-designed to
created an educated and virtuous citizenry. The main thrust of the
it;
Bill was not to downplay organizational structure, but to 2deploy
72
not to impede popular majorities, but to empower them.
266 See LEVY, supra note 64, at 31-32.
267 Id. at 14.
268 1(. at 27-32. This restriction was proposed by, among others, the ratification
conventions of the states of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and South
Carolina. CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTs: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS 14-16, 25 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991).
269 See ROBERT A. GOLDWIN, FROM PARCHMENT TO POWER: How JAMES MADISON
USED THE BILL OF RIGHTS To SAVE THE CONSTrrUTION 30-33, 79-81 (1997).
270 See, e.g., id. at90-91;James H. Hutson, The Bill of Rights and the American Revolutionamy Experience, in A CULTURE OF RIGHTS: THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND LAW-i 791 and 1991, at 96-97 (Michael J. Lacey & Knud Haakonssen eds.,
1991).
271 Amar, supra note 264, at 1131-32.
272 Id. at 1132.
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It will be worthwhile to look at a few of its provisions in somewhat
greater detail in light of their structural basis and implications. It is,
for instance, well worth noting that the First Amendment's freedoms
of speech, press, assembly, and petition are rights all directly related
to both the federal republican and populist structural norms of the
Constitution. 273 It is the national government, rather than those of
the states that is enjoined by the Bill of Rights-in accordance with
the fundamental constitutional principle of federalism. 2 74 In fact, it
was widely argued at the ratification debates that Congress simply had
no delegated and enumerated power on which to base an invasion of
expressive rights, making specific rights provisions protecting speech,
press, and assembly superfluous. 275 Even so, many members of the
founding generation, after their experience with the British Crown,
simply did not trust the distant national government with even a potentially implicit power over political expression. 2 76 They therefore
sought to clarify further that this power was not delegated to the Congress, that it was instead retained by the people, and that it would be
found, if at all, in the domain of the state governments, which were
"closer" to the people and in the views of many in the founding gener2 77
ation, much less likely to become oppressive.
Second, the rights themselves-speech, press, assembly, and petition-are directly related to the healthy functioning of a representative form of government and thus to what the Founders viewed as the
fundamental and preeminent right to representation. 278 In fact, the
founding generation typically viewed the right of representation as a
preeminent "sheltering" right, one which, by providing a popular
check on the government, also indirectly protects a broad range of
other rights from governmental violation. 279 In short, then, a deprivation of these rights of expression and association would undermine
273

Id. at 1146-62.
274 See, e.g., Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833) (noting that the
limitations on power expressed in the federal constitution are "necessarily applicable
to the government created by the instrument" and not to the states).
275 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 254, at 481-83; see also LEvy, supra

note 64, at 121.
276 Of course, the colonists had generally argued that the taxation policies of the
King in Parliament violated the unwritten British Constitution. See BAILYN, supra note
219, at 66-77, 175-98, 208.
277 Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 52 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999)

(noting that influence of factions "will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the
Union than a particular member of it").
278 AMAR, supra note 167, at 20-21, 26-27.
279 RAKOVE, supra note 130, at 293 (contending that in the view of the Founders,
"[i]f the rights to representation and to trial by jury were left to operate in full force,
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the right to representation and the broad range of additional rights
that depend upon, and could be frustrated without, these closely re20
lated rights to political expression.
As one would expect, these rights are also further related to the
foundational constitutional norm of popular sovereignty and the concomitant right of revolution. These rights, stated in the Virginia Declaration, Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution's
Preamble, obviously require for their effective exercise broad rights to
freedom of expression and association. 28 1 Indeed, with the passage of
the Sedition Act in 1798, a partisan measure criminalizing certain
forms of criticism of the federal government, James Madison made
the following points in the Virginia Resolutions: the Sedition Act exceeded the delegated and enumerated powers of the U.S. Congress,
violated the constitutional principle of federalism, and was incompatible with the representative democratic and populist structure of the
American constitutional design. 2 2 Madison thus argued that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional under both the original Philadelphia
Constitution as well as the First Amendment's structural and declara83
tory protections of freedom of expression.2
The First Amendment provisions relating to the non-establishment and free exercise of religion also have important structural implications and are in fact best understood as structural federalism
provisions. 28

4

Indeed, the federalist proponents of the original Con-

stitution firmly denied that the constitutional plan contained any delegated or enumerated power that could be used by Congress to
establish a religion and that, therefore, the federal structure of the
Constitution made such a specific prohibition unnecessary.28 5 Amar
notes that the "original establishment clause, on a close reading, is not
antiestablishment but pro-states' rights; it is agnostic on the substantive issue of establishment versus nonestablishment and simply calls
for the issue to be decided locally." 286 The amendment, then, given
its agnosticism on the establishment issue, did not even implicitly conthey would shelter nearly all the other rights and liberties of the people" (emphasis
added)).

280
281

Id.
AMAR, sup/a note 167, at 20-32.
282 See, e.g., James Madison, Report Accompanying the Virginia Resolution, reprinted in 4 TiE DEBATES IN TlE STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPrION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITU'ION 546 (J. Elliot ed., 1866); William Mayton, Seditious Libel and the
Lost Guarantee of Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REXV.
91, 126-28 (1984).
283 Mayton, supra note 282, at 126-28.
284 AMAR, supra note 167, at 20-45.
285 LEVY, supra note 63, at 80-81.
286 AMAR, supra note 167, at 34.
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demn the establishment of religion 2 7 that existed in several states at
the time of the ratification of the Bill of Rights. It is thus better understood as a federalism provision protecting the rights of states to
establish or disestablish state religions than one of substantive religious liberty. Again, the founding generation's chief concern here was
with maintaining the strict limits on the delegated and enumerated
powers of the national government rather than directly with individual rights per se.
Moreover, the strong emphasis of the Bill of Rights on the impor288
tance of juries, which is guaranteed in three separate amendments,
is also closely related to structural concerns; it embodies the founding
generation's civic and republican preference for popular "representation" in thejudicial branch, for a "sheltering" right providing a powerful check on judges, and for the educative value of jury service for
citizens of a democratic republic. 28 9 Indeed, as Rakove reminds us,
trial by jury and legislative representation were the two rights to which
Americans gave "preeminent importance," reasoning that if "the
rights to representation and to trial by jury were to operate in full
force, they would shelter nearly all the other rights and liberties of the
people." 290 As Rakove observes, "representatives and jurors.., shared
parallel constitutional duties" that were chiefly "to protect people
against the abuse of power" by arbitrary government. 2 1 Juries thus
"evolved into a bastion of popular rights'' 29 2 and served as "Populist

Protectors," 293 "play[ing] a leading role in protecting ordinary individuals against governmental overreaching."'2' 4 It is particularly worth
noting in the context ofjudicial reform that the great value placed on
juries in the Bill of Rights is premised in part precisely on distrust of
judges as potentially tyrannical governmental actors.
Additionally, jury duty served the important republican educative
goal of allowing ordinary citizens a great measure of political participation 295 and affording an opportunity to learn about their government. 296 Juries then served the important purposes of providing a

popular check on judges and prosecutors, and of providing additional
287
288
289
290
291
292

Id. at 41.
U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, VII.
Amar, supra note 264, at 1182-95.
RAKOvE, supra note 132, at 293.
Id. at 294.
LEVY, supra note 64, at 219.
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opportunities for political participation and civic education. One may
further note that the Fourth Amendment's provision disfavoring
search warrants is premised precisely on the fact that they could be
issued by judges who were not subject to the check of a jury.297 Finally, when combined with right to trial in the district where the crime
occurred, juries instantiate the structural principle of localism in the
Constitution, parallel in many ways to that of federalism.
The Ninth Amendment is also closely related to populism (or the
popular sovereignty basis of government), to federalism, and to republican notions of civic education through formal statements of
principles or maxims of free government. The Ninth Amendment's
language concerning rights "retained" by the people is indicative of
the popular sovereignty principle of the founding generation. The
language of the amendment also implicates federalism and was meant
in part to belie the commonplace Federalist concern that enumeration of certain rights in the federal Constitution would imply that the
national government had power-beyond its strictly delegated and
enumerated powers-to violate rights not enumerated. 29 8 Therefore,
a provision negating this implication provided additional security for
the federal structure of the Constitution.
The Ninth Amendment also implicates civic republican concerns
related to political argument and culture. In fact, to the extent that
the Bill of Rights had an important educative and political function, a
provision such as the Ninth Amendment would also limit the potentially misleading political and educative implications of an omission of
important rights from the Bill: that rights not mentioned in it were in
fact unimportant and unworthy of respect. Indeed, if one thought
that the primary function of a bill of rights was to provide a stronger
basis for political objections to governmental action or to foster popular respect for certain basic principles of free government, then the
harm of an incomplete listing of rights is a very real one, weakening
the political and educative force of rights left unenumerated. But an
"unenumerated rights" provision could substantially mitigate such
harm. The Ninth Amendment would thus provide a powerful response to any claim that a right not listed in the Bill of Rights is by
virtue of its omission not an actual or important right of the people.
Through the Ninth Amendment, the Bill of Rights itself states that it is
not an exhaustive list of rights because the "enumeration" of "certain
297
298

Id. at 68-69.
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rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
299

the people.."

Along these lines, Leonard Levy ultimately concludes that the
Ninth Amendment, in its original understanding, refers in part to important "positive" and natural rights not listed in the Bill of Rights but
articulated in other founding-era sources, such as the various state
bills of rights and the Declaration of Independence. 30 0 Notably, this
view has decided implications for both the structural dimension of the
Bill of Rights and the question of judicial power under the constitutional design. The Virginia Declaration and the Declaration of Independence contain a large number of important structural principles
relating to popular sovereignty, representation, separation of powers,
and federalism. Indeed, the Ninth Amendment may be read as incorporating by reference the "rights" related to the structural provisions
of those documents discussed above: popular sovereignty, representation, separation of powers, and federalism, among others. What this
should suggest is the existence of what one might call a Ninth Amendment "right to judicial restraint" as a corollary to these fundamental
structural principles that are strongly supportive of judicial restraint.30 1 In short, the numerous array of structural "rights" on display in the Virginia Declaration of Rights and the list of grievances
(illustrative of grave threats to natural rights) in the Declaration of
Independence, if implicitly incorporated in the Ninth Amendment,
would in essence create a Ninth Amendment right to judicial restraint. This right would be defended, in light of the original structural understanding of the Bill of Rights, via popular and legislative
interpretation and political "enforcement" through the political process, rather than through the courts. 1 2 Notably, this interpretation of
the Ninth Amendment also conforms to the pattern of predominance
of structural concerns in the other provisions of the Bill of Rights.
In any event, whatever one may think of the precise content of
the Ninth Amendment and its relationship to federalism or other
299 U.S.
300

CONST.

amend. IX.

LEVY, supra note 64, at 254-55.

301 Notably, Levy does not see the tension between recognizing unenumerated
rights and supporting sweeping power by unelectedjudges to create new controversial
rights via the Ninth Amendment, thus circumventing these crucial rights-driven constitutional constraints on the exercise of federal political power. Even so, Levy recognizes that the Founders were not advocates of expansive judicial power and were
highly likely to have opposed it had it been raised as a potential aspect of the constitutional plan. Id. at 243.
302 See AMAR, supra note 167, at 120-23 (discussing popular enforcement of rights
provisions).
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structural principles, its text demonstrates an unequivocal grounding
in popular sovereignty, providing that rights are "retained" by the people and that only limited powers are delegated by the people to their
state or national governments (including courts as governmental actors). As Amar concludes, to see the Ninth Amendment as "a palladium of countermajoritarian individual rights [to be enforced on the
,' 3 3
people by unelected judges] . . .is to engage in anachronism. 1
Moreover, the Tenth Amendment, as Amar notes, "fit[s] together
snugly" with the Ninth Amendment 30 4 as a forthright statement of the
federal-populist basis of the Constitution. This amendment provides
that the peoples of the individual states delegate authority to their
state governments and also to the national government, though
whether this second delegation is accomplished directly or through
the state governments is a matter of some contention.3 0 5 It thereby
reinforces federalism and popular sovereignty and complements the
Constitution's specific provisions, such as Articles V, VII, and the Preamble. Indeed, the original Constitution, as revised by the Bill of
Rights, opens with the Preamble and closes with the Tenth Amendment, demonstrating parallel popular sovereignty provisions. 30 6 Notably, the phrase "the people," typically understood at the time as
referring to the "sovereign citizenry, ''31 7 appears only once in the en-

tire Philadelphia Constitution-in the Preamble-but it occurs an additional five times within the short space of the first ten amendments,
thereby establishing the American people "as an integral part of the
Constitution, in a way they had not been before. 30 8 Thus, the Bill of
Rights as a whole, and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments in particular, place a high value on populism. One may conclude, then, that
303

Id. at 120.
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Id.at 123.

305 See, e.g.,
U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 840 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting the contention that "because the States ratified the Constitution, the people can delegate power only through the States or by acting in their
capacities as citizens of particular States"); id. at 846 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The
ultimate source of the Constitution's authority is the consent of the people of each
individual State, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a
whole."). In The Federalist,James Madison maintained that "ratification is to be given
by the people not as individuals . ..but as composing the distinct and independent
States to which they respectively belong." THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 211 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999); see also FORREST McDONALD, STATES' RIGHTS
ANn THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO, 1776-1876, at 8-9 (2001) (describing the "nationalist" interpretation as "untenable").
306 AMAR, supra note 167, at 120-21.
307 Id. at 120.
308 See GOLnWIN, supra note 269, at 178.
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these are structural provisions that provide an additional constitutional basis in the Bill of Rights for objecting to expansive judicial
power.
What conclusions may one draw from this structural emphasis?
The original understanding of the Bill of Rights is highly structural in
nature and emphasizes rights-driven structural norms indicative of
foundational constitutional principles such as popular sovereignty,
representation, federalism, and civic republicanism. The Bill of
Rights was simply not understood originally as either primarily countermajoritarian in form or directly focused on individuals rights qua
individual rights. Rather its focus is largely populist/majoritarian in
substance and structural in nature, protecting rights implicitly and indirectly by reinforcing and complementing the original structure of
the Philadelphia Constitution. Amar concludes rightly that "[t] he essence of the Bill of Rights was more structural than not, and more
majoritarian than counter. ' 30 9 Nor should these observations be surprising when one recalls how intertwined for the founding generation
were questions of governmental structure and the rights of individuals, as evidenced by the Virginia Declaration of Rights, the Declaration
of Independence, and the Philadelphia Constitution. It was quite natural that a number of structural and related provisions were advocated
in the debates over the Bill of Rights and that the final ten amendments to the new Constitution should have strong structural bases and
implications that reinforced the Philadelphia Constitution's basic architectural principles. One may conclude, then, that constitutional
reform designed to reinforce or restore the basic populist/republican
structures of the Constitution in order to protect individual rights
would indeed be reform in the spirit of the Bill of Rights. Therefore a
reform amendment in the area ofjudicial power designed to limit the
Court's power to erode or circumvent these basic structures would itself be well within the spirit of the Bill of Rights-in addition to a
textual elaboration upon the implicit content of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments.
2.

The Bill of Rights as a Declaratory Measure

The Bill of Rights was not only heavily a structural measure, but
also heavily a declaratory and complementary one. In other words, it
did not purport to alter the structure of the Philadelphia Constitution
in any significant way, but rather was designed primarily to emphasize,
clarify, and reinforce its basic pre-existing structure. As Goldwin ob309
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serves, Madison's emphasis in defending the Bill of Rights was (1) "on
the expected favorable public reaction" to the provisions and the popular support for the new Constitution it would help to build, and (2)
"on their substantive harmlessness, that they would make no meaningful change in the Constitution," altering or weakening the Constitu3
tion's basic design. "'
This is, of course, precisely the reason why so many Anti-Federalists, who desired a weakening of the federal government in favor of
states' rights, were so disappointed with the Bill of Rights as it came to
be written, and why they ultimately declined to support its ratification. 3 11 It is also one of the reasons why so many Federalists in Congress did eventually vote to propose the Bill of Rights-once it was
understood that it generally reflected, complemented, and reinforced
rather than altered or weakened the structure of the new Constitution.3 12 It is, moreover, the principal reason why there was such a lack
of fanfare accompanying the final ratification of the Bill of Rights,
given that it was seen largely by its ultimate supporters, the Federalists,
as a simple (and perhaps superfluous) restatement and clarification of
the basic principles of the Philadelphia Constitution designed mostly
to forestall abuses they considered generally unlikely to occur.-3
One might note, as an example of the "declaratory" structural
aspect of the Bill of Rights, Madison's defense-in the face of the Sedition Act of 1798-of the "individual" right to free speech. As noted
above, Madison claimed that the right to free speech and press was in
fact implicit in both the federal and republican structure of the Philadelphia Constitution and therefore actually predated the First Amendment, which only restated and emphasized the federal government's
general lack of a delegated power to censor political speech.31 4 Hamilton had also earlier argued that the federal government had no delegated and enumerated power in Article I to regulate the press and,
therefore, that there was no need to add a "free press" rights provision
to the Constitution. 315 Notable also is that the Sixth Amendment
310
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GOLDWIN, supra note 269, at 90-93, 255-57.

313

Id. at 173-74.

supra note 269, at 93.

314 See, e.g., James Madison, Report Accompanying the Virginia Resolution, reprinted in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 282, at 546; James Madison, Report of 1800, reprinted
in 17 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 307 (David B. Mattern et al. eds., 1991); see also
Mayton, supra note 282, at 94.
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right to jury trial 316 is also largely declaratory of the Article III jury
trial requirement.3 17 As we have seen, the same can be said for other
provisions of the Bill of Rights, including the Establishment Clause
and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments; they prohibit the national
government from taking actions that were already typically outside its
delegated and enumerated powers, 3 18 and they restate, for purposes
of emphasis, principles of popular sovereignty already expressly and
impliedly incorporated within the original Constitution. 3 19 The Ninth
Amendment in part negates the potential mistaken impression that
the Bill of Rights might have created, i.e., that the federal government
has power beyond its delegated and enumerated powers to engage in
320
any conduct not prohibited by the provisions of the Bill of Rights.
The Tenth Amendment further reinforces this federalist principle,
holding that all powers not delegated to the federal government are
retained by the states or, if not delegated to the states by the people of
the states, retained by the people.3 2 1 In short, the original structural
understanding of the religion and expression clauses of the First
Amendment, as well as the Ninth and Tenth Amendment, are essentially declaratory in nature, designed to clarify and emphasize the preexisting constitutional structure. Thus, reform designed to clarify and
emphasize the meaning of the Constitution's republican architecture
through a declaratory amendment is reform in the broad spirit of the
Bill of Rights.
3.

The Bill of Rights as a Political Measure

How was the Bill of Rights to function? What was its strategy for
protecting rights? 322 There are two basic points that must be kept in
mind to avoid falling into anachronism. First, the Framers did not
view the Supreme Court as a powerful institution or assume that it
would be a wholly benign guardian of constitutional rights and structures. On the contrary, the founding generation viewed the Court as
316
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amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy

the right to... trial.., by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed.").
317 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeach-

ment, shall be byJury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes
shall have been committed.").
318 SeeAMAR, supra note 167, at 119-33.
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by far the weakest institution of the federal government. 323 In light of
the uncertain status of judicial review circa 1790 and the general quiescence of the judiciary at this period, this perspective is not at all
surprising.3 24 Moreover, those who did claim to view the Supreme
Court as a potentially powerful institution were invariably the AntiFederalists, whose political interests were furthered by painting the
proposed Court as a threat to state governments and the rights of the
people.32 5 Second, the clear concern of the majority of the Framers

involved general oppression of the governed rather than majoritarian
oppression of minorities. 32" Such oppression, of course, could include oppression by courts, and the judiciary, as the least representative branch of the federal government, might be thought to pose a
particularly serious threat. 32 7 Nor is it likely that the Founders would

have thought that giving federal judges a wide-ranging policy veto
over the elected branches of government would have been a particularly thoughtful or impressive solution to the inevitable dangers of
democratic government.3

28

This understanding of the tenuous link

between the Bill of Rights as originally understood and the practice of
judicial review is further reinforced by the widely recognized and
longstanding tradition in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
329
of almost total judicial non-enforcement of the Bill of Rights.
How, then, did the Founders think the Bill of Rights would protect rights from the government? As Rakove reminds us, the Founders, Anti-Federalists and Federalists alike, "regarded bills of rights as
standards that would enable the people to judge the behavior of their
governors, to know when their legitimate rights and interests were be323 THE FEDERALIS-r No. 78, supra note 56, at 433 (noting that the Court is the "the
least dangerous" branch to the political rights of American citizens).
324 On the general weakness of the Supreme Court in the 1790s, see MCCLOSKEY,
supra note 24, at 19-23; and SCHlWARTZ, supra note 23, at 15-31.
325

SeeBrutus, Essay XI (1788), r)rintedinTI-I t.AN-TII-FEDERALIST 162, 164-67 (Mur-

ray Dry ed., 1981).
326 See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 132, at 336.
327 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VI.
328 See THE FEDERALIST No.51, at 288-93 Uames Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1999) (noting in the context of monarchy that attempting to protect minority rights
by "creating a will in the community independent of the majority" is but a "precarious

security" because a power independent of the majority "may as well espouse the tinjust views of the major as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be
turned against both" (emphasis added)). This criticism applies as well to thejudiciary
acting as a countermajoritarian "will independent of the majority" involved in policymaking on moral-political issues via expansive judicial review. See generally CHRISTOPHER WOLFEJUDICIAL ACTIVISM: BULWARK OF FREEDOM OR PRECARIOUS SECURITY? (rev.

ed. 1997) (making a case for the democratic character of moderate judicial activism).
329 See supra Pa't Il.A.
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ing violated."' 3 0 Thus, the traditional and widely held view of the
principal function of a bill of rights was one of providing the sovereign people with an express constitutional standard from which to (1)
judge whether an action of the government violated a constitutional
right or structure and (2) use as a cynosure of political debate in opposition to unconstitutional acts. The purpose of a bill of rights, then,
was to provide citizens with both an express standard ofjudgment and
a political rallying point from which to oppose abuse of power by their
government.I l Amar notes that both Madison and Jefferson emphasized the link between a bill of rights, "popular education," and "popular enforcement" through the political process, including the actions
of juries, as remedies for and deterrents to unconstitutional conduct. 33 2 For instance, Jefferson endorsed this view when he observed

that "[w] ritten constitutions may be violated in moments of passion or
delusion, yet they furnish a text to which those who are watchful may
again rally and recall the people; they fix too for the people the principles of their political creed. '3 3 This, of course, was also the original
structural understanding of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which
functioned in a purely political and educative manner and which was
34
valued by the founding generation precisely for those effects.1
This structural understanding of the Bill of Rights also explains
why a number of its provisions are limitations on courts rather than
political actors. This was so not because courts were going to be
'judges in their own case" as to whether they themselves were acting
oppressively, but rather because in the view of the Founders, the people needed a written standard to answer that question for themselves
and to oppose potential acts of judicial tyranny. Indeed, as Gerard
Bradley has observed, several "amendments in the Bill of Rights (the
Fourth, much of the Fifth, the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Amendments) reveal a lack of confidence in the judiciary: they guaranteerights
within judicial proceedings.' 335 It is clear, then, that the widely agreedupon view of the chief value of a bill of rights at the founding was what
can be termed a political function: it would provide a written standard
330
331
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332

AMAR, supra note 167, at 131-32.

RAKoVE,

supra note 132, at 336.
supra note 269, at 65.

333 Letter from Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States, to Joseph Priestley, Pastor (June 19, 1802), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 158, 159-60
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1897), quoted in AMAR, supra note 167, at 131.
334 See supra Part III.B.2.
335 AmAR, supra note 167, at 129; Gerard V. Bradley, The Post-ConstitutionalEra, in
REINVENTING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE: UNITY OF DIVERSny TODAV 141 (Robert Royal ed.,
1995) (emphasis added).
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for the people whenjudging whether any of the institutions of government were acting tyrannically. Thus, while the potential role for federal courts in enforcing the Bill of Rights did not go completely
unremarked upon,"": 3 it was a generally new, unfamiliar, and uncertain approach, which was further undermined by the general weakness of the judiciary in the founding era.
The Sedition Act controversy also provides an illustration of the
political function of the Bill of Rights. 337 There the First Amendment

speech and press clauses chiefly functioned as a political measure,
sharpening the Jeffersonians' objections to censorship by the federal
government. The First Amendment thus contributed to the defeat of
the Federalists in the elections of 1800, even though the Sedition Act
was not in fact struck down by the courts. 38 A reform amendment
proposal that was designed to work politically by shaping discourse on
public affairs and providing an express standard and "rallying point"
to empower constitutional. objections to expansive judicial power,
would fall well within the original spirit of the Bill of Rights.
4.

The Bill of Rights as an Educative Measure

It should be noted thatJames Madison was somewhat skeptical of
the traditional political value of a bill of rights simply because in a
republican form of government the people themselves were already in
control. 19 Given the popular control of a republic, the people would
be judging and rallying against themselves. This objection is of especially limited value in the present context, however, where the political function is being asserted against unelected and electorally
unaccountable judges. In short, Madison's initial doubts about the
value of a bill of rights are much less applicable when the institution
one seeks to limit is subject to only very indirect and limited popular
control. Still, it is worth examining what Madison did think was the
chief value of the Bill of Rights. He thought the Bill of Rights might
have an important educative, civic use, helping to instill republican
virtues in the populace and thereby limiting majoritarian tyranny. Indeed, Madison observed that "the political truths declared in that solemn manner [i.e., by constitutional amendment] acquire by degrees
the character of fundamental maxims of free government, and as they
become incorporated with the national sentiment, counteract the im336
337
338
339
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pulses of interest and passion."340 This view did not originate with
Madison but was in fact a common view in colonial Virginia, and it
34
underlay the functional value of the Virginia Declaration of Rights. '
Therefore, even in a government premised on a structural plan
of protecting rights through democratic institutions and dispersed political power, a bill of rights could still indirectly augment those protections by fostering civic virtues among the voters, such as respect for
the legitimate rights of others, particularly those rights direcdy or in3
directly related to the republican structure of the government.

42

It

could also foster greater respect for the constitutional structural principles themselves. Indeed, as Madison thought, the fostering of a political culture and "national sentiment" strongly supportive of
foundational constitutional principles could effectively restrain the
passions and interests which might lead individuals to reject them or
violate. them in particular cases. 34 3 Thus, as Jefferson also thought,
fixing the principles of the American political creed in a constitutive
document could have a powerful effect on political rhetoric and culture. 344 In particular, there is every reason to believe that the Consti-

tution in general and the Bill of Rights in particular, as "basic symbols
of legitimacy," have played a central role in shaping American political culture, including our understandings of the rights of the individual and the proper structure of government. 34 5 It is also true, of
course, that the major influence the Supreme Court has had on how
Americans think about rights is derivative of its interpretive function
with respect to the Constitution and is therefore at least partly parasitic of the educative value of the Bill of Rights. 3"4 6 Thus, the Bill of

Rights has operated for much of its history-and to a significant extent still does so today-in a political and educative fashion. A reform
340 3 THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 616 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1980), quoted
in GOLDWIN, supra note 269, at 72. Rakove writes that "[b]ills of rights [in Madison's
view] would best promote the cause of republican self-government if they enabled
republican citizens to govern themselves-to resist the impulses of interest and passion that were the root of factious behavior." RAKOVE, supra note 132, at 336.
341
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345 For a discussion of politico-cultural conflict over the invocation of "symbols of
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amendment proposal designed to work educatively by shaping American political culture over generations and creating a favorable climate
for objections to expansive judicial power would fall well within the
spirit of the Bill of Rights.
5.

The Bill of Rights and the Judicial Power

As the previous discussion demonstrates, the original understanding of the Bill of Rights was that of a measure largely structural and
declaratory in substance and political and educative in function. The
substance of the Bill of Rights, as originally understood, was largely
declaratory of and complementary to the Philadelphia Constitution
and its basic structural norms. There is good reason to think that the
American constitutional design, properly interpreted, precludes expansive judicial power, given its propensity to undermine basic constitutional principles. Thus, the Bill of Rights is correctly read as
reinforcing a constitutional design that prohibits expansive judicial
power. Indeed, the basic themes of the Bill of Rights-populism, federalism, civic republicanism, separation of powers-are in stark tension with a highly expansive judicial role. Moreover, the Ninth
Amendment in particular can be read as textual reinforcement or incorporation of basic structural principles of American constitutionalism-principles apparent in the design of the Philadelphia
Constitution and in the text of the Virginia Declaration of Rights and
the Declaration of Independence. Therefore, the Ninth Amendment
itself can be said to contain, as a corollary of its structural commitments, an implicit "right to judicial restraint."3 4 7 To that extent, then,
the Ninth Amendment, like the Tenth, is simply declaratory of the
pre-existing American constitutional design. Even so, the analytic,
normative, and rhetorical value of this view should not be
underestimated.
Further, the Bill of Rights, as originally understood, was thought
to function primarily in an educative and political fashion, protecting
constitutional structure and rights by shaping the national political
culture and political debate on these crucial matters. In short, the
primary method by which the Bill of Rights was thought to protect
rights was through civic promotion of popular respect for rights and
rights-driven structures. In particular, judicial review in this era was a
new, unfamiliar, and generally uncertain alternative strategy for en347

cf Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 520 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting)

(observing that the Ninth Amendment "was passed ... to assure the people that the

Constitution in all its provisions was intended to limit the Federal Government to the
powers granted expressly or by necessary implication").
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forcing bills of rights that was also vitiated by the general weakness
and quiescence of courts. Thus, it is worth emphasizing that the contemporary association of the Bill of Rights with a strong Supreme
Court, routine use ofjudicial review, and countermajoritarian individual rights is largely an early and mid-twentieth century development.3 48 Moreover, while judicial review under the Bill of Rights has

been in many ways a valuable constitutional development worth preserving, its dangers to the constitutional order and the degree to
which its expansive exercise undermines many of the core values of
the Bill of Rights and Philadelphia Constitution must be fully
recognized.
In sum, then, the Bill of Rights not only provides no positive support for expansive judicial power, but it also provides strong support
for the contention that such power exceeds the authority of the Supreme Court and violates the structure of the Constitution..3 49 Ajudicial reform amendment designed to make this implicit reading of the
structure of the Constitution textually explicit therefore clearly falls
well within the spirit of the Bill of Rights.
D.

The Bill of Rights and the Eleventh Amendment

Moreover, the founding generation's recognition of the value of
judicial reform can also be seen in its broad support for the Eleventh
350 This amendment was ratified in 1794, shortly after
Amendment.
the Bill of Rights became law, and it overturned the Supreme Court's
decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,35 1 which held that the judicial power
under Article III extended to "suits for money against a state government" by a citizen of that state or any other state. 352 The language of
Article III extending the judicial power to controversies "between a
State and citizens of another State '3 53 read literally and in isolation
would seem to support such a contention. Even so, many of the Constitution's most prominent proponents-including Madison, Hamilton, and Marshall-had expressly disclaimed this interpretation
during the ratification debates as inconsistent with the fundamental
348
349
350
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background constitutional principle of federalism.3 5 4 This interpretation was thus viewed by many as precluded by the structural design of
the Constitution and the concomitant proper structural context of the
interpretation of Article II1. Indeed, the evidence strongly suggests
that Chisholm was widely viewed by the founding generation as a misinterpretation of the Constitution, resting on an overly literal reading of
the text of Article III in isolation from the broader structural context
of the American constitutional design. 35 5 This misinterpretation allowed federal courts to exceed the scope of the national judicial
power, undermining both state power and the crucial federal structure of the Constitution.

356

In response to Chisholm, Congress hastened to propose3 57 and the
states swiftly ratified3 58 the Eleventh Amendment: "[t]he judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.

3'
1

59

Indeed, the fact that the text uses the language of construction
(i.e., "the judicial power shall not be construed to extend . ...")
rather than simple alteration (i.e., "the judicial power shall not extend .

. .

.") also supports the contention that the Eleventh Amend-

ment was not seen by its framers and ratifiers as a substantive
alteration of Article III of the Constitution, but rather as a declaratory
provision clarifying its pre-existing meaning and correcting the Supreme Court's misconstruction of that meaning 6 11
354 MCCLOSKEY, supra note 24, at 21. Overall the Framers' views on these questions were mixed, with proponents and opponents of the Constitution expressing
opinions on both sides of this reading of Article III. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 91,
at 182-83.
355 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). Whether the Eleventh Amendment stands for a broad federalist sovereign immunity principle or a more narrow
limit on diversity jurisdiction, leaving federal-question subject matter jurisdiction unaffected, is hotly contested. For the former view, see Seminole Tribe of Fl. v. Florida,517
U.S. 44, 54 (1996). For the latter view, see id. at 78 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 110
(Souter, J., dissenting); and James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269 (1998).
356 See Alden., 527 U.S. at 714-15, 720-21; Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 429 (Iredell,

J.).
357 It took only three weeks. STONE, supra note 105, at 230.
358 They ratified within a year, although the official proclamation of ratification
was not made until 1797. Id.
359 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
360 Alden, 527 U.S. at 722 (observing that "the text and history of the Eleventh
Amendment... suggest that Congress acted not to change but to restore the original

constitutional design" (emphasis added)).
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The Eleventh Amendment, then, ratified by the founding generation less than a decade after the ratification of the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights, 3 6 ' likely rests upon the following premises:

first,

that the Supreme Court can misinterpret the scope of the judicial
power under Article III by failing to attend to background structural
norms of the Constitution such as federalism. Second, that such misinterpretations can lead the federal courts to exceed their authority
under Article III and undermine important structural constitutional
norms. And, third, that such misinterpretations by the Court are subject to correction, and the Constitution to clarification, by declaratory
amendment. In short, the founding generation did not hesitate to
clarify the meaning of Article III, as understood "holistically" in light
of the Constitution's architecture, even when this required a constitutional amendment to overturn the Supreme Court's (mis)understanding of the scope of judicial power.
The Eleventh Amendment, then, is constitutional reform well
within the spirit of the Bill of Rights: it is primarily declaratory and
structural in nature and that is meant to function in an important
educative and political manner. The Eleventh Amendment thus reinforces the important reform lessons of the Bill of Rights (as well as
other founding-era documents) and demonstrates their specific application in the area of judicial power under Article III. This amendment, therefore, may also serve as an additional model and
inspiration for our contemporary constitutional reform efforts. One
may conclude, then, that an amendment proposal designed to overturn or limit the judiciary's power to misconstrue its own powers
under Article III and erode fundamental structural principles is a
mode of constitutional reform well within the spirit of the founding
generation's understanding.
E.

ConstitutionalRights, ConstitutionalStructure, and the American
ConstitutionalDesign

In the final analysis, the range of "original understanding(s)" of
the Bill of Rights, as supplemented by our examination of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights, The Declaration of Independence, the Philadelphia Constitution, and the Eleventh Amendment, is one of a document primarily structural, declaratory, political, and educative in
nature. This original understanding is broadly reflective of the importance that the founding generation placed upon fundamental principles of constitutional structure, the close relationship of structure to
361
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rights, and the great political and educative value of formal statements
of principles of constitutional structure and rights in a declaration or
bill of rights.
Of course, the purpose of this exploration of the original understanding of the Bill of Rights has not been to argue against the legitimacy of the development of restrained judicial review, but rather to
reinforce our concerns about expansive judicial power and to seek
inspiration for our contemporary judicial restraint reform project in
the founding generation's profound meditations on constitutional
government. There is every reason to suppose that our modern reform efforts can greatly benefit from a close study of the political theories and practices of the Founders. Indeed, the original
understanding of the Bill of Rights can provide us with an important
inspiration and a practical model for reform. This model can guide
our reform project and thus restore a more populist, republican understanding of the Constitution's design. The original structural understanding of the Bill of Rights, then, is highly suggestive of the
potentially great value of an amendment that functions in a chiefly
political and educative manner to clarify, reinforce, and emphasize
the important implications of fundamental structural principles as
they relate to the constitutional limits of Article III and the constitutional rights of American citizens.
F

ConstitutionalReform in the Spirit of the Bill of Rights

What form, then, might modern constitutional reform in the
spirit of the Bill of Rights take? The original understanding of the Bill
of Rights was of a document structural, declaratory, political, and educative in nature. Therefore, first and foremost, constitutional reform
in the "spirit" of the Bill would be structural, reinforcing the basic
design of the Constitution-such as representative democracy, federalism, and separation of powers-and clarifying and deploying these
designs' relationship to the closely related questions of (1) individual
rights under the Constitution and (2) their more particular constitutional implications with respect to structural questions such as allocation of power among various institutions.
How, then, might these principles be deployed to limit expansive
judicial power? Ajudicial reform amendment would seek to reinforce
these fundamental structural values and emphasize and clarify their
implications for the properjudicial role, including the important (implicit) structural limits on the exercise of judicial review and the relationship of judicial restraint to the fundamental rights of the
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individual. 36 2 As shall be shown, such an amendment might particularly emphasize the constitutional imperative of judicial restraint, requiring judges to ground their decisions firmly in traditional legal
materials, minimize their political discretion in the area of constitutional interpretation, and exercise the power ofjudicial review deferentially-all in order to preserve fundamental constitutional values.
Second, constitutional reform in the spirit of the Bill of Rights
would be largely declaratory in nature. It would avoid any important
substantive innovations in the design of the Constitution and would
seek instead simply to emphasize, clarify, and reinforce its preexisting
(if partially implicit) fundamental structure. A judicial power reform
amendment would avoid obvious structural innovations-such as congressional override, recall elections, or supermajority requirements
for the exercise of judicial review-meant to "improve" the Constitution. Such an amendment, then, would simply (re)state the implicit
preexisting constitutional limits on the exercise of the judicial power
in constitutional cases-and do so as plainly and precisely as possible.
Third, constitutional reform in the spirit of the Bill of Rights
would be political in nature, providing a statement of principles of
constitutional structure and rights, as well as their implications for the
judicial power and specifically what actions by the judicial branch violate the Constitution. Ajudicial reform amendment would, therefore,
be designed to promote popular objections to judicial usurpation of
legislative authority by (1) evincing in the constitutional text (further)
distrust of unelected judges, 36 3 (2) attempting to clarify what legitimate rights (related to structural principles such as representative democracy and federalism) expansive judicial power would violate, and
(3) indicating more precisely which judicial actions are in fact constitutional violations. The amendment's ultimate goals would be to provide a more explicit standard for the proper use ofjudicial power and
to serve as a rallying point for opposition to the expansive use of the
judicial power. These developments in turn would facilitate the use
of, and clarify the proper scope and dimensions of, the various politi362 See Waldron, supra note 20 (arguing that a broad belief in individual rights
rooted in human dignity entails a belief in the basic democratic rights that are violated
when unelected judges enforce their own controversial conceptions of rights against
those of democratic majorities).
363 Such distrust would be in addition to that implicit in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,

and Seventh Amendments. See U.S. CONST. amends. IV (conditioning the issuance of
warrants), V (requiring indictment of a grand jury for capital crimes, prohibiting
double jeopardy, and requiring due process of law), VI (ensuring the right to a jury
trial in all criminal prosecutions), VII (ensuring preservation of jury trial rights in
suits at common law and limiting the reexamination of jury verdicts).
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cal checks on the judiciary as well as other strategies for correcting
judicial overreach.
Finally, constitutional reform in the spirit of the Bill of Rights
would be educative in nature. It would be concerned with declaring
political truths in a highly visible and solemn manner in order to educate the public, shaping American political culture and limiting "factious" passion- and interest-driven behavior. Thus, a judicial reform
amendment would hope to foster a national political culture that is
sensitive to the dangers of juristocracy, that recognizes the value of
representative democracy, and that opposes the "factious" pursuit of
partisan political agendas-whether slavery, laissez-faire, or abortion-from the federal bench.

IV.

AN OVERARCHING REFORM MEASURE: THE JUDICIAL
RESTRAINT AMENDMENT

A.

The Idea of a Judicial Restraint Amendment

What measures should reformers pursue to rein in the Court, restore the republican structure of the Constitution, and promote its
fundamental populist aspirations? Certainly reformers should continue to pursue diverse political and educative avenues of reform,
seeking the appointment of restraintist judges to the federal bench,
promoting greater public awareness of the American constitutional
design, and identifying the highly suspect status of expansive judicial
power in our framework of government.
What may be most needed, however, is an overarching avenue of
reform that encompasses, complements, and transcends these more
specific political and educative efforts by organizing, promoting, reinforcing, and legitimating them. A judicial restraint amendment
would serve these needs. In particular, it could give the judicial reform movement a dramatic, single unifying goal or rallying point
around which to organize and concentrate its efforts. An amendment
in the spirit of the Bill of Rights could potentially further judicial reform purposes in four ways. First, it could clarify and reinforce the
structural nature of the American constitutional design by igniting
and concentrating debate directly on the most fundamental structural
interpretive issues at stake. Second, it could render implicit constitutional limits more explicit in a declaratory fashion rather than substantively altering the constitutional design in a controversial and
unpredictable manner. Third, it could empower political objections
to expansive judicial power in an effective fashion. And, finally, it
could educate and shape elite and popular opinion with respect to the
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danger and constitutional (il)legitimacy of expansive judicial power in
the pursuit of controversial partisan and ideological ends.

B.

A Specific Proposal: The ConstitutionalRights RestorationAmendment

If we have established the basic lineaments of a judicial restraint
amendment, what might such an amendment actually look like more
specifically? One might formally entitle it the "Constitutional Rights
Restoration Amendment" (CRRA), and it could read something like
this:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS RESTORATION AMENDMENT
SECTION 1
The authority of the Supreme Court and lower federal courts to
review the constitutionality of state and federal legislation and executive and judicial acts in potential conflict with the justiciable provisions of the Constitution is itself derived from and limited by the
structure of the Constitution. In order to protect the basic rights
reflected in and preserved by fundamental constitutional principles
such as popular sovereignty, representative democracy, the separation of powers, and federalism, the judicial power shall not be construed to exceed its constitutional limits.
SECTION 2
This amendment recognizes the constitutional requirement ofjudicial restraint. When exercising the power ofjudicial review, the Justices of the Supreme Court and other federal judges shall ground
their decisions firmly in constitutional text, history, and structure;
minimize any degree of discretion they may have in the interpretation of constitutional provisions; strive to be non-partisan and nonideological in rendering decisions; and defer to the judgment of
state and federal elected representatives except in cases involving a
clear violation of the Constitution.
SECTION 3
This amendment recognizes that an exercise of judicial review in
violation of this standard exceeds the scope of the authority of the
federal courts under the Constitution, undermines the republican
design of the Constitution, and threatens the constitutional rights
of the people. Such an exercise of judicial power is therefore a violation of the Constitution.
SECTION 4
The President and Congress have a constitutional obligation to uphold and defend the Constitution. In light of this obligation and in
accordance with the system of checks and balances established by
the Constitution, this amendment recognizes the preexisting and
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concurrent authority of the elected branches to check and limit judicial violations of the Constitution. The constitutional question of
the degree of deference the elected branches must extend to the
decisions of the judicial branch may be determined by the elected
branches independently of the views of the judiciary.
SECTION 5
The enumeration of judicial interpretative authority in this amendment shall not be construed to deny or disparage the ultimate interpretive authority reserved to the Sovereign People of the United
States, who ordained and established this Constitution and its
amendments, or any other interpretive authority granted to their
elected representatives in the state and federal governments by the
Constitution.
SECTION 6
All political power in the United States is vested in, and consequently derived from, the Sovereign People of the United States,
who bear the final responsibility for the preservation of their constitutional order and their constitutional rights; no free government,
or the blessings of liberty, can be preserved by any People except by
popular vigilance and frequent recurrence to fundamental principles of republican government.
Such a structural amendment is, in fact, modeled quite closely on
what we have seen of the "original understanding" of the Bill of
Rights: it is primarily structural, declaratory, political, and educative in
nature.
It is structural, of course, not only in the sense that it is an attempt to remedy the problem of expansive judicial power, but that it,
like the Bill of Rights, echoes, restates, clarifies, emphasizes, and deploys the implicit basic structural and foundational principles of the
Constitution. These include the following: popular sovereignty, representation, federalism, and separation of powers, as they relate to the
proper scope of the judicial power. In particular, both its title, the
"Constitutional Rights Restoration Amendment," and its textual provisions emphasize the important relationship-recognized by the Founders and reflected in the Virginia Declaration, the Declaration of
Independence, the Philadelphia Constitution, and the Bill of Rightsbetween constitutional structure and constitutional rights. Special
emphasis is placed on the ultimate dependency of constitutional
rights, both participatory and non-participatory, upon the interaction
of constitutional structure with the civic virtue of the people.
The amendment is declaratory in the sense that it does not purport to-and does not-substantively alter or "improve" the Constitution but simply clarifies and emphasizes the implicit
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unconstitutionality of expansive judicial power in light of the Constitution's basic architecture. It therefore follows the Bill of Rights,
many of whose provisions were declaratory of and complementary to
the structure of the Philadelphia Constitution. In fact, a judicial restraint amendment might be seen as simply a textual elaboration
upon a preexisting Ninth Amendment structural "right to judicial restraint.

'364

The CRRA also echoes the declaratory language of the

Eleventh Amendment regarding the manner in which the judicial
power of the United States shall be "construed," limiting the Supreme
Court's potential misunderstanding of its own power under the
Constitution.

365

The CRRA is functionally political in that it would derive its force
not purely from judicial self-enforcement, but from facilitating objections by political actors to expansive judicial power, and by providing
an express standard and rallying point for criticism of judicial decisions incompatible with the constitutional design. It would thus raise
significantly the salience of the issue of judicial constitutional violations, encouraging both the appointment of "restraint" judges to the
bench and moderate checking activities by the political branches, including the traditional and widely accepted "debate, litigate, legis36 7
late ,366 and "nominate" strategies.
Finally, the CRRA is educative in its basic function: one hopes
and expects that it would help to foster a political culture that recognizes the existence of constitutional limits on the judicial power and
that opposes the passion- and interest-driven "factional" misuse of judicial review in violation of the Constitution to further controversial
3 68 Ultipolitical agendas-whether slavery, laissez-faire, or abortion.
mately, such a view of the judicial power might become so deeply ingrained in the national sentiment that the "factious" litigation strategy
of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), centered around the
impermissible circumvention of the Constitution's political processes,
would become as politically anachronistic as monarchy, state
churches, or sedition acts.
In fact, the only major functional difference between the numerous structural and declaratory provisions of the Bill of Rights and the
CRRA is that the former. was designed largely to forestall future mistaken constitutional practices, and the latter is designed to correct
364
365

See supra Part III.C.1.
See supra Part III.D.

366 Moynihan, supra note 37, at 8.
367 See id.
368 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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contemporary mistaken practices that have actually achieved substantial support, at least in elite circles and in the practice of the Supreme
Court. In this respect, then, the amendment actually has more in
common with the founding generation's Eleventh Amendment, clarifying the importance of state sovereign immunity and overturning the
Supreme Court's misinterpretation of the constitutional design and
judicial overreach. 369 The CRRA is, then, an amendment well within
the original reform spirit of the Bill of Rights and the Philadelphia
Constitution, reinforcing both documents and reflecting the implicit
political judgment of the Founders as to the nature of structural constitutional reform. In particular, it would complement the Bill of
Rights by clarifying the limits that the basic structural values of the
Philadelphia Constitution place on judicial review of the Bill's provisions, thereby correcting mistaken structural practices the Framers of
the Bill of Rights did not foresee and had thus had no reason to expressly prohibit-those surrounding the rise of an anti-republican,
anti-populist federal judiciary.
C.

Evaluating the Amendment

Even if a judicial restraint proposal such as the CRRA falls within
the spirit of the Bill of Rights, it is possible that it is still deeply flawed
as a practical matter and thus inferior to amendment proposals already placed on the table by earlier generations of republican reformers. Furthermore, one might criticize both the general idea of a
judicial restraint amendment and the particular amendment put forth
here. It therefore makes sense to attempt to evaluate both the general
idea and the specific proposal, even if this must be done in a somewhat rough-and-ready fashion given space constraints. One might
look, then, at three related lines of inquiry: (1) potential effectiveness
in limiting expansive judicial power; (2) relative likelihood of ratification at some point in the foreseeable future; and, finally, (3) political
and educative value as a mere proposal in complementing and furthering political reform efforts.
1. Effectiveness in Limiting Judicial Power
a.

Direct Effects of the Amendment on the Judiciary:
Promoting Self-Restraint

What, then, would be the advantages of the CRRA if it was actually ratified? Would it effectively limit expansive judicial power, keep369

See supra Part III.D.
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ing the Supreme Court within its constitutional limits and promoting
populist aspirations without impairing unduly the Court's legitimate
constitutional functions? A critic might contend that such a provision
would simply require judges to enforce the amendment themselves,
allowing them to dilute it substantially through the very sort of politically driven "creative" interpretation the amendment was meant to
prohibit. Indeed,judges might even attempt to stand the amendment
on its head, arguing that its provisions somehow support more expansive judicial power, perhaps by recognizing that judges sometimes
have some degree of discretion or that they cannot always be wholly
apolitical. There is, of course, a measure of truth in these points.
There is something paradoxical about using a textual provision that
will be interpreted by judges to direct those same judges' interpretation of other textual provisions, particularly when the provision is premised upon distrust of the judiciary's ability to understand or
willingness to respect the constitutional limits placed on its own
power. Still, one must be careful not to underestimate the direct and
indirect effect such an express provision might have on judicial behavior, even as a purely hortatory and commonsensical matter.
First, with the passage of this amendment, it seems certain that
basic structural constitutional issues relating to judicial power would
be brought to the fore as overt questions of structural interpretation
concerning the constitutional limits of the judicial power. By clarifying and emphasizing the basic point that expansive judicial review by
the Court can itself be a violation of the Constitution and is subject to
constitutional objection and political criticism, the CRRA would ensure serious debate about the proper scope of the authority of the
Supreme Court under the Constitution, at least in any case involving a
controversial use of the judicial power. In particular, dissenting Justices are very likely to raise CRRA-based objections to the Court's decisions, asserting that the majority's exercise of judicial review violates
the Constitution. Plainly, dissents of this sort will pressure the Justices
engaging in judicial overreach to address the question of the constitutional scope ofjudicial power in their opinions and to reconcile their
use of judicial review with the judicial restraint amendment. Thus,
discussion of the question of the constitutional limits of the power of
the Supreme Court-so seldom raised and debated on the Court today-would be very difficult for the Court to avoid in its decision
making.
Second, one can fairly assume that the members of the Supreme
Court possess a sincere desire to enforce the Constitution to the best
of their ability and understanding and that they do not wish to violate
the Constitution by exceeding the scope of their authority. Certainly,
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the language of the amendment-and likely context of its passagewould make it quite difficult for a Justice holding a highly expansive
conception of the judicial power to make a plausible claim in good
faith that his view is consistent with the CRRA, given the amendment's
express requirements thatjudges exercise "restraint," ground their decisions "firmly" in traditional legal materials, "minimize" their political
discretion, "strive" to be "non-ideological," and strike down laws only
in "clear" cases.3 7 1 Thus to the extent that the plain language and
obvious import of the provision discourages judicial expansionism,
the members of the Court would likely react to it in good faith and
embrace more restrained judicial philosophies, shifting the entire
spectrum of the debate over judicial power substantially in the direction of judicial restraint. In short, then, a judicial restraint amendment would both tend to force members of the Court to defend
expansive judicial power in express terms as a constitutionally sound
use of the Court's power and also to make it much more difficult for
them to do so in a plausible and good faith manner.
b.

Indirect Effects of the Amendment on the Judiciary:
Checking the Courts

Even so, it is quite possible that the amendment's greatest impact
on the courts will occur indirectly through the political process and
through popular (i.e., political) enforcement efforts. It is often forgotten that the founding generation did not value the provisions of
the original Bill of Rights primarily for what they thought judges
would do with them, but rather for the important political and educative consequences they expected the amendments would have for political debate and culture. 37' Indeed, by far the most common
understanding among the Founders of the chief value of a bill or declaration of rights was the express political standard it could provide
the people for judging for themselves whether their governmental actors, including judges, were acting unconstitutionally. 37 2 Its value,
then, lies in the way it would politically empower objections to the
violation of certain rights by the government. Madison and other
Founders also valued a bill of rights much more for its educative function, for the way in which a solemn declaration of political principle in
the Constitution could help to inculcate basic precepts of free govern370
371
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ment in the national sentiment and thus counteract the impulses of
3
interest and passion.

73

Similarly, simply rendering the Constitution's implicit structural
requirement of judicial restraint explicit and strongly emphasizing it
in its own particular textual provision is likely to have important long-.
term political and educative consequences. First, the amendment will
indeed establish an immediate express judicial restraint political standard for judicial behavior against which the actual practices of the
judges can be measured to determine if those practices themselves
violate the Constitution. As some of the Founders recognized this political function of a Bill of Rights is of much greater importance when
the governmental actor in question is not elected, increasing the likelihood of elite tyranny against the will of the people. 3 74 Such an express provision, given the weakness of democratic controls on the
federal courts, is of particular importance in this area as a political
standard and rallying point for critics of judicial overreach. Voters,
representatives, and even dissenting Justices, rather than simply decrying 'judicial activism," could point directly to the CRRA, arguing
much more persuasively that extravagant uses of judicial power are
explicitly unconstitutional. What this would mean is that every expansive exercise of judicial power would provoke immediate and serious
questions as to its own structural constitutionality under the new
amendment, raising structural-interpretive issues as to the proper judicial role in a more obvious, direct, easily understandable, and overtly
judicial restraint form. There is every reason to believe that this would
encourage a much more active use of checks on the judicial process,
involving the traditional "debate, legislate, litigate" and "nominate"
strategies, as well as the promotion of other methods of checking the
Court. It would thus significantly chill the expansive exercise of the
judicial power.
Second, the amendment will also serve an educative function,
helping to entrench the political truths most directly related to the
constitutional requirement ofjudicial restraint into our national sentiment, as fundamental maxims of free government, and counteracting
the use of expansive judicial power for narrow partisan or ideological
ends such as in Dred Scott, Lochner, and Roe.375 In particular, it will
sensitize American political culture to the simple incompatibility of
expansive judicial power with other fundamental constitutional values
373 See supra Part III.C.4.
374 See GOLDWIN, supra note 269, at 72; RAKOVE, supra note 132, at 336.
375 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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such as popular sovereignty, representative democracy, separation of
powers, and federalism. The doctrine ofjudicial review has obscured
the important nature of the constitutional limits that other foundational constitutional values implicitly place on the judiciary's powers.
This reform amendment will raise the salience of this insight and underscore the importance of a restrained judiciary to the integrity of
the constitutional design and the preservation of the rights of citizens.
It will therefore foster a larger political climate conducive to checking
the judiciary.
It will further help ordinary citizens, legislators, and even judges
to recognize that the arbitrary judicial imposition of moral-political
conclusions with which they may strongly agree is deeply repugnant to
both the foundational structural principles of the Constitution and
the fundamental rights which the design of the Constitution protects,
reflects, and instantiates. It will therefore discourage attempts to bypass the ordinary amendment processes that are subject to the Constitution's strict structural-procedural requirements in favor of
petitioning the judiciary to engage in "super-legislative" judicial policymaking. Such behavior, however tempting in light of ever-present
political passions and interests, is still ultimately factious, tyrannical,
and as illegitimate as political censorship or the disenfranchisement
of voters with whom one disagrees politically. The amendment will,
finally, reinforce the American people's fundamental commitment to
basic constitutional values. It is quite evident, then, that the educative
value of such a reform amendment could be immense, perhaps altering the way in which Americans think about judges, courts, and the
Constitution. The amendment could promote the restoration of
something closer to the Founders' vision of the constitutional design
in light of the populist evolution of the American political tradition.3 7" Ultimately, therefore, a president, congressman, dissenting
judge, or ordinary citizen could invoke the CRRA and the strongly
held American beliefs it would reinforce and foster to correct expansionist judicial decisions.
2.

Reinforcing Crucial Constitutional Insights
a.

The Crucial Relation of Rights and Structures

It is worth emphasizing that the CRRA would clarify, emphasize,
and reinforce several additional and broader crucial constitutional insights. It would, for instance, make textually explicit the founding
376 Obviously, a great deal of this change would occur during the debates stirrounding the proposal and ratification of the amendment.
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generation's understanding of the (often neglected) intimate relationship between constitutional structures and constitutional rightsa view we have seen displayed in the original understanding of the Bill
of Rights, the Philadelphia Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, and the Virginia Declaration. 377 In particular, the amendment
would underscore the simple but decisive fact that basic structural values directly instantiate our fundamental participatory rights and protect our non-participatory rights indirectly by diffusing and balancing
political power and by promoting civic virtue among voters and officeholders. Therefore, the CRRA could strongly emphasize the point
that the security of our rights is ultimately dependent upon the integrity of the constitutional structure. Indeed, the amendment's suggested title straightforwardly attests the simple truth that only by
reestablishing the fundamental principles of the American constitutional design can one hope fully to restore genuine constitutional
rights, including the full substance of the basic right to political
participation.
b.

Supreme Court Constitutional Violations

The amendment would also work to clarify and emphasize the
simple precept that the Supreme Court itself can violate the Constitution, promoting the view, quite familiar to the Founders, that judges,
as well as voters, legislators, and executives, pose a potential threat to
our basic law and to our political liberties. A moment's reflection
shows this to be true, but the Court's role as primary interpreter of the
Constitution has tended to obscure this simple fact. 378 Indeed, the

Court itself is a creation of the Constitution, its power is limited by the
Constitution, and its decisions can violate the Constitution by exceeding the authority of Article III and by conflicting with the structural
principles of the Constitution.3- 79 There should be no doubt that a
Supreme Court decision striking down a state or federal law as unconstitutional can itself be as unconstitutional as any law passed by a state
legislature or Congress if the exercise of judicial power exceeds the
scope of the Court's proper authority under Article III or undermines
constitutional structures. An express articulation of even a broad standard for proper judicial decisionmaking within implied constitutional
limits and placed in the Constitution as the "Twenty-Eighth Amendment" would greatly strengthen and reinforce this crucial insight.
Moreover, the clarification of this important constitutional principle
377
378
379

See supra Part II.
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would likely have profound consequences over time for the political
culture regarding use of the various avenues for correcting judicial
mistakes and constitutional violations.
c.

Guarding the Guardians

And, indeed, if the Supreme Court, the institution widely viewed
reflexively as the guardian of the Constitution, can and does violate
the Constitution, the question then arises: who will guard the guardians? A judicial restraint amendment will help to render more intelligible to judges, scholars, and the public the principle, widely accepted
at the founding, that the President and Congress have serious roles to
play in checking the Supreme Court and containing its power within
the limits set by the Constitution. 83 0 This point clearly follows from
sections 1, 2, and 3 of the CRRA, but it is particularly emphasized in
section 4, which recognizes that the Court, as Hamilton expected, is
subject to the same system of checks and balances as the other
branches of the federal government. 8 1
Section 4 of this amendment would also recognize that the question of the range and nature of legitimate political checks on the judiciary is a constitutional question that must necessarily be answered by
the democratically elected political branches independently of the
views of the judiciary. Indeed, even the now widely accepted doctrine
of judicial supremacy reinforces rather than refutes this basic point.
Obviously, the doctrine of judicial supremacy is not based upon the
Supreme Court's bare assertion of that power in, say, United States v.
Nixon 38 2 or Cooper v. Aaron.38 3 That claim would simply be tautological, justifying judicial supremacy in terms of adherence to the Supreme Court's decisions and justifying adherence to the Supreme
Court's decisions in terms of judicial supremacy. Rather, judicial
supremacy is necessarily based upon the executive and legislative
branches' independent judgment respecting the scope of judicial
power in the Constitution's design for government. The coordinate
political branches have already, of necessity, made an independent,
i.e., departmentalist, (provisional) judgment concerning the proper
role for courts in the framework of government created by the Constitution. Thus, section 4 of the CRRA, while not displacing the practice
of judicial supremacy, recognizes that judicial supremacy has itself a
necessarily departmentalist basis-the conclusion of all three
380
381
382
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See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78, 82 (Alexander Hamilton).
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branches of the federal government in favor of judicial supremacy384
and is subject to revision upon that same basis.
Thus, whether the elected branches of government will continue
to adhere to an interpretation of the constitutional design that includes the practice of judicial supremacy-and thus whether their legitimate checking actions have to be consistent with that practice-is
inherently a question that cannot be resolved by the judiciary
alone.3 85 It is worth noting here that judicial supremacy has been rejected earlier in our history on constitutional grounds related to the
separation of powers by Thomas Jefferson, AndrewJackson, and Abraham Lincoln, the last of these in the context of the Dred Scott decision,
slavery, and the citizenship of free African-Americans. 3 86 Moreover,
even if a general rejection of judicial supremacy were thought unde384 Section 5 of the CRRA also ensures that it cannot be read as an endorsement
ofjudicial supremacy, although it clearly does not constitutionalize a rejection of judicial supremacy.
385 For a recent rejection of judicial supremacy and endorsement of coordinate
role or departmentalist approach, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous
Branch:Executive Power To Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994). For a defense

ofjudicial supremacy, see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On ExtrajudicialConstitutionalInterpretation, 110 t-LRv. L. REV. 1359 (1997).
386 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, XI, 50-51 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903) ("The opinion which
gives to the judges the right to decide what laws are constitutional and what are not,
not only for themselves in their own sphere of action, but for the legislature and
executive also in their spheres, would make the judiciary a despotic branch."); Andrew Jackson, Message on Veto of the Bank Bill (July 10, 1832), in 2 A COMPILATION
OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 576, 582 (James D.
Richardson ed., 1961) (vetoing the Bank of the United States as unconstitutional despite the Supreme Court's ruling to the contrary and declaring that "[t] he opinion of
the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has
over the judges, and on that point the President is independent of both"); Abraham
Iincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc. No. 101-10, at 139 (1989) ("The candid citizen
must confess that if the policy of the government, upon vital questions, affecting the
whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant
they are made, in ordinary litigation between parties, in personal actions, the people
will have ceased, to be their own rulers, having, to that extent, practically resigned
their government into the hands of that eminent tribunal."). On departmentalism
and Lincoln's position, see also ARKES, supra note 257, at 42 (discussing the Lincoln
administration's issuance of passports and patents to free African-Americans as citizens of the United States despite the Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott, holding
that blacks, slave or free, could not be U.S. citizens); and Hadley Arkes, Prudent Warnings and Inprudent Reactions, in THE END OF DEMOCRACY?, supra note 243, at 44-85, 79
(observing that departmentalism is "already embedded in the Constitution and confirmed in notable precedents-namely, Lincoln's teaching on the authority of the
political branches to interpret the Constitution and limit the power of the courts").
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sirable given the doctrine's obvious strengths and its status as a settled
constitutional practice, the elected branches should still seriously reconsider their support forjudicial supremacy at the margins, that is, as
applied to judicial constitutional violations. The question here is one
of a simple modification of the application of the doctrine of judicial
supremacy as applied to judicial decisions that are not "mere" mistakes by the Court about constitutional meaning, which the branches
would continue to regard as "supreme," but rather decisions that are
themselves judicial constitutional violations undermining foundational constitutional principles, structures, and rights of republican
government. 38 7 Such a marginal modification of judicial supremacy,
as it applies to judicial violations of the Constitution, is worth serious
consideration, given the dangers the Court itself poses to the
Constitution.
In short, then, the potential bases for interpretations of the constitutional design allowing for more equitable distributions of interpretive power across the three branches of the federal government
warrant continued thought and debate. The CRRA could revive these
lines of argument and promote serious political debate about the relationship of constitutional structure to the institutional dimensions of
constitutional interpretation by making textually explicit these implicit constitutional principles relating to the checking functions of
the elected branches and the inevitably departmentalist foundations
of judicial supremacy. Such an amendment, then, would very likely
help to shift an important degree of power (back) from the judiciary
to the President and Congress, helping to re-establish the judiciary as
once again "the least dangerous branch."3' 8 8
d.

Populist Constitutional Responsibilities of a Sovereign
People

Finally, the amendment will also render more intelligible to ordinary Americans the notion that the sovereign people in a republic
must retain ultimate interpretive authority with respect to their Constitution. Indeed, the sovereign people must retain final interpretive
responsibility as part of their civic duty to elect men and women who
will defend the integrity of the Constitution-by appointing and confirming Justices who will adhere to the constitutional design and by
discouraging constitutional violations by ambitious Justices. This
point, of course, would tend to follow quite naturally from sections 1,
2, 3, and 4 of the CRRA, but it is also rendered more emphatic in
387
388
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section 5's recognition of the "populist" interpretive authority to the
sovereign people and their elected representatives.
This point is further driven home by section 6's provision echoing the popular sovereignty language of the Virginia Declaration of
Rights, the Declaration of Independence, the Preamble to the Constitution, and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments of the Bill of Rights.
Again, making this implicit constitutional principle textually explicit-in the specific context of the judicial power-will help foster a
political culture that encourages citizens to take democratic self-government more seriously and to resist the temptation to delegate (de
facto or dejure) unchecked political authority to unelectedjudges or
other political actors. The Constitutional Rights Restoration Amendment would, then, tend to reinforce the basic constitutional principle
that the sovereign American people are the ultimate source of the
political authority of the Constitution and that they therefore must
also serve as the Constitution's ultimate interpreters and guardians.
Finally, section 6 of the CRRA borrows language from the Virginia
Declaration of Rights, 38 9 constitutionalizing and thus formally solemnizing a principle of popular vigilance and frequent recourse to fundamental principles, emphasizing the necessity of civic education to
the ultimate preservation of freedom in a democracy.
3.

Promoting Diverse Avenues of Reform

One can see how this amendment would complement other avenues of reform, promoting, facilitating, legitimating, and reinforcing
them. It would make it easier to appoint avowed proponents of judicial restraint to the Court, given the necessity that judges take an oath
to uphold the Constitution, which would include the requirements of
the CRRA. It would make it easier to exhort the sitting Justices to
eschew expansive judicial power, given the obvious language of the
amendment and therefore the greater ease with which persuasive objections to activist decisions could be articulated by other judges,
elected representatives, and citizens. It would thus make it easier to
encourage the President and Congress to engage in moderate checking activities to discourage judicial overreach, especially given both
the need for some sort of check on the judiciary and the language in
the amendment expressly recognizing the constitutional propriety of
such measures. Finally and most fundamentally, it would sensitize the
American people to the notion that judges themselves can violate the
389 "That no free Government, or the blessing of liberty, can be preserved to any
people but ... by frequent recurrence to fundamental principles." VA. DECLARATION
OF RIGHTS

art. XV (1776).
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Constitution, that expansive judicial power directly conflicts with fundamental constitutional principles, that the judicial "guardians" must
themselves be "guarded," and therefore that the Supreme Court like
all governmental institutions must be monitored and subjected to political checks. In sum, the broad political and educative consequences
of such an amendment would go a long way toward re-establishing
judicial restraint as a constitutional norm and restoring the republican constitution to its original vigor. It would thus promote the fulfillment of the populist democratic aspirations of our evolving
constitutional tradition. Finally, given the predominance of anti-populist elites in the judicial process, a populist measure strongly facilitating political checks on the judiciary through educative and political
effects is likely the best practical measure for enforcing constitutional
limits on thejudiciary-at least without radically altering the structure
of the Constitution or significantly undermining the ability of the judiciary to perform its central functions.
4.

Pluralism, Judicial Restraint, and Democratic Debate

Judges would likely react to the CRRA directly and would be
forced to react to it indirectly by virtue of its wider political and educative consequences. The amendment therefore would foster judicial
restraint and strongly discourage the exercise of expansive judicial
power. Of course, just as judicial restraint is consistent with a number
of more particular conceptions of the judicial role, a restraint amendment would leave room for interpretation and reasonable disagreement with respect to the precise contours of the proper judicial role.
For instance, whether the proper judicial role best reflects the broad
judicial philosophy of an Oliver Wendell Holmes, a Benjamin Cardozo, a Felix Frankfurter, a John Marshall Harlan III, a Byron White,
or of someone else broadly in the restraint camp,s 0° would still be
390 For instance, Justices across the current spectrum on the Court have serious
claims to important aspects of the judicial restraint mantle. justice Scalia's general
support for textualism, originalism, and traditionalism as interpretive approaches and
his emphatic rejection of discretionary judicial policymaking on controversial social

issues such as abortion are obviously central aspects of any sound theory of judicial
restraint. See Scalia, supra note 58. On the other hand, justice Breyer's tendency to
defer to Congress as a co-equal branch of government and his deference to government more generally in, say, the area of free speech law and federalism also give him
an arguable claim to represent important facets of judicial restraint, even though his

overall approach to judging is in fact moderately expansive. See Jeffrey Rosen, Modest
Proposal,THE NEW REPUBLIC,Jan. 14, 2002, at 22-25; see also Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 377 (2001) (Breyer, J. dissenting) (arguing that the
Court should not have declared 42 U.S.C. § 12202 unconstitutional because "Con-
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largely an open question. And, no doubt, there would also be attempts (though, one imagines, largely disingenuous) to defend more
expansive conceptions of judicial power as meeting the amendment's
requirements, despite its plain language concerning the firmness of
the legal grounding in traditional legal materials, the minimizing of
judicial political discretion, and the "clear" mistake standard as well as
its obvious purpose of limiting actual abuses of judicial power.
What is obvious, then, is that the language and structural logic of
the CRRA would serve strongly both directly and indirectly to promote judicial restraint and to de-legitimate expansive judicial power.
Indeed, the point of a judicial restraint amendment is certainly not to
settle all questions with respect to the proper judicial role, much less
choke off debate within reasonable limits, but rather to (1) indicate,
however roughly, the outer limits of judicial power under the Constitution through express language, and (2) insure that voters and their
elected representatives, as well as elites and unelected judges, determine the more specific answers to questions of judicial power within
the broader ambits of judicial restraint. Such an express political debate about the constitutional limits of the judicial power would revive
an important tradition of vigorous extra-judicial constitutional interpretation. In this context, then, a continuing debate about the
proper role for the judiciary would be a very healthy expression of
democratic self-government.
D.

Comparative Likelihood of Ratification

The reform proponents of judicial restraint are likely to find the
potential benefits of a judicial restraint amendment quite inspiring,
but it still does not alter the simple fact that the CRRA would be controversial and that a controversial amendment is unlikely to be ratified. What, then, can be said about its relative degree of
controversiality and its relative likelihood of ratification in comparison to other amendment proposals?
In fact, the appeal of this amendment could be fairly widespread,
extending well beyond the typical contemporary originalist critic of
judicial activism. First, the amendment is fairly modest in nature compared to other prominent proposals for the abolition of judicial review or the creation of a congressional override of the Supreme
Court. Indeed, the judicial restraint amendment avoids radical strucgress reasonably could have concluded that the remedy before us constitutes an 'appropriate' way to enforce this basic equal protection requirement"); Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98, 144-58 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that by halting the manual
recount in Florida, the Court inappropriately and hastily crafted its own remedy).
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tural innovations and simply reflects an understanding of the judicial
role that is likely quite close to that of the "man on the street," a common-sense, pre-analytic understanding of what law is and what judges
are supposed to do."I In fact, there is good reason to think ordinary
Americans view "law" as something quite distinct from "politics" and
further believe that judges should apply the "law," refrain from pursuing "political" agendas from the bench, and respect the Constitution's
structural commitment to the democratic process. 39 2 The reform
amendment is also formulated broadly enough to include virtually all
opponents of extravagant judicial power, including non-originalists,
but it is still narrow enough-given its emphasis on firmly grounding
decisions in traditional legal materials, minimizing political discretion, striving to be apolitical, and striking down laws only in clear cases
of unconstitutionality-so that its most natural reading and obvious
import is strongly prohibitive of expansive judicial decisionmaking.
Further, the amendment proposal could also avoid the most serious
charges of radicalism, given not only its common-sense and moderate
restraint appeal, but also that it is simply a declaratory amendment
that does not actually alter the Constitution in any substantive way but
merely makes its preexisting, implicit constitutional principles textually explicit for the obvious purposes of clarity and emphasis. It would
therefore avoid the political pitfalls associated with indisputably structurally innovative attempts to amend the Constitution, such as placing
electoral controls on judges-including the necessity of overcoming
the full weight of the (quite salutary) procedural conservatism of the
American people in the area of constitutional change.
In fact, the CRRA may well have the potential to win the support
of a major political party, given both the Republican Party's strong
criticism of judicial activism in recent decades3 93 and the recent Re39] DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 50, at 3, 5-6.
392 Id.
393 The 1996 Republican Party Platform's discussion of the judiciary reads in part:
"The federal judiciary, including the U.S. Supreme Court, has overstepped its authority tinder the Constitution. It has usurped the right of citizen legislators and popularly elected executives to make law by declaring duly enacted laws to be
,unconstitutional' through the misapplication of the principle ofjudicial review." Reptiblican Nat'l Comm., The 1996 Republican Party Platform, reprinted in Prosperity, Self
Government and "Moral Clarity", 1996 CQ ALMANAC D-21, D-27. TilE 2000 Republican
Party Platform also endorses judicial restraint, noting,
The sound principle of judicial review has turned into an intolerable presumption of judicial supremacy. A Republican Congress, working with a Republican president, will restore the separation of powers and reestablish a
government of law. There are different ways to achieve that goal-setting
terms for federal judges, for example, or using Article IIt of the Constitution
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publican trend of supporting constitutional amendments as a means
of political reform, including a balanced-budget amendment, a
human-life amendment, a school-prayer amendment, and a flag-protection amendment. 394 Notably, the last three Republican amendment proposals are clearly tied to overturning activist Supreme Court
decisions which would themselves likely have been constitutionally
suspect if decided under a judicial restraint amendment. In short,
then, the mainstream of the Republican Party has shown itself quite
willing to support numerous amendments to the Constitution in recent years, to support amendments specifically to overturn activist Supreme Court decisions, and to declare expansive judicial power
incompatible with important constitutional values such as the separation of powers and representative democracy. There is, then, at least
some reason to hope that a substantial portion of the mainstream of
the Republican Party could be brought to support the CRRA or some
other version of a judicial restraint amendment not involving radical
structural innovations likely to provoke immediate mainstream objections. There is also real hope that even some degree of support for
the amendment could be found in progressive and Democratic Party
circles, despite their generally stronger partisan reasons for supporting judicial activism. 395 Such hope stems from the consistent, longstanding, principled opposition to judicial activism espoused by such
voices of liberal reason as The New Republic,3 9 6 the disenchantment
to limit their appellate jurisdiction-but the most important factor is the
appointing power of the presidency. We applaud Governor Bush's pledge to

name only judges who have demonstrated that they share his conservative
beliefs and respect the Constitution.
Republican Nat'l Comm., The 2000 Republican Party Platform, reprinted in Republicans
Adopt "Uplifting and Visionary" Party Platform, 2000 CQ ALMANAC D-22, D-44.
394 See, e.g., Km, supra note 140, at 426-60.

395

One can note here the many progressive or liberal decisions of the Warren

Court as well as Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S 113 (1973). See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 42;
SCHWARTZ, supra note 23, at 263-85, 334 (noting the two broad principles of the "activism" of the Warren Court, "nationalism" and "egalitarianism").
396 As Jeffrey Rosen has recently observed, "From its founding, The New Republic
has resisted [the] cynical claim" of legal realists, critical race theorists, and legal
pragmatists that law is merely a form of politics. Rosen, supra note 11, at 18. Indeed,
Rosen continues,
From Learned Hand and Felix Frankfurter to Alexander Bickel, the editors
of this magazine have insisted that, precisely because legal arguments are so

malleable, judges must exercise radical self-restraint. They should refuse to second-guess the decisions of political actors, except in cases where constitutional arguments for judicial intervention are so powerful that people of
different political persuasions can readily accept them.
Id. (emphasis added).
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with expansive judicial power expressed in recent years by many leftleaning constitutional and political theorists, 3 9 7 the relative moderation of President Clinton's Supreme Court appointees, 9 8 and the potential threat of a new era of conservative judicial activism. 3 9 Support
for the amendment, then, could be quite broad, and thus its likelihood of ratification substantially higher than its more structurally radically innovative rivals.
E. Political and Educative Value as a "Mere" Proposal
Even so, the actual ratification of the CRRA is highly unlikely simply because the ratification of any amendment on an issue as controversial as this one is highly unlikely. There is, for instance, no reason
to suppose that an expansive judicial power amendment designed to
legitimate the Warren Court's routine use of expansive judicial power
would have any chance of ratification. What, then, more precisely,
would be the advantage of simply advocating this amendment even if
its eventual ratification were thought something much more to be
hoped for rather than expected? As discussed, merely advocating a
constitutional amendment has a potentially very powerful political
40
and educative purpose, serving as a prominent "symbol" of reform. 11
Therefore the mere fact of the high probability of an amendment's
ultimate failure to be proposed by Congress or ratified by the states is
simply not a conclusive reason not to advocate it, given that it can still
serve as an important vehicle, indeed, as a catalyst, for political
40
reform. '
In fact, an amendment proposal itself, as Kyvig suggests, can be a
"vivid symbol" of its proponents' constitutional principles, and thus a
judicial restraint amendment could certainly represent and embody
the foundational constitutional principle of judicial restraint, its concomitant structural-interpretive bases, and the constitutional principles which it is designed to promote and restore. 40 2 It could, in
particular, dramatize its proponents' view of the great importance of
the need for constitutional reform in this area and the great depth of
their commitment to that reform. A proposal to amend the constitution, then, could communicate a sense of urgency, seriousness, and
397

See, e.g., Walzer, supra note 62.

398 On the "moderate" minimalism ofJustices Breyer and Ginsberg, see SUNSTEIN,
supra note 1, at xiii. On Breyer as a "restrained" judge, see Rosen, supra note 390, at
21.
399
400

See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 390.
KyviG, supra note 140, at 418-27; see text accompanying note 138.

401

See Kyvic., supra note 140, at 395.

402

Id. at 427.
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gravity. It might, therefore, attract significantly more political attention and support than a simple statement of the same principle in a
speech or political platform. One might think of the way that the
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) served to spearhead and promote
in the 1970s despite its ultimate
the ideals of the feminist movement
40 3
ratification.
achieve
failure to
The CRRA could therefore help to spark a broader and much
more serious debate about judicial power, and, importantly, one focused squarely on the question of the proper role of the Supreme
Court in light of the best construction of the American constitutional
design. Of course, other reform amendments, such as one providing
for a congressional override of the Supreme Court, would also raise
many important structural issues, but they would still place the primary focus on the peripheral issues surrounding the structurally radical nature of the reform. An amendment such as the CRRA would
put the focus more directly on the central structural-interpretive issues and thereby place the proponents of expansive judicial power
precisely where they belong-on the structural defensive. The activist
critics of the amendment would have to explain the putative attractions of an interpretation of the constitutional design allowing for judicial activism, with a judiciary that grounds its decisions only loosely
in traditional legal materials, that maximizes its political discretion,
that pursues ideological or partisan agendas, that strikes down laws
that might not be unconstitutional, and that has the sole power to
determine the scope of its own authority. Indeed, these are precisely
the arguments proponents of expansive judicial power seldom
enough venture and which they should be forced to articulate more
expressly, systematically, and publicly if they continue to defend expansive judicial power as (implicitly) the best interpretation of the
American constitutional design. Finally, it is quite possible that a
show of even moderate support for such an amendment might lead at
least some activist judges to rethink the political prudence, as well as
the constitutional propriety, of expansive judicial power.
A judicial reform amendment would also directly serve as a terse
statement of principle and increase public understanding of the
American constitutional design, including the importance of fundamental structural principles and their relation to individual rights and
judicial power. It would specifically highlight the dubious status of
expansive judicial power in that design for government, emphasizing
its incompatibility with fundamental structural constitutional values,
and the Constitution's evolving democratic promise. It would also
403

Id. at 394-425.
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emphasize the simple but often-forgotten point that the Court itself
can violate the Constitution by exceeding its authority under Article
III. It would teach, as does the Bill of Rights, that judges as well as
elected representatives must be distrusted, monitored, and checked if
tyranny is to be avoided and rights are to be preserved. In fact, the
CRRA restates, clarifies, reinforces, and emphasizes the basic structural themes of the Constitution and therefore would teach the
proper lessons to the American people, shaping the national senti40 4
ment in a way that the Founders would be likely to approve.
This last point is of particular importance because in recent decades a large number of the Justices of the Supreme Court, in what
amounts to their de facto role as "prophets" of the American "civil
faith,' ' 41 5 have repeatedly thrown their prestige behind -(and thus implicitly "taught") lessons that are fundamentally anti-democratic, antirepublican, anti-federal, and anti-populist in nature. The CRRA or
similar reform amendment could help counter that message and correct the misunderstandings of the spirit of the government that the
Court has fostered in the spirit of the people. In fact, the political
campaign to have Congress propose and the states ratify the CRRA
would promote republican populism over the anti-republican constitutional elitism fostered by the activism of the Supreme Court or the
simple majoritarianism or legislative supremacy implicit in many other
proposals. Further, one may wonder what lessons other structural
amendments might teach. Would electing Supreme Court Justices
suggest, perhaps, that judging is intrinsically so political that it must
be democratic? Or does the congressional override suggest that the
national legislative majority is in some way supreme over the Constitution-or, perhaps, that it would be better to replace ourjudicial "constitutional law" with a legislative "constitutional politics"? In any
event, it seems clear that these more structurally innovative proposals
would distract from, as well as tend to distort, the fundamental structural lessons that should be clarified and reinforced in constitutional
discourse and the national sentiment. Ajudicial restraint amendment
would communicate both the right structural messages and do so in a
vivid, effective, and solemn manner consistent with the actual gravity
and constitutional status of the issue.

404 The CRRA, also as with the Eleventh Amendment, would overturn a judicial
misinterpretation of the scope of the judicial power under Article III, restoring a
proper understanding of the role of the federal courts in the Constitution's design for
government. See supra Part IlI.D.

405

SEMONCHE,

supra note 346, passim.
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Finally, the political and educative value of a proposal is also tied
to the degree of support and thus exposure and legitimacy it is likely
to achieve. The judicial restraint amendment-as a declaratory rather
than structurally innovative proposal, as one already largely reflective,
at least broadly speaking, of a major political party's general view of
judicial power, as well as that of the large majority of ordinary Americans-has the potential to receive significantly greater mainstream
support than its rivals. Therefore, while it is true that a judicial restraint amendment is generally unlikely to be ratified, 40 6 a fact true of
virtually all amendment proposals, a judicial restraint amendment
proposal has great political and educative value simply as a way of focusing, structuring, and promoting debate. In the final analysis, given
its potentially vast political and educative effects, the CRRA is complementary to more diffuse reform efforts, and thus the resources spent
on its behalf would not be wasted-even if the amendment failed to
be proposed by Congress or ratified by the states.
F

Populist ConstitutionalAspirations

What are the ultimate constitutional aspirations of a judicial restraint reform amendment? It is difficult in a discussion such as this
one to avoid a heavy concentration on the negative face of the amendment: opposition to expansive judicial power. Therefore, it is also
worth strongly (re-) emphasizing here in the context of evaluating the
amendment the fundamental reasons for opposition to expansive judicial power, to present firmly and clearly the important populist "positive face" of judicial restraint and of the judicial restraint reform
amendment proposal. In brief, the positive face of judicial restraint
includes support for: (1) the traditional architecture of the American
constitutional design as amended in the direction of robust populist
406

And if it were ratified, it would only be after a successful judicial reform move-

ment had created a political environment broadly opposed to expansive judicial
power.

See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114

HARv. L. REv. 1457, 1505 (2001) (arguing that "our constitutional order would look
little different if a formal amendment process did not exist" and that "formal amendments serve the function of mopping up pockets of resistance to a national consensus,
making what otherwise would be merely a dominant rule into the universal rule").
Notably, Strauss does not consider the value of amendment proposals as a way of
structuring and promoting a chiefly political and educative reform campaign that
both supports ratification and also (thus) partly obviates the actual need for the
amendment. The reform campaign for the ERA is instructive in this regard. Nor
does Strauss seriously consider any political and educative value amendments might
have post-ratification in shaping the evolution of American politics and political culture. A judicial restraint amendment would involve both of these potential reasons
for recourse to the amendment process.
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democratization; (2) the basic overlapping moral, political, and constitutional principles of the American constitutional tradition, including popular sovereignty, representative democracy, separation of
powers, federalism, presentment and other basic structural principles
related to checks and balances; (3) the individual participatory rights
to vote and hold office instantiated in the American constitutional design as part of America's evolving populist political ethos; and (4) the
individual rights to "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness," 407
which are protected indirectly through the Constitution's plan of diffusing and balancing political power, making such power accountable
to the people and promoting civic virtue among citizens as voters and
office-holders. Ultimately, then, it is the desire to preserve, restore,
promote, and reinforce these fundamental moral, political, and constitutional principles, structures, and rights that animates support for
a judicial restraint amendment.
Additionally, support for the amendment is also driven by a
closely related desire to revive and reinvigorate the American tradition of serious debate about constitutional matters outside of thejudicial process in the executive and legislative arenas of the state and
federal governments. Not only has the assertion of activist judicial
power expanded the reach of constitutional matters and thus the
scope of judicial power into matters long thought beyond the authority of the judiciary, but it has also often led political actors to abdicate
their own constitutional responsibilities. 408 It seems clear that the
once robust American tradition of serious debate about constitutional
matters in the political arena has been vitiated by growth of the judicial power and its intrusion into controversial political matters. 40 9 In
particular, the Supreme Court in recent years has vigorously asserted
an especially extreme judicial supremacist view of American constitutional law that denies other branches of government significant political or interpretive authority even where there is undeniable structural
and textual support for such authority. 4 10 Most notably, the Court has
reduced the section 5 power of Congress to enforce the provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment to a minor power only narrowly supplementary to the decisions of the Court. 4 1I The Court also apparently
407 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
408 See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 21, at 57-65.
409 For a discussion in support of including extra-judicialexercises of constitutional
interpretation in the "canon" of constitutional law, see J. M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of ConstitutionalLaw, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 1003-06 (1998).
410 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
411 See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364-65 (2001)
(stating that "[s] ection 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to
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intends zealously and aggressively to police these newly created
boundaries on congressional power, denying Congress the power to
enforce its own reasonable understandings of the requirements of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment even as understood by the Supreme Court. 4 12 Thus, part of the ultimate aspirations of a judicial

restraint amendment should be not only to create more breathing
space for rights-based structural values, but also to recognize and revitalize the once-strong tradition of serious democratic political debate
about constitutional matters.
It is worth emphasizing that the one common thread running
through the above concerns is advocacy of a robustly populist understanding of the Constitution: an understanding that recognizes the
populist super-majoritarian foundations of the Constitution; 41 " an understanding that recognizes the populist democratic form of government established by the Constitution and its amendments and thus
the full dignity of legislation, of legislatures, and of voters; 4 14 and an
understanding that also recognizes the important populist dimension
4 15
of robust political debate about the meaning of the Constitution.
The advocacy of this form of populist constitutional law obviously necessitates opposition to the elite disempowerment of ordinary Americans through expansive judicial power 416 and elite manipulation of
public opinion through misleading judicial invocations of basic symbols of legitimacy such as the Bill of Rights. 4 17 A judicial restraint

amendment is thus an important part of the project of promoting a
truly populist vision of the Constitution and American constitutional
law. In sum, it is a positive belief in the populist rights, structures, and
enforce the substantive guarantees contained in § 1 by enacting 'appropriate legislation' . . . [but] it is the responsibility of the Court, not Congress, to defined the sub-

stance of constitutional guarantees").
412 Id. (stating "§ 5 legislation reaching beyond the scope of § 1 actual guarantees
must exhibit 'congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or

remedied and the means adopted to that end"').
413 U.S. CONST. pmbl. (stating that the Constitution arises from "[w]e the People
), arts. V (requiring two thirds of either both houses of
of the United States ....
Congress or the state legislatures to propose a Constitutional Amendment, as well as
requiring three quarters of either the state legislatures or state conventions to ratify
the amendment), VII (providing that nine of the thirteen colonies agreed to ratification of the Constitution).
414 Waldron, supra note 20; see alsoJeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, 54
MD. L. REv. 633 (1995).
415 TUSHNET, supra note 21, at 177-94.
416 See generally GLENDON, supra note 17, at 111-73 (describing the expansion of
judicial power throughout history).
417 HUNTER, supra note 345, at 147-48.
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practices at the heart of the evolving constitutional and political tradition that provides the driving force behind both support for judicial
restraint and advocacy of a judicial reform amendment.
G.

Populist Means and Ends

Moreover, a judicial restraint amendment is especially well-suited
for promoting populist constitutional law, given the harmony of the
populist means selected and the ends sought. As to means, first, a
judicial restraint amendment itself involves the use of a strongly populist form of constitutional law-an amendment to the Constitution
necessarily involving a broad national political debate about the constitutional design in order to meet the supermajority requirements of
the amendment process. Second, the judicial restraint amendment is
meant to function in a populist and civic fashion both as a "mere"
proposal and an actual amendment through its political and educative
effects in shaping American political debate and culture. 41 8 Thus,

both recourse to the amendment process itself and the use of a political and educative amendment premised upon political enforcement
are populist means or methods of constitutional reform. As to the
end sought, the objective of a judicial restraint amendment is precisely to promote a more populist understanding of the structure and
foundation of the Constitution and to reinvigorate the American tradition of serious debate in the political arena about the meaning of
the Constitution. Thus, the means of reform-a political and educative measure in the form of an amendment to the Constitution-and
the ends of the reform-limiting the judicial power in order to promote popular sovereignty, robust representative democracy, and revival of serious extra-judicial debate about constitutional matters-are
both populist in nature. In fact, the judicial restraint amendment
would deploy a vigorous form of populist constitutional law in order
to achieve a more populist form of constitutional law.
This harmony of ends and means is important for two reasons.
First, this very method of attempting to restrain judicial power in order to promote a more populist ethos involves an exercise of that populist ethos and thus reinforces the ultimate ends of the project. It
thus avoids the internal tension and even outright contradictions of
attempts to promote democracy by recourse to undemocratic actors, a
structural strategy premised on an uneasy combination of democratic

418

See sulyra Part IV.C.1-3.
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aspirations and intrinsic distrust of the democratic process. 419 Second, given the elite dominance of American constitutional law, there
may be no other feasible remedy for expansive judicial power other
than attempting to shift the debate outside of narrow, elite circles,
promoting a broader popular political debate about the constitutional
limits on the judicial power. Indeed, such a debate is probably a prerequisite to any serious attempt to restrain the judicial power though
the use of the Constitution's checks and balances. As discussed, ajudicial restraint amendment is designed to spark and structure precisely such a serious debate about constitutional meaning in the
political arena. Therefore, the harmony of populist ends and means
on display in the judicial restraint amendment has an important practical significance for judicial reform.
CONCLUSION

The persistence of the regular use of expansive forms of the judicial power in recent decades presents a serious structural constitutional problem that demands a remedy more far-sighted and farreaching than a narrow "debate, litigate, legislate" and "nominate"
strategy operating through ordinary political processes. Indeed, there
is good reason to think that ordinary political and educative reform
efforts alone will ultimately fail to reestablish the important constitutional boundaries the federal judiciary has so often violated in recent
decades. A more adequate reform strategy for minimizing the constitutional irregularities of activist judges may involve proposing a structural constitutional reform amendment designed to limit the
judiciary's capacity to exceed its authority. Even so, amendments proposing radical structural innovations in the Constitution's design for
government-such as congressional power to override the Supreme
Court or the abolition of judicial review-are ill-advised for a number
of reasons: their actual consequences are hard to predict; they will do
little to complement or promote other reform efforts; they are likely
to teach the wrong structural lessons to the American people; they
may significantly impair, the Court's legitimate constitutional functions; and they have very little chance of ratification.
One can, however, find inspiration for reform proposals by drawing on the founding generation's profound meditations on the theory
and practice of constitutional government. Indeed, if one wishes to
honor the founding generation's commitment to the core of the
419

See, e.g., ELY, supra note 42, at 102-04 (advocating a "representation-reinforce-

ment" role for unelected judges based in part on the lack of incentives for politically
insulated judges to block the channels of political change).
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American constitutional tradition-a form of constitutional govern-

ment which protects individual rights by establishing democratic institutions, diffusing and balancing political power, and promoting civic
virtue among the sovereign people-one must work to renew the
American people's own commitment to substantive reform in the area
of judicial power. Moreover, one can find a quite specific model for
reform in the founding generation's understanding of the basic principles of republican government, the close relationship between constitutional rights and constitutional structures, and the political and
educative value of solemn declarations of rights and structural principles in foundational and constitutive documents. As this Article's examination of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, the Declaration of
Independence, the Philadelphia Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and
the Eleventh Amendment demonstrates, the founding generation was
deeply committed to fundamental constitutional principles, such as
popular sovereignty, representative democracy, separation of powers,
bicameralism, presentment, and federalism.
The Founders saw these basic structural principles as inextricably
related to individual rights, directly incorporating basic participatory
rights and indirectly "sheltering" non-participatory rights by diffusing
political power and making it accountable to voters. Indeed, in light
of these facts, the populist Ninth Amendment may be read as prohibiting expansive judicial power through its implicit incorporation of
rights-driven structural principles on display in 1791 in the state bills
of rights and in the constitutional commitments of the Declaration of
Independence. Moreover, the founding generation further recognized an important populist and republican principle: that in any
popular form of government the spirit of the people-their civic virtue-and robust political debate about constitutional matters would
provide the ultimate security for individual rights and for the preservation of constitutional government. The Founders therefore strongly
advocated solemnizing in constitutive documents maxims or aphorisms affirming the basic principles of republican government in order to shape, guide, and constrain civic culture and political debate.
Indeed, in documents such as the Virginia Declaration of Rights and
the Bill of Rights, the Founders evinced their faith in a strategy of
protecting rights through the diverse political and educative effects of
formal declarations of rights and structures in basic constitutional
documents. In fact, the Bill of Rights itself was generally understood
by the founding generation as this sort of measure: primarily structural, declaratory, political, and educative in nature.
A judicial restraint reform amendment, such as the Coristitutional Rights Restoration Amendment, should be written in this spirit,
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the populist reform spirit of the original understanding of the Bill of
Rights. A judicial reform amendment should emphasize the structural implications of the American constitutional commitment to republican principles of government for the constitutional exercise of
the judicial power. It should be a declaratory amendment clarifying
the preexisting constitutional limits on the exercise of judicial review
rather than a measure seeking to "improve" the Constitution through
dubious structural innovations. It should be a political and educative
amendment seeking to constrain judicial misconduct both directly
and indirectly by providing an express written standard which will empower political objections to expansive judicial power, thus promoting
political debate and political culture that recognizes the constitutional
requirement of judicial restraint.
Obviously, there is need for further critical evaluation of both the
general idea of a judicial restraint amendment and its potential concrete expressions such as the Constitutional Rights Restoration
Amendment. Still, even at this early stage it should be clear that such
an amendment could be quite effective in limiting expansive judicial
power. For instance, the CRRA's express language and obvious import is incompatible with expansive judicial power, and therefore it
would facilitate constitutional objections to activist decisions while
sensitizing the American people to the dangers ofjudicial violations of
the Constitution. The CRRA could also have significantly broader political support than rival amendment proposals given its strictly declaratory nature and its avoidance of radical structural innovations.
Finally, even as a proposal unlikely to achieve ratification, the CRRA
could still have very important political and educative value: it could
spur structural interpretive debate about the role of courts in the
American constitutional design, raise the political salience of constitutional objections to judicial activism, and help educate the American
people with respect to the Constitution's design and the limited judicial role therein. The CRRA would thus potentially spearhead a diverse range of political and educative reform efforts, such as
appointment of restraintist judges to the federal bench and more vigorous use of the political branches' checks on the judiciary.
In sum, a reform amendment simply declaring the constitutional
imperative of judicial restraint, highlighting its connection to foundational constitutional structures and rights, and identifying the Supreme Court as a potential violator of the Constitution could have
profound, far-reaching, and highly beneficial consequences for the
debate about the proper scope of the judicial power. Indeed, such an
amendment would both restrain the judicial power and promote populist forms of constitutional law by encouraging and shaping serious
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political debate about the meaning of the Constitution, including the
constitutional limits of the judicial power. There is every reason to
suppose that this debate, centered around a formal judicial restraint
amendment, would strongly promote judicial modesty and serve to
promote fundamental constitutional principles such as popular sovereignty, representative democracy, the separation of powers, and federalism from improper judicial incursions. Thus, a judicial restraint
reform amendment could reshape the national sentiment as it relates
to the complex relationship of the judiciary, judicial review, and the
Constitution. Moreover, in light of elite, anti-populist establishment
dominance in the judicial process, deployment of a populist measure
may be the only practical way to enforce the constitutional limits on
the Supreme Court without radically altering the structure of the Constitution. There is, then, good reason to believe that a judicial restraint reform amendment inspired by a profound faith in the
American people and designed as a structural constitutional measure
in the original populist reform spirit of the Bill of Rights will provide
the best means of fulfilling the populist ethos of the American
republic.

